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The Ferguson Effect, which has resulted in de-policing or disengaging from proactive 
community policing in response to increased violence against police since 2014 and fear 
of civil liability, has led to increases in crime and attacks on law enforcement officers. 
Previous research focused on exploring law enforcement officers’ perceptions of media 
and public scrutiny, crime rates, self-legitimacy, and willingness to engage in community 
relations. No studies identified have attempted to predict the source of the Ferguson 
Effect and its effect on crime. Moreover, no studies have conducted a time-series analysis 
of crime and de-policing focusing solely on the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. To 
better understand the phenomenon, Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism was 
applied. Data were analyzed from open-source publications made available by the 
Missouri State Highway Patrol, Missouri Attorney General’s Office, U.S. Census Bureau, 
and American Community Survey, The research intent was to evaluate the relationship 
between crime and de-policing through the replication and expansion of a previous study 
and the use of descriptive and inferential statistical analyses. Findings suggested that 
sources of increases in crime rates extend beyond de-policing and are likely the result of 
organizational factors. This study was important for positive social change because it 
offered insights into the effects of policing on crime. Moreover, the findings of this study 
and future inquiries may be used to evaluate current and future policies and their impact 
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Chapter 1: Introduction of the Study 
Introduction 
Since 2014, law enforcement officers (LEOs) have been criticized by the public 
and media for their use of force against noncompliant subjects, even when force is 
justified. As a result, many agencies have revised their use of force policies. Officers 
have become more reluctant to use force against noncompliant subjects and to engage in 
proactive policing efforts, leading to what has been dubbed the Ferguson Effect. While 
the Ferguson Effect was initially coined to describe distrust of the public for police, 
prompting an increase in crime rates stemming from de-policing efforts, the term has 
evolved to describe the phenomenon of de-policing arising from a fear of civil litigation 
or increased public distrust (MacDonald, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017; Wolfe & Nix, 
2016). 
The use of excessive force by some officers has further enhanced criticism 
leading to an increased reluctance by officers to use force due to fear of public and media 
scrutiny, civil liability, and civil unrest beyond that reluctance emanating from the 
Ferguson Effect (Adams, 2019; Capellan et al., 2019; Deuchar et al., 2018; Morin et al., 
2017; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix & Wolfe, 2017; Tiwari, 2016). Despite the existence of 
research supporting the underlying consequences of the Ferguson Effect, there is a gap in 
knowledge arising from how civil unrest and public scrutiny since 2014 have affected 





An exploration of de-policing in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area was 
conducted through the lens of reciprocal determinism. Albert Bandura’s theory of 
reciprocal determinism is based on the premise that behavioral outcomes are the 
byproduct of continuous and reciprocal interactions between the environment, individual, 
and behavior. Changes in policing behaviors since the events in Ferguson in 2014 may be 
explained through the application of Bandura’s theory. Furthermore, through the analysis 
of state-level Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and Vehicle Stop Report (VSR) databases, 
the quantity and quality of policing and crime trends were measured to determine the 
impact of LEOs’ behaviors related to policing and crime rates. 
Background 
 Selected articles relating to the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and law enforcement 
officers’ perceptions of policing are illustrated here.  
Previous research has focused on exploring officers’ perceptions of media and 
public scrutiny, crime rates, self-legitimacy, and willingness to engage in community 
relations. However, no studies identified have attempted to predict the consequences of 
the Ferguson Effect (i.e., de-policing and alterations in crime trends). Moreover, those 
studies relating to the Ferguson Effect were conducted at single agencies or locales away 
from St. Louis, MO. While relevant studies regarding de-policing and crime rates were 
identified, they were conducted between 2014 and 2015 or focused on a single agency 
far-removed from the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. Deadly force incidents in 





increased reluctance to engage in proactive policing due to fear of civil and criminal 
liability, public and media scrutiny, civil unrest, and job loss. Therefore, a sizeable gap 
regarding de-policing and crime trends associated with the Ferguson Effect in the St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan area exists. Furthermore, this study involves evaluating the 
quantity and quality of policing and crime trends over 10 years while also assessing 
differences in policing and crime across defined regions within the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area. 
Problem Statement 
There is a problem in law enforcement stemming from internal and external 
factors that influence LEOs’ decisions regarding proactive policing and patrol practices 
leading to alterations in crime trends exuding from the Ferguson Effect. The Ferguson 
Effect, or reluctance to engage in proactive policing practices, has negatively impacted 
officers and society, leading to an increase in assaults and injuries to LEOs, de-policing, 
crime rates, and impaired community relations (Capellan et al., 2019; MacDonald, 2019; 
Maguire et al., 2017; Morin et al., 2017; Shjarback et al., 2017). Potential sources for this 
problem include fear of civil liability, public and media criticism, civil unrest, low 
morale, and lack of organizational support. To understand the phenomenon, a quantitative 
approach was undertaken to identify recent crime trends that support the existence of the 
Ferguson Effect through presumed changes in LEOs’ decisions regarding changes in how 





Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand the impact of the 
Ferguson Effect on crime trends in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area, while the intent 
of the study was to understand the extent of de-policing in the St. Louis area by analyzing 
crime data five years before and five years after the Michael Brown shooting. This study 
used statistics from the Missouri State Highway Patrol’s (MSHP) UCR database and the 
Missouri Attorney General’s (MOAG) VSR to assess trends in crime and policing. 
Statistical analyses relating to offense type and frequency, arrests, and searches for 
contraband were also conducted to determine if there is a correlation between de-policing 
and crime rates in the region. Three covariates were also included in the data analysis 
(racial/ethnic make-up, socioeconomic index, number of law enforcement officers). 
Moreover, the analysis of secondary data was essential to understand if there are 
alterations in proactive policing efforts and crime rates either resulting from or 
independent of the Ferguson Effect, thereby supporting or disproving the phenomenon as 
the key factor responsible for increased crime rates in the region. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
RQ1: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 





 H01: There are no annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. 
Ha1: There are annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. 
RQ2: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to 
determine the extent of de-policing occurring in the area? 
 H02: There are no differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring in the area.  
Ha2: There are differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring in the area. 
RQ3: Are there differences in race, socioeconomic index, and the number of 
officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, 





LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to determine the extent of de-
policing occurring within the region? 
H03: There are no differences in terms of differences in race, socioeconomic 
index, and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of 
quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and 
assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time.  
Ha3: There are differences in terms of differences in race, socioeconomic index, 
and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities 
of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and 
fatal injuries for LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time. 
Theoretical Framework 
 Since 2014, LEOs have reduced citizen contacts and engaged in de-policing 
practices to avoid negative media attention, public criticism, civil unrest, and civil 
litigation (Adams, 2019; MacDonald, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017; Wolfe & Nix, 2016). 
This change in behavior in response to threats may be explained through the application 
of Albert Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism as an extension of Bandura’s social 
learning theory. Three interrelated factors influence behavior: the environment, 
individual, and behavior (Bandura, 1978; Bernston & Cacioppo, 2005). The theory is 
based on the continual influence of these three behavioral determinants. 
 While the environment or social forces exert an influence on one’s behavior, an 





environment (Bandura, 1978). The behavioral component is reinforced or shaped through 
environmental or social responses, while the environmental component contains 
reinforcing or punishing stimuli that influence the intensity and frequency of behavior. 
The individual component is comprised of all the personality and cognitive factors that 
underlie behavior (e.g., expectations, motivations, beliefs, unique personality 
characteristics; Bandura, 1978). While Bandura’s social learning theory provides insight 
into human behavior and motivation, the model of reciprocal determinism is best suited 
to explain how and why LEOs alter their behaviors in response to high-profile events and 
perceived threats to their safety and career. Additionally, the model may be applied to 
offenders whose behavior is shaped through a lack of punishment and reinforced by 
changing societal norms where criminal behavior has become acceptable through a lack 
of deterrence. 
Nature of the Study 
This study involved employing a quantitative research design with multiple 
statistical tests, repeated measures of ANOVA, one-way MANOVA, and multiple 
regression to analyze secondary data derived from UCR crime and VSR databases across 
time. Sampling units for this dissertation were time and region, where a single year was 
used as the reference point. The data for each year included all aggregate law 
enforcement agencies in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area as well as agencies within 
the defined regions (St. Louis City, North St. Louis County, West St. Louis County, 





County). Secondary data analysis using descriptive statistics was also employed to 
explain the Ferguson Effect and crime patterns between 2010 and 2019. The statistical 
analyses aided me in identifying crime trends and their relationship with the Ferguson 
Effect. 
Possible Types and Sources of Data 
Data were collected from the MSHP’s UCR database and the MOAG’s VSR that 
included data from every law enforcement agency in the state of Missouri. The data were 
sorted by both agency and region to improve the analysis and align with the first research 
question, whereby only data for the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region were analyzed. 
Additional data were derived from the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
American Community Survey to inform the results by evaluating the effect of the 
confounding variables. 
Definitions 
 De-policing: Withdrawing from proactive policing and patrol practices in 
response to negative publicity perpetrated by the media (Shjarback et al., 2017). 
 Ferguson Effect: A reluctance of LEOs to engage in proactive policing and patrol 
practices due to widespread public and media scrutiny, resulting in increased crime rates 
(MacDonald, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017; Wolfe & Nix, 2016). 
 Law enforcement officer (LEO): Any public servant having both the power and 





firearms and make arrests for violations of the laws of the United States (Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§556.061.32). 
Assumptions 
LEOs are becoming increasingly reluctant to engage in proactive policing and 
patrol practices due to the increased public and media scrutiny stemming from recent 
events involving both justified and excessive uses of force against noncompliant subjects. 
De-policing originated from the events in Ferguson, MO in 2014 due to fears stemming 
from lack of organizational support, public and media criticism, and civil unrest 
(Capellan et al., 2019; Maguire et al., 2017; Morin et al., 2017; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix 
& Wolfe, 2017; Pyrooz et al., 2016; Shjarback et al., 2017; and Wolfe & Nix, 2016). 
Crime rates and assaults on LEOs have also increased due to fears of public reprisal 
(MacDonald, 2019; Maguire et al., 2017; Shjarback et al., 2017). These assumptions have 
led to the development of this study regarding the unintended consequences associated 
with de-policing. 
Scope and Delimitations 
This quantitative study’s scope involved analyzing data derived from the MSHP’s 
UCR and MOAG’s VSR databases. This study also incorporated several covariates 
(racial/ethnic make-up, socioeconomic index, and the number of law enforcement 
officers) to inform results. This study evaluated regional differences within the St. Louis, 





better inform where and why de-policing occurs and its impact on crime rates in the 
region. 
While investigating the effects of the covariates may explain findings, caution 
should be exercised when generalizing these findings across the state of Missouri and the 
U.S. Data for this study were collected from state-level databases involving law 
enforcement agencies in the independent city of St. Louis, St. Louis County, St. Charles 
County, and Jefferson County. Even though all law enforcement agencies employing 
officers who regularly engage in patrol practices and have arrest authority granted by the 
state of Missouri were included in this analysis, the suburban-urban nature of the 
agencies selected further limited the generalizability of the findings. However, both 
internal and external validity were strengthened by the analysis due to the state’s 
reporting requirements and use of validated reporting instruments. Mandatory reporting 
to the state UCR and VSR databases further improved the reliability of results because 
the entire population of interest was used in this analysis. 
I chose this topic due to the increased public and media outrage scrutinizing 
LEOs’ actions, especially in instances involving the use of force. The resulting affront 
arising from the negative publicity has purportedly led to the emergence of the Ferguson 
Effect as well as increases in crime rates across the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region. 
Therefore, the Ferguson Effect should be further explored to determine how high-profile 





adversely impact law enforcement and society, creating a need for law enforcement 
leaders to reevaluate policing strategies, staffing, and training. 
Limitations, Challenges, and Barriers 
 The use of secondary data was an inherent limitation in and of itself. Secondary 
data were collected for a primary purpose that may not necessarily align with the 
purposes of this project. Incomplete or missing information may also pose challenges for 
ensuring each analysis was robust and comparable. Additionally, secondary data 
overlooks the presence of confounding variables or alternative explanations for research 
findings. 
Strengths and Weaknesses 
This study design’s main strength was the quick and easy means by which the 
data were collected. The use of secondary data not only reduces the costs associated with 
developing and deploying an instrument and data collection but also lessens the time 
needed to collect the data. Additionally, using secondary data for analysis allowed for 
multiple variables to be examined and analyzed. Moreover, data analysis consisting of 
data comparisons allowed for multiple types of statistical analyses while also providing 
the ability to generate and test hypotheses (Maxfield, & Babbie, 2016). While data 
comparisons using multiple regression analysis are useful for investigating differences 
between groups, they do not determine which variable has the most influence, leading to 
faulty causal assumptions (Price et al., 2017). Furthermore, the inability to determine 





methodology may also result in bias due to confounding or unidentified variables that 
influence results. To overcome this effect, multiple regression analysis was used to assess 
confounding variables’ effects on crime and policing. 
Barriers 
A potential barrier when using secondary data involves incomplete data or a lack 
of consistency in how the data were reported. Ensuring my analysis and conclusions were 
free from bias by creating a clear separation of my role as a LEO in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area and researcher also presented a challenge. 
Significance 
The results of this study provided much-needed insights into the Ferguson Effect 
and its relationship with crime in the St. Louis, MO region. By analyzing crime trends 
and potential mediating and mitigating factors, law enforcement administrators can 
identify the organizational factors that support de-policing and develop strategies to 
reduce de-policing practices and crime rates. By understanding the relationship between 
crime trends, recent high-profile events, and alterations in policing and patrol practices, 
policymakers and law enforcement administrators can identify community-level solutions 
to reduce crime and de-policing. 
Moreover, improved awareness of the factors that influence LEOs’ decisions will 
help policymakers and law enforcement administrators improve the effectiveness of 
policing practices while also mitigating the risks associated with criminal and civil 





serving and protecting the community; however, task effectiveness is contingent upon 
community cooperation, trust in police, and a willingness to accept responsibility. 
Therefore, to drive change, both law enforcement and society must be willing to 
compromise and understand both law enforcement’s function and the need for proactive 
policing and patrol activities. 
Summary 
De-policing, otherwise known as disengaging from proactive community policing 
in response to increased violence against police since 2014 and fear of civil liability, has 
led to increases in crime and attacks on LEOs (MacDonald, 2019). There has been a 
decrease in arrests, an increase in violent crime rates, and an increase in assaults on LEOs 
(MacDonald, 2019; Maguire et al., 2017). The Ferguson Effect has been perpetuated by 
negative media influences on the public, creating an additional barrier for LEOs to 
overcome (Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix & Wolfe, 2017). Nonetheless, LEOs have changed 
their policing methods in response to the current climate. Therefore, the purpose of this 
study was to examine the impact of policing efforts on crime in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area.  
To evaluate how internal and external influences have impacted LEOs’ behaviors 
regarding de-policing, Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism served as the 
theoretical framework for this study. The model of reciprocal determinism includes three 
interrelated factors which influence behavior: the environment, individual, and behavior 





three constructs results in alterations in the individual, behavior, and environment in 
order to achieve equilibrium. Therefore, the theory was applied to understand trends in 
terms of the quality and quantity of policing and crime rates. Trends in policing and 
crime, then, were expressed through an exploration of quantitative research methods 
using a variety of descriptive and inferential statistical methodologies. 
Chapter 2 provides insight into what is known about the Ferguson Effect as well 
as gaps in knowledge regarding de-policing and crime. In the next chapter, I analyzed 
literature regarding the Ferguson Effect and how it has altered policing practices. The 
chapter furthers my discussion on the Ferguson Effect and how changes in police 
practices are further influenced by the self, one’s behavior, and the environment through 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The Ferguson Effect (i.e., the reluctance to engage in proactive policing practices 
resulting in higher crime rates) purportedly stems from widespread public scrutiny over 
police legitimacy and policing practices, outrage over racial discrimination, and concerns 
regarding the use of excessive or unnecessary force. As a result of this criticism, officers 
reportedly have become less willing to engage in proactive policing measures. Decreased 
engagement in proactive policing is believed to be one of several contributing factors 
responsible for the increasing U.S. crime rates. 
The internal and external factors that influence LEOs’ decisions regarding 
proactive policing and patrol practices have led to alterations in policing behaviors and 
crime trends as a result of the Ferguson Effect. The potential sources for this problem 
include a lack of organizational support, public and media criticism, civil unrest, and low 
morale. To understand the phenomenon, a quantitative approach to research was used to 
identify recent crime trends that support the existence of the Ferguson Effect through 
presumed changes in LEOs’ decisions regarding policing practices.  
While the Ferguson Effect is a widely researched multidisciplinary topic, 
literature pertaining to the theorized mechanisms behind the Ferguson Effect and its 
unintended consequences is limited. Moreover, the research was limited to single 
agencies or locales away from the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region. Although relevant 





between 2014 and 2015 or focused on a single agency far-removed from the St. Louis, 
MO metropolitan area. Recent events in Minneapolis, MN; Atlanta, GA; and Kenosha, 
WI stemming from deadly force incidents also support the premise of LEOs having an 
increased reluctance to engage in proactive policing due to a perceived lack of 
organizational support, public and media scrutiny, civil unrest, and job loss. An 
additional gap in knowledge also exists involving identifying trends, which were 
localized to the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region, as well as time-series analyses where 
the events in Ferguson were considered the intervening event. Most research has focused 
on public scrutiny and police legitimacy, not the effects of de-policing on crime.  
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine the impact of the 
Ferguson Effect through an analysis of crime and policing trends in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area. The intent of this study was to better understand the extent of de-
policing in the St. Louis area by analyzing crime data five years before and five years 
after the Michael Brown shooting (2010 to 2019). This 10-year window was selected 
because it reduces the incidence of statistical errors and causal inferences when 
conducting a time-series analysis. Moreover, this time-series analysis uses the events in 
Ferguson in 2014 as an intervening event, allowing me to determine the presence of 
trends in policing and crime five years before and after the shooting of Michael Brown. 
Finally, I chose to evaluate an equal amount of time before and after the intervening 






This study made use of statistics from the MSHP’s UCR database and the 
MOAG’s VSR. Statistical analyses relating to offense type and frequency, arrests, and 
searches for contraband were conducted to determine if there is a correlation between de-
policing and crime rates in the region. This study evaluated crime rates, traffic stops, 
arrest rates, search rates, and contraband hit rates. This study evaluated data from the St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan region. The independent variables were time and region, which 
were categorical variables. The dependent variables related to policing were derived from 
data pertaining to (a) criminal arrests, (b) traffic stops, (c) traffic stop outcomes, (d) 
search rates, (e) contraband hit rates, and (f) arrest rates related to vehicle stops, while the 
dependent variables pertaining to crime were evaluated using data relating to crimes 
against persons and property, and homicide rates. This study also incorporated the 
number of law enforcement officers killed or assaulted (LEOKA) as a function of crime. 
Each of the variables was quantitative and measured on a continuous scale. To better 
inform the results, three covariates were included in the data analysis (racial/ethnic make-
up, socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs per capita). The analysis of secondary 
data was essential to understand if there were alterations in proactive policing efforts and 
crime rates either resulting from or independent of the Ferguson Effect, thereby 
supporting or disproving the Ferguson Effect as the key factor responsible for increased 
crime rates in the region. 
The review of the literature included research that identified causal mechanisms 





from the phenomenon. Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism was applied as a 
theory to explain the consequences of the Ferguson Effect on policing and crime. This 
was a novel application of Bandura’s theory as no studies relating to crime and deviance, 
law enforcement and policing, or the Ferguson Effect involved using the model of 
reciprocal determinism to explain alterations in behavior resulting from internal and 
external forces. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Selected articles relating to the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and LEOs’ 
perceptions of policing are addressed here. The keywords searched were Ferguson Effect, 
law enforcement or police or cops or officers, and depolicing or de-policing in the 
Criminal Justice, SAGE Journals, and SOCIndex databases. A Walden University 
Thoreau multi-database search was also conducted to locate additional articles. Because 
of the recency of the events in Ferguson, research was no more than five to six years old 
(i.e., published between 2014 and 2021). 
Theoretical Framework 
 Since 2014, LEOs have reduced citizen contacts and engaged in de-policing 
practices to avoid negative media attention, public criticism, civil unrest, and civil 
litigation (Adams, 2019; MacDonald, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017; Wolfe & Nix, 2016). 
Theories to explain changes or sources of influences for behavior were limited. Most 
studies identified do not have a concrete theoretical foundation; instead, they were reliant 





causation. While there are several theories that have been applied to criminal and deviant 
behavior, these theories do not necessarily apply to alterations or influences on LEOs’ 
behavior in response to exogenous factors.  
Foundational Theories 
 To better explain how both external and internal factors impact internal decision-
making processes, an exploration of learning and observation theories was useful. From a 
young age, individuals learn to mimic others and respond to social and environmental 
changes through behavioral modification. Ivan Pavlov’s theories of classical and operant 
conditioning both rely on stimuli to produce an effect through a learned response 
(Newman & Newman, 2016). While conditioning may be responsible for behavioral 
changes that have led to de-policing, the theory does not account for societal or 
environmental influences on behavior in the short term. 
 Jean Piaget’s cognitive learning theory involves individuals learning new 
behaviors and cognitive processes (Newman & Newman, 2016). Individuals interpret, 
understand, and engage in cognitive processes to learn new actions and behaviors; 
however, the absence of social and environmental influences made this theory ineffective 
in explaining how intrinsic and extrinsic factors influence behavior. 
 Albert Bandura’s social cognitive theory involves the notion that individuals are 
capable of self-regulation through behavioral modification in response to internal and 
environmental influences (Newman & Newman, 2016). The social cognitive theory is 





dynamic and reciprocal interactions between the individual, their behavior, and the 
environment (Newman & Newman, 2016). Therefore, alterations in LEOs’ behavior in 
response to threats to oneself may be explained through the application of an extension of 
this theory—the model of reciprocal determinism. This study, then, relies on how 
changes in behavioral patterns may be learned based on social cues that guide internal 
and external influencers of behavior.  
Bandura’s Model of Reciprocal Determinism 
 While the social learning theory involves how behavior and cognitive processes 
are learned through both the environment and one’s internal motivations, Bandura’s 
model of reciprocal determinism expands upon his theory to explain how the 
environment, individual, and behavior influence individual responses to one’s 
environment through dynamic and reciprocal interactions (see Figure 1; Bandura, 1978; 
Bernston & Cacioppo, 2005). Bandura’s theory was founded upon continuous 
interactions between the three behavioral determinants that influence an individual’s 
behavior and actions. An individual’s behaviors also exert an influence on the 
environment that generates a response to the individual’s actions, either reinforcing or 
punishing the behavioral modification in an attempt to achieve equilibrium within the 











Note. From “The self system in reciprocal determinism” by A. Bandura, 1978, American 
Psychologist, 33(4), 344-358. 
https://www.uky.edu/~eushe2/Bandura/Bandura1978AP.pdf 
 Behavior is shaped by social forces that define the environment. In turn, the 
environment shapes behavior by providing individuals with feedback. According to 
Bandura (1977; 1986), learning can occur through observing the actions of others and the 
consequences of those actions, which can produce individual alterations in behavior 
without action. It is the environment, then, that influences the intensity and frequency of 
behavior through reinforcement or punishment. The individual component relates to 







beliefs, unique personality characteristics; Bandura, 1978). Together, the three 
components interact continuously to alter behavior, both consciously and subconsciously. 
 The model of reciprocal determinism, which involves exogenous influences on 
both the psychological and physiological domains as well as reciprocal influences of 
psychological and physiological processes on the environment, can be applied to 
understanding both the behavior and motivation of LEOs as well as society. It is feasible 
to apply Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism as a theoretical means to explain 
alterations in LEOs’ behaviors in response to the events in Ferguson in 2014. 
Theoretical Model Application 
 Police officers’ behavior is shaped by organizational and social forces to elicit 
changes in individual cognitive processes. In turn, the environment receives input from 
the individual and the behavior change to create feedback based on the response. If, for 
example, the new behavior receives a negative response from the environment, then the 
individual will likely alter their behaviors as well as internal thought processes to appease 
the environment. Conversely, if an individual with the predisposition to commit a crime 
sees their criminal behaviors reinforced by the environment and society, then those 
behaviors will likely increase while cognitive processes further justify the behavior based 
on societal acceptance and a lack of deterrence. 
 The nonlinear reciprocal relationship between the environment, behavior, and 
individual is the foundation for understanding the effects of de-policing. The application 





the Ferguson Effect on communities. Therefore, the first step in applying this theoretical 
model is to identify relationships and causal mechanisms associated with de-policing and 
crime rates. 
The Ferguson Effect 
 Following the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the 
ensuing protests and civil unrest resulted in increased police scrutiny by the public and 
the media. Administrators responded by altering policies while and law enforcement 
officers allegedly began withdrawing from proactive policing and patrol activities. The 
subsequent alterations in behavior stemming from the series of events in 2014 and 2015 
led to de-policing by law enforcement and higher crime rates (Capellan et al., 2020; 
Morgan & Pally, 2016; Pyrooz et al., 2016; Shjarback et al., 2017).  
 Today, the Ferguson Effect represents a plausible mechanism to explain increases 
in crime since 2014. Some proponents of the Ferguson Effect have explored how the 
Ferguson Effect has indirectly contributed to alterations in crime rates through exogenous 
pressures on law enforcement officers (e.g., public scrutiny and negative media; Adams, 
2017; Capellan et al., 2020; Maguire, 2017; Nix & Wolfe, 2016; 2018; Oliver, 2017; 
Wolfe & Nix, 2016). Others have focused on the internal factors that contribute to de-
policing as possible causal mechanisms associated with the changes in behavior seen in 






The phenomenon of de-policing is not new and has been the source for media 
criticism and federal investigations for decades. However, many scholars argue about 
how to define the term best. Some scholars define de-policing as passivity or 
disengaging, detaching, or retreating from one’s duties (Oliver, 2017). Others define the 
practice as avoiding a particular area or activity due to politics, lack of organizational 
support, or excessive citizen complaints (Oliver, 2017). However, the most accepted 
modern definition for de-policing appears to concentrate on how police officers 
disengaged from policing and patrol practices due to negative experiences, especially 
those related to public scrutiny and civil unrest (Oliver, 2017). 
De-policing or disengaging from proactive community policing responses as a 
reaction to the increased violence against police since 2014 and the fear of civil liability 
has led some scholars to believe increases in crime and attacks on law enforcement 
officers are the direct result of the Ferguson Effect (MacDonald, 2019; Oliver, 2017). 
Some researchers have discovered that there has been a decrease in arrests, an increase in 
violent crime rates, and an increase in assaults on law enforcement officers (MacDonald, 
2019; Maguire et al., 2017; Shjarback et al., 2017). Other scholars purport that the 
Ferguson Effect has been perpetuated by negative media influences on the public, 
creating an additional barrier for law enforcement officers to overcome (Nix & Pickett, 
2017; Nix & Wolfe, 2017). At the same time, other researchers dispute the legitimacy of 





2019; Rosenfeld, 2015; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019; Tiwari, 2016). Nonetheless, the 
deleterious effects of de-policing have been well-documented, most notably in the Kansas 
City Preventative Patrol Report, whereby a decrease in police presence led to catastrophic 
increases in crime in the 1970s (Kelling et al., 1974). While the source for de-policing 
differs, the effects on crime and society are similar. Therefore, it becomes necessary to 
further explore the underlying causes of de-policing and its relationship with crime. 
 According to Shjarback et al. (2017), de-policing can be measured through 
proactive or preventative patrol actions. In their study, the researchers measured de-
policing through criminal arrests, traffic stops, traffic stop outcomes, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, and arrest rates related to vehicle stops (Shjarback et al., 2017). 
While the variables do provide a measure of the quantity of policing performed by law 
enforcement officers in a particular region, they are measured over a span of 18 months 
and do not take into account the number of officers per capita or other geographical 
factors that might affect policing practices or crime rates. This research project will 
expand on the time frame for analysis while focusing only on law enforcement agencies 
in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region. This study will also determine if the 
socioeconomic index (i.e., the average of the percentage of persons living below the 
poverty level, unemployment rates, and persons over the age of 25 who have attained less 
than a high school education), percent of non-White residents, and the number of officers 
per capita impact measures of policing (i.e., arrests, traffic stops, traffic stop outcomes, 





provide additional insight to determine if decreases in staffing rates are potentially 
responsible for increases in crime rates or if decreases in the socioeconomic index and 
minority populations impact crime and policing. The supplementary analysis will provide 
additional plausible causal explanations for de-policing or increases in crime. 
Proposed Causal Mechanisms for De-Policing 
 While there is mixed evidence supporting the Ferguson Effect, evidence 
supporting internal justifications for withdrawing from proactive policing and patrol 
practices is prevalent. Potential internal sources of dissonance within law enforcement 
officers included impediments to organizational or procedural justice within law 
enforcement agencies, declining morale, increasing cynicism, impaired self-efficacy, 
increases in the number of officers assaulted and killed or assaulted, fears of additional 
public scrutiny and negative media reports, and declining public support for law 
enforcement. Though each of these factors, when taken alone, may create dissonance 
within an individual officer, their collective impact may contribute to an overall decline 
in proactive policing and patrol practices (i.e., de-policing) by law enforcement officers 
due to their synergistic effect on the individual, which influences both the individual and 
their behavior in response to changes within the environment. 
Organizational Factors 
 Like many employees, police officers look to their organization for guidance and 
support. However, when agencies fail to support or empower their officers, the quality 





felt their organization supported their actions and had their best interests engaged in 
fewer instances of de-policing and did not alter their behavior in response to negative 
exogenous pressures (e.g., negative publicity). Similarly, when law enforcement agencies 
lacked procedural justice, officers were more affected by negative publicity and engaged 
in higher levels of de-policing when compared to those agencies where procedural justice 
was a priority (Deuchar et al., 2018; Nix et al., 2015; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix & Wolfe, 
2016). In the months since the events of 2014 and 2015, both officers and society have 
placed increased demands on organizations commanding procedural and organizational 
justice. These external pressures, then, may be responsible for the heightened stressors 
felt by LEOs. 
 Scholars have used the general strain theory to explain why LEOs disengage from 
proactive policing strategies. Bishopp et al. (2016) determined that organizational stress 
and strain resulting from a perceived lack of support or procedural justice increased anger 
and deviant or defiant behavior. Researchers have also found that organizational and 
bureaucratic characteristics influenced behavior by having an aggravating or mitigating 
effect on LEOs’ behaviors and perceptions (Alpert et al., 2005). The adverse effects of 
impaired organizational fairness and transparency on LEOs have also led to lower 
morale, self-confidence, and job satisfaction (Deuchar et al., 2019; Nix & Wolfe, 2017). 
Despite research surrounding the aggravating and mitigating effects on LEOs’ behaviors 
and perceptions, none evaluated the relationship between the police officers’ behavior 






 Law enforcement officers expect their respective agencies to provide reliable and 
predictable oversight and support so they may be productive and proactive in their duties 
while also ensuring organizational legitimacy with the public. However, when agencies 
fail to support or respect their officers, the system fails to thrive, resulting in 
organizational anomie. Anomie is a state of lacking ethical or social standards (Parnaby 
& Leyden, 2011; Smith, 2008). When expectations and procedural justice are lacking, the 
system breaks down, creating defiance or dissonance among the ranks (Capellan et al., 
2020; Parnaby & Leyden, 2011; Smith, 2008). Defiance stemming from a lack of 
guidance or clear direction may also extend beyond the organization into society through 
impunity.  
When individuals outside of the organization perceive the organization as broken 
or illegitimate, individuals who are both internal and external to the organization may 
have an increased propensity to engage in deviant behaviors due to a lack of deterrence or 
positive alternatives (Smith, 2008). Organizational anomie, then, can have adverse 
consequences on both LEOs and society as the system failure potentiates de-policing 
behaviors and criminal activity. However, the application of Durkheim’s anomie theory 
does not adequately explain sources of de-policing beyond organizational failure or a lack 
of procedural justice; rather, it is an outcome associated with the process. Organizational 





Morale, Cynicism, and Self-Confidence  
 Employee morale is a function of organizational effectiveness, fairness, and 
transparency. Organizations that fail to support their employees, maintain transparency, 
and engage in procedural justice impair employee morale and reduce self-confidence 
(Deuchar et al., 2019; Nix & Wolfe, 2017; 2018; Wolfe & Nix, 2016). In their research 
study, Deuchar et al. (2019) explored the relationship between law enforcement officer 
morale, confidence, and policing strategies related to the Ferguson Effect, determining 
that organizational strategies and policy coupled with negative media coverage adversely 
affected officer morale. Researchers also concluded that a community’s decreased 
willingness to engage with law enforcement and the increased demonization of law 
enforcement by the media led to both decreased proactive patrol and policing strategies 
and increased officer cynicism and community distrust (Deuchar et al., 2019; Wolfe & 
Nix, 2016). 
Cynicism stems from a general distrust of the public, a trait maintained by many 
LEOs to maintain their situational awareness and aid in coping with job-related stressors. 
However, cynicism may also be emerging from the increased disrespect directed at 
LEOs, leading to heightened levels of suspicion, antagonistic emotions (e.g., anger, 
frustration, annoyance), fear, and perceived danger (Nix et al., 2019). Similarly, officers 
who perceived hostile public attitudes were significantly and substantially more likely to 
report higher levels of social isolation from the public, greater police solidarity, increased 





2019). Widespread criticism of police has also had a tangible influence on how police 
officers conduct themselves and perform policing activities, potentially leading to a de-
policing effect (Marier & Moule, 2019; Nix & Pickett, 2017). Though each of the studies 
evaluated officer perceptions regarding hostile citizens and media, the recency of high-
profile events (e.g., allegations of excessive force in Minneapolis, MN; Louisville, KY; 
and New Orleans, LA ) involving law enforcement may have exaggerated the effect. 
Moreover, the inherent suspiciousness directed toward citizens could make it difficult to 
determine baseline and heightened levels of cynicism. Personal, organizational, and job-
related stressors may also be responsible for increased cynicism and the resulting 
exaggerated emotional responses, not merely increased public and media scrutiny. 
Despite evidence that negative publicity and disrespectful citizen encounters lead 
to lower morale and increased cynicism toward others, Phillips (2020) determined that 
law enforcement officers are not withdrawing from proactive patrols, according to his 
scenario-based inquiry of law enforcement officers in Texas and New York. However, 
respondents did express concern over how their scenario-based reactions might impact 
their careers or lead to negative publicity. The Phillips study, then, demonstrated, at the 
very least, that officers are questioning their reactions or hesitating prior to engaging a 
subject. Self-reporting may have also skewed the results resulting in the underreporting 
of hesitancy or concern for engaging in proactive policing. The hesitancy or reluctance to 





 Reduced self-efficacy has also been identified as an outcome of negative media 
reports and a potential source of de-policing. Capellan et al. (2020), Hosko (2018), Nix 
and Pickett (2017), and Nix and Wolfe (2017) evaluated the impacts of negative publicity 
on self-efficacy, crime trends, and de-policing in the U.S., concluding that hostile media 
effects had a significant impact on self-confidence leading to a hesitancy to engage in 
both proactive policing and use of force incidents. Researchers also determined that 
LEOs have begun to question their abilities due to negative publicity, increased public 
scrutiny, and a lack of organizational support despite the legal authority granted to 
officers to perform their ascribed duties as defined by state statutes and federal law. 
 Self-confidence among LEOs has also declined following the Michael Brown 
shooting in 2014. Researchers noted that 86% of LEOs perceived their jobs as more 
difficult while noting increased tensions between police and minority populations leading 
to a decreased willingness to stop and question suspicious persons (Morin et al., 2017). 
The rise in assaults and deaths of LEOs has also increased concerns over officer safety 
since 2014 (Morin et al., 2017). Researchers have found evidence of intertemporal 
relationships among officer-involved shootings, the number of law enforcement officers 
killed, and homicide rates, thereby supporting the assertion that law enforcement has 
become a more dangerous profession.  
Parkin et al. (2020) identified a relationship between the number of law 
enforcement officers killed and national homicide rates. However, the researchers found 





shootings) and homicide rates or law enforcement officers killed (Parkin et al., 2020). 
While the researchers demonstrated that increases in LEOs killed in the line of duty are 
likely not in response to deadly force incidents, the increased prevalence may be an 
unintended consequence associated with rises in violent crime, specifically homicide. 
Nonetheless, the link between homicide and officers killed in the line of duty creates the 
need for an additional inquiry to understand the phenomenon better. The research also 
supports the model of reciprocal determinism whereby behavioral changes (i.e., 
withdrawing from preventative and proactive patrols) contribute to de-policing and 
increased crime rates. 
Police Legitimacy 
Unlike legislators, attorneys, and judges who fall within a single branch of 
government, LEOs maintain a unique position that impacts all three branches of 
government. As enforcers of the law, police officers are part of the executive branch of 
government, upholding the Constitution and laws of the land. By arresting suspects and 
providing members of the judicial branch with evidence in accordance with state and 
federal laws, LEOs effect the judicial branch. Additionally, impacts on the judicial 
branch and new case rulings lead to new legislation within the legislative branch that 
alters how LEOs perform their sworn duties. 
 Despite the legal authority granted to LEOs, events since 2014 have significantly 
altered how LEOs perform their duties due to increased scrutiny over police legitimacy. 





microscope and caused many to question the authority bestowed upon officers to ensure 
public safety and enforce the law, and, most notably, the ability of law enforcement 
officers to use deadly force. As a result, police administrators are altering their policies, 
and officers are changing their behaviors as a means of self-preservation (Oliver, 2017). 
The new policies, however, are also facing increased public scrutiny and adversely 
impacting police legitimacy. 
 To improve transparency and accountability, several agencies have instituted 
citizen review boards to improve police legitimacy. However, the review boards are 
reactive, and most citizens are not knowledgeable about police strategy and tactics or the 
laws that grant special authority to LEOs, thereby creating dissonance between policy 
and action. Ochs (2009) determined that citizen review boards are ineffective at 
improving the quality of policing and adversely impact police officers and crime because 
of the disconnect between policy and policing practices. The reactive policies were also 
shown to increase dissonance between officers and their respective law enforcement 
agencies, which resulted the refusal to carry out new policies by some officers (Ochs, 
2009). The review boards, then, serve to perpetuate the cycle of discontent and lead to 
higher levels of de-policing rather than improve police legitimacy.  
Aside from procedural justice mitigating de-policing practices, fairness and 
transparency also improved public acceptance of law enforcement practices by driving 
perceived legitimacy and community support for law enforcement agencies. Bradford et 





police officers are involved in use of force incidents, the level of public acceptance 
regarding the incident dictates the level of distributive and retributive justice (Bradford et 
al., 2017). However, increased public and media scrutiny of police incidents involving 
force, especially deadly force, has resulted in a nationwide movement to defund the 
police as well as a reduction in the power and authority of LEOs (Deuchar et al., 2020; 
Rushin & Michalski, 2020; Silver, 2020). Public acceptance and perceived legitimacy, 
then, appear to be correlated with officer conduct and perceived support by their 
respective agencies. Therefore, public acceptance and support for policing practices (i.e., 
police legitimacy) appear to be a mitigating factor in de-policing practices. 
The new policies limiting police response have also resulted in increased crime 
rates, reduced officer safety, and done little to quell the public and media’s negative 
perception of police (Deuchar et al., 2020; Rushin & Michalski, 2020). While striving for 
legitimacy, law enforcement administrators and policymakers have succumbed to the 
influence of mass and social media, resulting in a crisis as police officers experience a 
sense of disempowerment when agencies revise their policies to appease society 
(Deuchar et al., 2020). The new policies also force de-policing, to a degree, because they 
limit the actions of law enforcement officers to reduce crime through preventative 
policing and patrol practices. Moreover, without the ability to exert social control and 
enforce laws, the increased scrutiny has altered policing practices in the 21st century with 





Public Scrutiny and the Media 
At the center of the call for legitimacy is the media. According to some scholars, 
the media, which provides a slanted view of use of force and deadly force incidents, is 
largely responsible for the unchecked rhetoric that is driving concerns over police 
legitimacy and demands for defunding the police or limiting police actions (Adams, 
2019; Hosko, 2018; MacDonald, 2019; Maguire et al., 2017; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix & 
Wolfe, 2017; Remsberg, 2018; Rushin & Michalski, 2020). Several researchers purported 
that both mass and social media are responsible for perpetuating public scrutiny 
stemming from incomplete, inaccurate, or misrepresented facts relating to incidents 
involving force (Adams, 2019; Capellan et al., 2020; Deuchar et al., 2020; MacDonald, 
2019; Nix & Wolfe, 2017). Researchers have also suggested that social media has 
become “weaponized for digital activism” to spread propaganda and spark public outrage 
regarding policing practices (Deuchar et al., 2020, p. 48). Citizen journalists have also 
harnessed the power of social media (e.g., RealStLNews) as a means to inform (or 
persuade) the public of breaking news involving the police and crime. While the activist 
portrayal of the news provides insights not found in traditional media outlets, some of the 
reporting is based on conjecture, and the commentary often paints law enforcement in a 
negative light.  
The widespread and instantaneous dissemination of information through social 
media has led to the YouTube Effect, where unedited and unchecked events are shared 





enforcement because viral videos often portray law enforcement negatively. Wolfe and 
Nix (2016) determined that police possess a decreased willingness to engage in 
community partnerships because the negative portrayal has adversely impacted their 
decisions to participate in proactive policing efforts. The widespread dissemination of 
information has made policing more difficult because of the increased scrutiny and fear 
of becoming part of the next viral video (Davis, 2015; Loiaconi, 2015). The withdrawal 
of proactive policing resulting from the YouTube Effect may also be a source of rising 
crime rates (Capellan et al., 2020; Loiaconi, 2015). However, it is unclear whether the 
increases in crime resulted from de-policing or criminal empowerment due to decreased 
police legitimacy and changing social norms. 
Conclusion 
 Since the unrest in Ferguson in 2014 following the shooting of Michael Brown 
and other Black men, the public and the media have criticized law enforcement agencies 
and officers for using excessive force resulting in perceived violations of the Fourth 
Amendment. In response to the blowback, many agencies have revised their policies, 
including those related to the use of force against noncompliant subjects. Officers have 
also become more reluctant to use force, even when force is authorized, and engage in 
proactive policing practices leading to the emergence of the Ferguson Effect—a term 
used to describe the phenomenon of de-policing and increasing crime rates (Capellan et 






 Scholars have linked negative publicity to increased public scrutiny of policing 
practices and decreased police legitimacy. The negative media has been shown to 
adversely impact officer morale, increase officer cynicism, and decrease self-efficacy. 
Law enforcement agencies have responded to negative media and public cries for reform 
by altering policies that not only facilitate de-policing efforts but also negatively 
impacting officers through impaired organizational justice and organizational anomie. As 
a result of these exogenous influences, law enforcement officers have altered their 
behaviors as a means of personal and career survival based on inputs from the 
environment and feedback involving the behaviors and actions of others. Because of this 
unique relationship between environmental and internal influences on behavior, 
Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism will be explored to understand better how de-
policing has affected crime. 
 While the exact mechanisms of de-policing are under contention, there is mixed 
evidence that de-policing is occurring and has resulted in higher crime rates in some 
cities. Because of the limited investigation regarding de-policing and crime rates, a gap in 
knowledge exists regarding the relationship between the two phenomena. To date, few 
researchers have explored the phenomenon associated with de-policing and rising crime 
rates (Capellan et al., 2020; MacDonald, 2016; Morgan & Pally, 2016; Shjarback et al., 
2017). However, none have examined policing and crime data five years before and after 
the events in Ferguson, nor have they focused solely on the St. Louis, MO metropolitan 





of de-policing as evidenced by alterations in crime and policing in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area pre- and post-Ferguson to determine if crime rates have increased in 
response to reports of de-policing. My findings shed light on how alterations in policing 
impact crime and how Bandura’s model of reciprocal determinism may be applied to 
explain how and why policing has changed since Ferguson through the expansion and 
replication of Shjarback et al.’s (2017) research study. In Chapter 3, I discussed my 
research methodologies and plan for analyzing the data. The sources of data and 
collection methods were also described. I also provided additional background 
information regarding the independent, dependent, and confounding variables as well as 






Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 The aim of this quantitative research study was to analyze Missouri’s UCR and 
VSR databases relating to crime, arrest, and search rates in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area to determine if there was a correlation between de-policing and 
increases in crime rates. Chapter 3 includes an overview of the research methodology. A 
quantitative approach to inquiry was selected to analyze secondary data to answer the 
research questions and evaluate the hypotheses. The quantitative methodology was the 
most relevant strategy to evaluate statistical crime data to determine the effect of de-
policing on crime rates because quantitative research offers the opportunity to investigate 
relationships between and among variables (Maxfield & Babbie, 2016). In this chapter, I 
presented the research design and rationale, research questions and hypotheses, 
methodology, and other elements related to the research methodology. Moreover, this 
research was designed to answer research questions involving possible interactions 
between de-policing and crime rates. 
Research Design and Rationale 
 I chose a quantitative research methodology because this method involves using 
numerical data to analyze and compare statistical data to test research hypotheses. 
Because my aim was to compare and evaluate data across time, a simple interrupted time-
series design was used. More specifically, a time-series research method allowed me to 





there was no control group. Since time-series quantitative research designs involve the 
manipulation of the independent variable before measuring the dependent variable, 
directionality was thereby eliminated. The ability to conduct multiple measurements 
across time both strengthened this design and reduced the incidence of regression to the 
mean, which results in inaccurate conclusions. Additionally, the ability to make 
comparisons and draw causal claims from a single entity or set of entities over time 
allowed me to test my hypotheses and determine if there was a relationship between de-
policing and crime rates by evaluating events before and after Ferguson in 2014. 
Methodology 
 A simple interrupted time-series research methodology offers the opportunity to 
evaluate a single group as well as compare groups within a given time frame before and 
after an intervention. In the case of this study, the events surrounding Ferguson in 2014 
served as the intervening event (i.e., treatment). The research also consisted of within-
group as well as between-group comparisons across time. Moreover, this study involved 
employing a nonexperimental comparative design that analyzed trends in data to develop 
interferences about crime and de-policing using data derived from established state-level 
databases. 
Population 
 The target population for this study was the over 70 police departments and law 
enforcement agencies in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area (i.e., the independent city of 





the population to include the counties of Jefferson and St. Charles to broaden the depth of 
the inquiry to include outlying suburban and rural populations to determine if the effects 
of de-policing are prevalent in those areas that lie outside the county but are also subject 
to influences in the region. The target population was all law enforcement agencies, 
including police and sheriff departments. It should be noted, however, that both the St. 
Louis Sheriff’s Department and St. Louis County Sheriff’s Department were excluded 
from the target population, as they do not serve traditional policing functions and do not 
report to the MSHP’s UCR. Instead, the St. Louis County Police Department was 
included as they perform policing services for a large portion of St. Louis County, while 
the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department serves the independent city of St. Louis 
and performs policing functions. Park rangers and college and university police 
departments were also excluded from the population and analysis. 
Sampling Design and Procedures 
 I evaluated all UCR data for agencies located within the independent city of St. 
Louis, as well as those in St. Louis County, Jefferson County, and St. Charles County. 
Because data were aggregated by agency or county, the sample consisted of all agencies 
that reported to the state’s UCR within the defined regions. The ability to capture the 
entire population improved outcomes and reduced threats to validity without added time 
or cost. The sampling units for this dissertation were time and region. A single year was 
used as the reference point. Data for each year included all aggregate law enforcement 





West, South, and East-Central Corridor of St. Louis County; St. Charles County; and 
Jefferson County). While traditional research does not include all members of a given 
population, the ability to capture data related to all law enforcement agencies in the 
region made this inquiry possible. The sampling time frame for this time-series analysis 
was 2010 to 2019. The time frame was chosen because it represents five years before the 
events in Ferguson and five years after the events to create a balanced inquiry. The 10-
year sampling frame also allowed me to evaluate data for trends. Moreover, data are 
considered reliable, as databases have been in place for several decades and are modeled 
after national law enforcement databases. 
Defined Regions 
To garner a better understanding of regions, I defined the seven regions that were 
used in this research study. The St. Louis, MO metropolitan area is made up of multiple 
counties and the independent city of St. Louis. For research purposes, only data 
pertaining to St. Louis, Jefferson, and St. Charles Counties and the city of St. Louis were 







St. Louis Region Map 
 
Note. From Missouri Department of Transportation. (2020). St. Louis District. 
https://www.modot.org/stlouis 
St. Louis, Missouri. The first independent geographical unit within the St. Louis, 
MO metropolitan region is the independent city of St. Louis, which lies outside of a 
defined county in Missouri. The city’s borders are defined by the Mississippi River to the 
east and an arbitrary boundary that runs from Weber Road and the River Des Peres along 
the south and southeast, McCausland Avenue/Skinker Road/Kienlen Avenue/Jennings 
Station Road to the west, and Riverview Boulevard to the north (see Figure 3). The city is 
comprised of 79 individual neighborhoods but is policed by a single police agency, the 
St. Louis Metropolitan Police. The city covers 65.99 square miles and has a population of 

















St. Louis County, Missouri. The second independent geographical unit within 
the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region is St. Louis County. The county’s borders are 
defined by St. Louis City to the east, Jefferson County and the Meramec River to the 
south and southwest, Franklin County to the west, and St. Charles County and the 
Missouri River to the north and northwest (see Figure 4). The county is comprised of 
over 90 municipal governments and a county council. The county is policed by over 70 
agencies, including St. Louis County Police that are responsible for unincorporated 
regions as well as contract municipalities, primarily in the northern and southern portions 
of the county. The county was the state’s most populous county in 2019, covering 523 
square miles with a population of 999,539 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020). 
 St. Louis County is further divided into five geographical subregions: North St. 
Louis County, West St. Louis County, South St. Louis County, the East-Central Corridor, 
and unincorporated St. Louis County. North St. Louis County houses one of the most 
racially and socioeconomically diverse populations in the county and includes the cities 
of Ferguson, Florissant, Hazelwood, Bridgeton, Maryland Heights, Woodson Terrace, 
Overland, St. Ann, Normandy, Bel-Ridge, and Bellefontaine Neighbors. The northeastern 
portion of the county is primarily policed by the St. Louis County Police. North County is 
defined as the area north of Page Avenue and is bordered on the west by the Missouri 
River and St. Charles County, and St. Louis City and the Mississippi River to the east. 
 West St. Louis County is generally defined as the area to the west of Interstate 





of Interstate 44. Communities in West County include Manchester, Ballwin, Ellisville, 
Des Peres, Town and County, Creve Coeur, Chesterfield, and Eureka. The township of 
Wildwood, as well as a small portion of West County that is unincorporated, is policed 
by the St. Louis County Police Department. West County is one of the most affluent 
areas of the county. 
South St. Louis County lies south of Interstate 44 and borders Jefferson County 
and St. Louis City. The southeast edge of South County also borders the Mississippi 
River. A majority of South County is unincorporated and is policed by the St. Louis 
County Police Department. Municipalities within the region include Affton, Crestwood, 
Mehlville, Lemay, Shrewsbury, Sunset Hills, and Lakeshire.  
 The East-Central Corridor is divided by Interstate 64, known as Highway 40 
locally, and is bordered by Lindbergh Boulevard/Interstate 270 to the west, Page Avenue 
to the north, and St. Louis city to the east. Municipalities in the region include Clayton, 
Maplewood, Richmond Heights, University City, Brentwood, Rock Hill, Kirkwood, 
Olivette, and Webster Groves. The East-Central Corridor is also known as Mid-County 
because it is centrally located and lies in the center of the St. Louis, MO metropolitan 
area. The region is also readily accessible via Interstates 270, 170, 70, 64, 44, and 55. 
 For the purposes of this evaluation, the regions patrolled by St. Louis County 
Police Department are treated as a standalone region because the agency has the authority 
to exercise police powers anywhere in the county. Moreover, because of the inability to 





region. As a result, data for the other four regions did not contain any crime or traffic data 
associated with the St. Louis County Police Department. The location of unincorporated 
areas of St. Louis County are shown in Figure 4 and shaded in light yellow. 
St. Charles County. The third independent geographical unit within the St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan region is St. Charles County, Missouri. St. Charles County lies 
primarily between the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers and is bordered on the southwest 
by Franklin County, to the south by St. Louis County, to the east by the Missouri River, 
and to the west by Warren County (see Figure 5). The county is Missouri’s third most 
populous county and has 407,056 residents within 593 square miles (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2020). The county is policed by several municipal agencies as well as the St. Charles 
County Sheriff’s Department. 
Jefferson County, Missouri. The fourth independent geographical unit within 
the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region is Jefferson County, Missouri. Jefferson County is 
bordered to the north by the Meramec River and St. Louis County, to the east by Franklin 
and Washington Counties, and to the south by Ste. Genevieve and St. Francois Counties 
(see Figure 6). The county is policed by several municipal agencies as well as the 
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department. The county is the state’s sixth most populous and 

















St. Charles County, Missouri Map 
  
 

















 The MSHP’s UCR database and the MAGO’s annual VSR were used to collect 
data for this study. The UCR database includes data related to part I crimes (i.e., murder 
and nonnegligent homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle 
theft, larceny-theft, and arson), arrests, and LEOKA (Missouri State Highway Patrol 
[MSHP], 2020). The VSR database includes data related to the total number of traffic 
stops, outcome (i.e., citation or warning), search rates, contraband hit rates, and arrest 
rates related to vehicle stops (Missouri Attorney General’s Office [MAGO], 2020). All 
annual reports between 2010 and 2019 were used to analyze the data and answer the 
research questions. 
 The data collection method was the most appropriate because of the mandatory 
reporting requirements established by law under the authority of the state attorney 
general. The use of a single database to capture data ensures consistency in collection and 
reporting. Second, the instruments (i.e., UCR and VSR) used an established set of 
variables that have been analyzed in scholarly research. No other sources of data would 
have provided the aggregation or breadth of data necessary to conduct this study. 
 No additional sources of data were considered for this study, as the aim of this 
study was to replicate and expand on Shjarback et al.’s (2017) study that evaluated crime 
rates, traffic stops, arrest rates, search rates, and contraband hit rates in the Kansas City, 
MO and St. Louis, MO metropolitan areas in 2014 and 2015. Moreover, the data 





records released annually. The pubic dissemination of such records is required under 
Missouri Sunshine Law (Mo. Rev. Stat. §610.010-200). All data needed for this research 
inquiry consisted of open source government records available under the Sunshine Law. 
Operationalization 
 For this study, variables relating to crime and de-policing were evaluated to 
determine if there was a relationship between the independent and dependent variables. 
The independent and dependent variables used in this study were the same variables 
analyzed in the Shjarback et al. (2017) study. The first analysis consisted of descriptive 
statistics that determined the underlying presence of trends in crime rates and de-policing. 
The second analysis made use of a time-series analysis that determined the underlying 
presence of trends in crime rates and de-policing for each region. The third analysis also 
involved a time-series analysis, which aided in determining the relationship between the 
covariates and the dependent variables. 
Independent Variables 
 The two independent variables for this analysis were time and region. Time was 
defined on an annual basis, while region was comprised of the eight earlier defined 
regions within the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. Both independent variables were 
categorical variables.  
Dependent Variables 
 The first dependent variable was crime, which is measured through the analysis of 





calendar years 2010 through 2019 consisted of quantitative data related to (a) total crime, 
(b) violent crime, (c) property crime, (d) homicide rates, and (e) LEOKA. The second 
dependent variable for this study was de-policing. The variable was analyzed using UCR 
and VSR databases and included data pertaining to (a) criminal arrests, (b) traffic stops, 
(c) traffic stop outcomes, (d) search rates, (e) contraband hit rates, and (f) arrest rates 
related to vehicle stops. Each of the dependent variables was a quantitative variable 
measured on a continuous scale. 
Confounding Variables/Covariates 
 In addition to the independent and dependent variables analyzed in the study, 
three confounding variables were explored in the third analysis to determine their impact 
on crime and de-policing. The covariates included racial/ethnic make-up, socioeconomic 
index, and officer employment rates. Racial/ethnic make-up was a quantitative covariate 
variable that was assessed as the percentage of the population that is non-White. The 
socioeconomic index was also a quantitative covariate variable that was measured by 
averaging the poverty level, unemployment rates, and percentage of persons without a 
high school diploma or GED for a given region. Officer employment rates were assessed 
as the number of law enforcement officers per 1,000 citizens and also functioned as a 
quantitative covariate variable. Data quantifying racial/ethnic make-up and 
socioeconomic index were derived from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community 





Data Analysis Plan 
 Data were collected from the MSHP’s and MAGO’s websites. The Excel 
spreadsheets were evaluated for missing data and formatting errors. The data were 
compiled into a single spreadsheet and included information pertaining to the 
confounding variables. The data were organized by year and region for ultimate analysis 
in IBM SPSS Statistics, version 27. Prior to analysis, data were evaluated to ensure 
consistency with what was found in the original database and that there was no missing 
data. The data were checked to ensure proper formatting and variable coding for the 
statistical analyses. Moreover, it was assumed that data within the original state databases 
were accurate and collected in a consistent manner as the databases are established, 
follow federal guidelines, and require mandatory data reporting by law enforcement 
agencies under Missouri law. The following research questions and hypotheses formed 
the basis for this study. 
RQ1: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area? 
 H01: There are no annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 





Ha1: There are annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. 
RQ2: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to 
determine the extent of de-policing occurring in the area? 
 H02: There are no differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring in the area. 
Ha2: There are differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring in the area. 
RQ3: Are there differences in race, socioeconomic index, and the number of 
officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, 
search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for 
LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to determine the extent of de-





H03: There are no differences in terms of differences in race, socioeconomic 
index, and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of 
quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and 
assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time. 
Ha3: There are differences in terms of differences in race, socioeconomic index, 
and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities 
of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and 
fatal injuries for LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time. 
 To evaluate the data and test it against the research questions and proposed 
hypotheses, both descriptive and inferential statistical analyses were employed. 
Additionally, a series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine the 
effects of the covariates on the dependent variables. F-tests were used to determine if the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables was large enough to be 
meaningful. The nominal alpha was set at 0.05, which was consistent with the threshold 
value in the Shjarback et al. (2017) study. The standardized derived coefficient, ß, was 
used to determine the magnitude of the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variables. The overall effect size will be a function of the R2 value. Moreover, 
to ensure the robustness of the analysis, the assumptions of multiple regression included 
the assumptions that 
• the dependent variable was a continuous interval or ratio variable, 





• the variance of the dependent variable across the values of the independent 
variable was homoscedastic, 
• the independent and dependent variables demonstrated independence (i.e., no 
multicollinearity) through the application of the Durbin-Watson test, 
• the distribution of errors was normal, and 
• there was no undue influence by outliers (Cook’s distance may be used to 
evaluate for undue influence; Mertler & Reinhart, 2016; Warner, 2013). 
Threats to Validity 
 Validity is related to the veracity of an inference or the truthfulness of 
conclusions. Internal validity was the accuracy of causal claims made through analysis, 
while external validity was the ability to generalize the findings (Langbein, 2012; Price et 
al., 2017). Therefore, to address threats to validity, I ensured that my analytical methods 
mitigated any issues about causal claims and generalizability. 
Internal Validity 
Threats to internal validity were addressed by carefully measuring how the 
dependent variables were measured, controlling for confounding variables that 
convoluted causal assumptions, and identifying potential sources of regression artifacts 
(Langbein, 2012; Price et al., 2017). Instrument calibration effectively ameliorated 
variable measurements and issues resulting from data collection. Because the data 
instrument for this analysis has been utilized by the state of Missouri for over 20 years, it 





therefore, reliable. Issues related to confounding variables were addressed by introducing 
three specific variables into the third analysis to evaluate the effect of the covariates on 
the dependent variables. Though regression artifacts can be less of an issue with the data 
obtained from the established instruments, it was not an issue when analyzing secondary 
data from the MSHP UCR and MAGO VSR databases because there were no significant 
outliers. However, this type of threat was effectively reduced by analyzing multiple data 
points across time and balancing the evaluation with the significant intervening event 
(i.e., Michael Brown shooting in 2014) at the midpoint of the evaluation. For this reason, 
data between 2010 and 2019—five years before and after the event— were assessed. 
External Validity 
 External validity is related to descriptive and causal claims that allow researchers 
to apply their findings to a broader population. While the population of interest for this 
study was localized to a single geographic region (i.e., St. Louis, MO metropolitan area), 
policing practices were generally similar across the country and responsive to events in 
jurisdictions that were far removed from the event. Therefore, the findings of this study 
should be generalizable to other law enforcement agencies across the country, though the 
effect size may differ. Threats to external validity may also be further mitigated by 
selecting a sample that is representative of the population of interest while ensuring the 
unit of analysis is what is counted and sampled, ensuring that the participant pool is large 





that remove the effects of mediating variables leading to improper causal inferences and 
conclusions (Langbein, 2012; Price et al., 2017). 
 Issues regarding reliability and validity impact research by altering data outcomes 
and generalizations. To reduce threats related to reliability, research methods must be 
calibrated to ensure they are producing reliable results that are both accurate and stable. 
Threats to internal validity of an instrument also require the appropriate application of 
statistical tests to ensure outside influences are effectively controlled. The external 
validity of the findings related to research methodology also requires that generalizability 
will be increased through the application of proper statistical controls and tests when 
assessing data. 
Ethical Concerns 
 All efforts were made to ensure this research conformed to the ethical guidelines 
and requirements established by Walden University and the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB). All data were gathered from open-source data repositories in a legal and ethical 
manner. Because this research involved open-source public records of secondary data, 
there was little risk to human subjects. To ensure data conformity to ethical standards, the 
Walden University IRB reviewed and approved this study (IRB approval number 01-04-
21-0726775). 
 The open-source data collected included the name of law enforcement agencies, 
county, and region. No information pertaining to arrestees, officers involved, or the 





violate any confidentiality or protected information standards because the information 
was disseminated under Missouri’s Sunshine Laws (Mo. Rev. Stat. §610.010-200). No 
personally identifiable information was used or collected for this study. 
 All data for this project was digital. To protect from potential loss or unintended 
disclosure of manipulated data, the data were stored on a local hard drive that is 
password-protected and encrypted. The data will remain on the hard drive for five years 
after the publication of this dissertation. A backup copy of data will be stored on a virtual 
cloud that is password-protected, encrypted, and subject to third-party verification 
procedures. Only my dissertation committee and I will have access to the protected data. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, I described my research process to evaluate the effects of de-
policing on crime. I employed a non-experimental retrospective quantitative time-series 
approach. The population consisted of all reporting law enforcement agencies in the St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan area. The independent variables were region and time. The 
dependent variables were (a) total crime, (b)violent crime, (c) property crime,  (d) 
homicide rates, (e) LEOKA, (f) criminal arrests, (g) traffic stops, (h) traffic stop 
outcomes, (i) search rates, (j) contraband hit rates, and (k) arrest rates related to vehicle 
stops. The confounding variables were racial/ethnic make-up, socioeconomic index, and 
officer employment rates. Data were collected through open-source government websites, 
specifically the MSHP’s and MAGO’s websites. Chapter 4 discussed my analysis and 





analyzed the variables using various statistical methods to determine how annual and 
regional (i.e., independent variables) differences influenced crime and policing (i.e., 
dependent variables) while also evaluating the effects of the confounding variables (i.e., 






Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
 This quantitative research study evaluated the quantity and quality of policing and 
crime rates between 2010 and 2019. The study aimed to investigate the presence of de-
policing and its effect on crime rates in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region, using the 
events in Ferguson in 2014 as the midpoint of the study. The study employed a non-
experimental time-series design that involved descriptive statistics and inferential 
statistical tests, which informed the research questions and hypotheses. 
RQ1: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area? 
 H01: There are no annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. 
Ha1: There are annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. 
RQ2: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to 





 H02: There are no differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring in the area. 
 Ha2: There are differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search rates, 
contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring in the area. 
RQ3: Are there differences in race, socioeconomic index, and the number of 
officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, 
search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for 
LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to determine the extent of de-
policing occurring within the region? 
H03: There are no differences in terms of differences in race, socioeconomic 
index, and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of 
quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and 
assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time. 
Ha3: There are differences in terms of differences in race, socioeconomic index, 
and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities 
of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and 





 To evaluate my research questions, I analyzed data derived from open-source 
publications made available by the MSHP and MAGO. Furthermore, racial/ethnic data 
used during the analysis of covariates in RQ3 were derived from the U.S. Census Bureau 
and American Community Survey, which are available to the public. 
 The study population was comprised of all law enforcement agencies in the 
independent city of St. Louis, MO and the counties of Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. 
Louis. Nontraditional law enforcement agencies (i.e., college and university law 
enforcement agencies) and those who do not perform traditional policing functions (i.e., 
St. Louis County and St. Louis City Sheriff’s Offices) were excluded from the analyses. 
Because data submission by law enforcement agencies in Missouri is compulsory, data 
derived from open-source state-level databases were considered complete. The inclusion 
of all law enforcement agencies that perform traditional policing functions at the 
municipal, city, or county level ensured an adequate sample size where the results are 
statistically significant and meaningful. For this reason, the minimum sample size was 
not calculated, as the entire population met the aforementioned criteria established for 
these analyses. 
 In all, approximately 80 law enforcement agencies in the region comprised the 
sample population. The number of agencies varied due to consolidation and 
reorganization. For example, in some cases, the St. Louis County Police Department took 
over policing functions for some municipal departments (e.g., Jennings, Kinloch) during 





(i.e., North County Police Cooperative) wherein several agencies pooled their resources 
to form one larger law enforcement agency. While the sample size varied by year, the 
number of counties (n = 4) and regions (n = 8) remained constant throughout the 
research. Therefore, county and regional totals became units of analysis per annum rather 
than individual agencies. Because of my familiarity with the region, I effectively coded 
each agency and assigned it a geographical region based on its location within its given 
county and regionally accepted geographical region. 
 I downloaded data from the MSHP and MAGO websites and placed it into a 
separate Excel file that specified each of the variables of interest and covariates. Data 
were cleaned to ensure accuracy of transcription as well as format and absence of missing 
data. Data coding was also performed to assign county and region codes for each 
jurisdiction correctly. Data were then consolidated into a single Excel file, representing 
data totals for each county by year and region. The Excel file also contained covariate 
data for each region to analyze the data pertaining to the third research question. 
 Data derived from databases were assumed to be complete and accurate, though 
there is a possibility that data were misreported by the original agency or representative 
database. Following cleaning and coding, the resulting Excel file was then converted for 
analysis using IBM SPSS Statistics version 27. IBM SPSS was then used to analyze data 
for interpretation. 
 This chapter reviews the data collection from open-source data repositories (i.e., 





research question were analyzed, and a summary of results was presented. A summary of 
data collection methods was presented before the presentation of the analysis of the 
results. 
Data Collection 
 Under the Missouri Sunshine Law (Mo. Rev. Stat. §610.010-200), government 
bodies shall make available public records paid for by public funds and relating to 
publicly funded activities. The annual dissemination of UCR data and VSR constitute 
publicly available information and are, therefore, made available for public consumption. 
While raw data are available upon request from the MSHP and MAGO, data made 
available on the state’s website were adequate to conduct this analysis. The online 
repositories, then, were used as the sole source of data.  
 The MSHP UCR databases contained data related to the number of violent and 
property crimes, homicides, criminal arrests, LEOKA, and officer employment rates. The 
MAGO VSR databases include data pertaining to traffic stops and traffic stop outcomes, 
searches, identification of contraband during a search, and arrests made during traffic 
stops. Demographic data (i.e., population, racial/ethnic make-up, poverty level, 
unemployment rates, educational attainment) were derived from open-source data 
repositories made available by the U.S. government. No records requests were made, as 
all data used in this analysis were readily available for download from public websites. 





2010 and December 31, 2019. It should also be noted that there were no fees incurred 
related to the use or download of the data used for this research inquiry. 
 After receiving IRB approval, I downloaded data from each source and inspected 
the data for accuracy and completeness. All downloaded data met the requirements for 
each analysis as a means to answer the research questions. I determined that no additional 
data collection was necessary, as the open-source data were considered complete for my 
research purposes. While I did have to parse multiple websites and databases to collect 
data for this research project, I located the requisite components needed to complete this 
inquiry. After my data were collected, I sorted the data by type, converted it to reflect the 
same measurement units, and compiled it into a single database for SPSS analysis. 
Descriptive statistics for each analysis are presented in the study results. 
Study Results 
 In addition to the inferential analysis, descriptive statistics were used to 
demonstrate the annual differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband 
hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to LEOs between years in 
each of the four defined counties and eight regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan 
area. Descriptive statistics were used to determine differences within and between 
counties or regions for a given year. For RQ3, inferential analysis incorporated three 
additional variables (i.e., race, socioeconomic index, number of LEOs) to explain the 
relationship between crime (i.e., violent crimes and LEOKA) and de-policing (i.e., 





identification). For ease of understanding, each research question was addressed 
separately. Moreover, because each of the research questions contained the same 
elements, each element was addressed independently to inform analysis and results. 
 In my study, I sought to examine the Ferguson Effect’s impact on crime in the St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan area between 2010 and 2019. To determine the effects of de-
policing practices on crime, I identified several independent and dependent variables as 
well as covariates that might mediate the effect of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables. The dependent variable of de-policing was 
evaluated from data pertaining to (a) criminal arrests, (b) traffic stops, (c) traffic stop 
outcome rates, (d) search rates, (e) contraband hit rates, and (f) arrest rates related to 
vehicle stops. Crime also served as the dependent variable and was measured using data 
relating to part I crimes such as violent and property crimes, homicide, and LEOKA. 
Each of the variables was quantitative and measured on a continuous scale.  
Time was designated as the independent variable in RQ1, while region and time 
became the independent variables for RQ2. For RQ3, the covariates served as the 
independent variables for analysis. The covariates, which were racial/ethnic make-up, 
socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs per capita, were measured on a 
continuous scale from 0 to 100. Racial make-up is expressed as a percentage of non-
White residents. The socioeconomic index is the average of the percentage of persons 
living in poverty, unemployed, and with less than a high school diploma or GED. The 





department or within a given region by the total population. The result was then 
multiplied by 1,000 to yield the number of law enforcement officers per 1,000 persons.  
RQ1 
RQ1 was developed to determine if there are between year differences or trends in 
de-policing through evaluation of quantities of traffic stops, citation issuance rates, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to LEOs 
between 2010 and 2019 in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. For each variable, a one-
way repeated measure ANOVA was conducted to evaluate annual differences in crime 
and traffic stop data at 10 points in time between 2010 and 2019. This research design 
was the best method to assess mean differences across time for a single variable because 
it allows for analysis that applies a within-subjects design using the same sample at 10 
specific points in time. Conducting independent t-tests or one-way ANOVA would not be 
the best choice as they involve assuming data are derived from different groups. Table 1 
depicts annual differences between each of the independent and dependent variables. 
Table 2 includes descriptive statistics for analysis, while Table 3 summarizes Mauchly’s 
test for sphericity.  
To evaluate whether annual differences in crime and policing changed across 
time, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was performed for each variable using the 
SPSS general linear model (GLM) with data derived from the MSHP UCR and MOAG 
VSR databases. Data are derived from 80 law enforcement agencies across the St. Louis, 





Crime rates, criminal arrest rates, LEOKA, and traffic stops were assessed based on a 
total count using a continuous scale. Traffic arrest rates, citation issuance rates, search 
rates, and contraband hit rates were analyzed using a scale from 0 to 100, whereby rates 
were expressed as a function of the total number of traffic stops, which allowed for a 
more robust year-by-year comparison that accounted for fluctuations in the total number 
of traffic stops. 
The independent variable for this analysis is time. The dependent variables, which 
were assessed individually, are total crime, violent crime, property crime, murder, 
LEOKA, criminal and traffic arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, search rates, and 
contraband hit rates. The research question for this analysis is: What are the annual 
differences in the quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and 
arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to law enforcement officers between years in 
the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area? The null hypothesis is: There are no annual 
differences in the quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and 
arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to law enforcement officers between years in 
the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. The alternative hypothesis is: There are annual 
differences in the quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and 
arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to law enforcement officers between years in 







Annual Differences in Policing and Crime 
 
 Year 
Variable 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Crime           
Total crime 78946 75949 69944 65355 62190 65120 63911 63496 60609 61659 
Violent crime 10628 10147 9642 8823 9374 10466 10676 11352 10236 10688 
Property 
crime 
68318 65802 60302 56522 51816 54698 53235 52144 50373 50971 
Murder 194 161 167 166 202 261 269 308 304 312 
LEOKA 1258 1264 1262 1128 1074 1068 1023 1018 801 894 
Policing                   
Criminal arrests 126784 133977 133361 123281 107444 93217 89120 86495 77745 63274 
Traffic stops 494944 500926 489069 489506 454243 401779 384478 378506 403357 412525 
Citation rate 63.90 63.01 63.20 62.63 62.39 57.13 57.62 55.29 53.01 50.69 
Search rate 7.77 7.72 7.86 7.73 6.74 6.93 6.75 6.70 6.21 6.16 
Contraband hit 
rate 
18.97 20.06 20.35 20.05 20.78 25.1 29.98 32.75 32.13 31.56 
Traffic arrest 
rate 











2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 35.7 22.0 68 36.2 22.6 68 35.0 23.8 68 32.9 21.2 68 30.2 18.4 68 
Violent Crime 4.1 4.9 68 3.9 4.8 68 4.1 5.3 68 3.4 3.6 68 3.4 3.7 68 
Property 
Crime 
31.6 18.8 68 32.3 19.6 68 30.9 21.2 68 29.5 19.4 68 26.8 16.3 68 
Murder .4 1.3 68 .6 1.8 68 .6 1.4 68 .3 .7 68 .5 1.9 68 
LEOKA .2 .2 68 .2 .2 68 .2 .2 68 .1 .1 68 .1 .2 68 
Criminal 
Arrests 
1722.4 4102.9 68 1844.4 4494.4 68 1812.7 4342.2 68 1663.8 3966.3 68 1461.6 3353.4 68 
Traffic Stops 6159.2 12815.7 80 6237.3 12773.8 80 6099.0 12276.4 80 6116.0 12123.1 80 5675.6 9534.5 80 
Citation Rate 71.5 23.0 80 69.9 24.6 80 66.7 26.91 80 66.3 27.5 80 65.6 25.7 80 
Search Rate 9.8 7.2 80 8.9 8.1 80 9.2 10.0 80 8.4 8.4 80 8.5 7.8 80 
Contraband 
Hit Rate 
17.9 10.2 80 17.5 10.6 80 18.0 11.2 80 19.3 12.4 80 20.3 12.5 80 
Traffic Arrest 
Rate 







 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 33.0 20.2 68 33.6 21.1 68 31.5 20.6 68 34.1 21.8 68 70.7 189.8 68 
Violent Crime 4.1 4.6 68 4.2 4.5 68 4.0 4.1 68 4.2 4.9 68 7.7 19.6 68 
Property Crime 28.8 17.3 68 29.1 17.9 68 27.6 17.9 68 29.9 18.6 68 63.0 171.0 68 
Murder .7 1.8 68 1.0 2.6 68 1.0 2.8 68 .5 1.4 68 2.1 7.4 68 
LEOKA .1 .1 68 .2 .2 68 .2 .2 68 .2 .2 68 .1 .2 68 
Criminal Arrests 1266.9 3230.7 68 1267.7 3410.7 68 1201.9 3205.0 68 1084.2 2820.6 68 914.3 2444.0 68 
Traffic Stops 5014.8 8984.3 80 4795.8 9000.5 80 4720.4 8202.9 80 5030.4 9326.6 80 5144.9 9464.8 80 
Citation Rate 59.6 25.8 80 55.2 26.9 80 51.8 27.1 80 52.5 27.9 80 51.1 27.8 80 
Search Rate 9.2 8.13 80 8.7 8.6 80 9.6 10.1 80 9.8 9.5 80 10.7 12.0 80 
Contraband Hit 
Rate 
23.4 14.7 80 27.5 20.3 80 29.9 19.7 80 28.8 17.9 80 28.0 18.7 80 
Traffic Arrest 
Rate 









Mauchly’s Test for Sphericity 
 
 
 Mauchly's W 
Approx. Chi-
Square df Sig. 
Epsilon 
Greenhouse-
Geisser Huynh-Feldt Lower-bound 
Total Crime .00 2031.99 44 .000 .12 .12 .11 
Violent Crime .00 1272.43 44 .000 .17 .18 .11 
Property Crime .00 1988.85 44 .000 .12 .12 .11 
Murder .00 879.28 44 .000 .30 .31 .11 
LEOKA .06 185.87 44 .000 .53 .57 .11 
Criminal Arrests .00 1211.24 44 .000 .14 .14 .11 
Traffic Stops .00 922.79 44 .000 .17 .17 .11 
Citation Rate .01 403.93 44 .00 .39 .41 .11 
Search Rate .01 390.87 44 .000 .44 .47 .11 
Contraband Hit Rate .03 230.15 44 .000 .58 .64 .11 
Traffic Arrest Rate .01 434.01 44 .000 .29 .30 .111 
Note. Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent variables 






Total Crime  
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 1703.48, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .18 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 
method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of freedom.  
The overall F for differences in the mean number of total crimes across the ten 
points in time were not statistically significant: F(1.38, 95.28) = 1.76, p = 19; the 
corresponding effect size was a partial η2 of .03. Therefore, because the differences were 
not significant, we should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal 
difference in the means of total crime rates across time. In other words, there is no 
evidence of statistically significant changes in total crime rates across time. 
Violent Crime  
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 1354.73, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .20 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 





The overall F for differences in the mean number of violent crimes across the ten 
points in time were not statistically significant: F(1.80, 124.07) = 2.23, p = .12; the 
corresponding effect size was a partial η2 of .03. Therefore, because the differences were 
not significant, we should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal 
difference in the means of violent crime rates across time. In other words, there is no 
evidence of statistically significant changes in violent crime rates across time. 
Property Crime 
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 1787.82, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .18 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 
method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean number of property crimes across the 
ten points in time was statistically significant: F(1.38, 95.28) = 1.85, p = .1.7; the 
corresponding effect size was a partial η2 of .03. Therefore, because the differences were 
not significant, we should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal 
difference in the means of property crime rates across time. In other words, there is no 







The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 1645.54, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .18 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 
method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean number of murders across the ten points 
in time was statistically significant: F(1.12, 77.43) = 2.25, p = .14; the corresponding 
effect size was a partial η2 of .03. Therefore, because the differences were not significant, 
we should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal difference in the means 
of murder rates across time. In other words, there is no evidence of statistically 
significant changes in murder rates across time. 
LEOKA 
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 885.36, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .18 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 





The overall F for differences in the mean number of LEOKA across the ten points 
in time was statistically significant: F(1.52, 106.29) = 1.80, p = .18; the corresponding 
effect size was a partial η2 of .03. Therefore, because the differences were not significant, 
we should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal difference in the means 
of LEOKA across time. In other words, there is no evidence of statistically significant 
changes in LEOKA across time. 
Criminal Arrests 
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 1211.24, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .18 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 
method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean number of criminal arrests across the ten 
points in time was statistically significant: F(1.1.25, 84.68) = 12.56, p < .001; the 
corresponding effect size was a partial η2 of .16. In other words, after individual 
differences in the quantity of criminal arrests were taken into account, about 16% of the 
variance in criminal arrests was related to time. Note that even if the ε correction factor is 
applied to the degrees of freedom for F, the obtained value of F for differences in the 





Planned contrasts were obtained to compare the mean traffic arrest rates across 
time. The mean traffic arrest rates decreased between 2010 and 2019. The mean decrease 
is statistically significant in 2015 (MD = 442.35, p = .03; MD = 564.42, p = .04, MD = 
536.00, p = .03; MD = 394.61, p = .01; MD = 195.12, p = .02), 2016 (MD = 442.07, p = 
.01; MD = 564.15, p = .01; MD = 535.73, p = .01; MD = 394.33, p = .01; MD = 194.84, p 
= .01), 2017 (MD = 508.01, p = .007; MD = 630.09, p = .01; MD = 601.67, p = .01; MD = 
460.28, p = .01; MD = 260.78, p < .001), 2018 (MD = 624.86, p = .03; MD = 746.93, p = 
.03; MD = 718.51, p = .02; MD = 577.12, p = .03; MD = 377.62, p = .01), and 2019 (MD 
= 792.75, p = .03; MD = 914.83, p = .04; MD = 886.41, p = .03 MD = 745.01, p = .02; 
MD = 545.52, p = .01) when compared to 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively 
(see Table 4). Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in means 
for the number of criminal arrests across time. Thus, of the three statistically significant 
time points in this study, the number of criminal arrests in 2015 and 2016 had 
significantly lower mean number of criminal arrests when compared to 2014, indicating 
some de-policing may be taking place. 
Traffic Stops 
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .00, χ2(2) = 973.41, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 





sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was close to 0, it is the most accurate 
method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean number of traffic stops across the ten 
points in time was statistically significant: F(1.58, 124.54) = 4.56, p = .02; the 
corresponding effect size was a partial η2 of .06. In other words, after individual 
differences in the quantity of traffic stops were taken into account, about 6% of the 
variance in traffic stops was related to time. Note that even if the ε correction factor is 
applied to the degrees of freedom for F, the obtained value of F for differences in the 
mean number of traffic stops across time remains statistically significant.  
Planned contrasts were obtained to compare the mean number of traffic stops 
across time. The mean number of traffic stops decreased in 2012 (M = 6099.03), 2014 (M 
= 5675.60), 2015 (M = 5014.78), 2016 (M = 4795.78), and 2017 (M = 4720.40) when 
compared to the previous year. The mean number of traffic stops was significantly lower 
in 2015 (MD = 660.83, p < .001) and 2016 (MD = 879.83, p = .001), when compared to 
2014. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in means for the 
number of traffic stops across time. Thus, of the three statistically significant time points 
in this study, the number of traffic stops in 2015 and 2016 had a significantly lower mean 







Mean Differences in Criminal Arrest Rates 
 Year 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig MD Sig 
2010 - - 
-
122.07 
1.00 -93.65 1.00 47.74 1.00 247.23 .96 442.35 .03 442.07 .000 508.01 .01 624.86 .02 792.75 .02 
2011 122.07 1.00 - - 28.42 1.00 169.81 1.00 369.30 .58 564.42 .04 564.14 .01 630.09 .01 746.93 .03 914.83 .04 
2012 93.65 1.00 -28.42 1.00 - - 141.39 .92 340.88 .40 536.00 .03 535.72 .000 601.67 .01 718.51 .02 886.41 .03 































































































































The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .003, χ2(2) = 451.22, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .37 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was closer to 0, it is the most 
accurate method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of 
freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean citation rates across the ten points in 
time was statistically significant: F(3.37, 265.99) = 18.27, p < .001; the corresponding 
effect size was a partial η2 of .19. In other words, after individual differences in the mean 
citation rates were taken into account, about 19% of the variance in the mean citation 
rates were related to time. Note that even if the ε correction factor is applied to the 
degrees of freedom for F, the obtained value of F for differences in the mean citation 
rates across time remains statistically significant.  
Planned contrasts were obtained to compare the mean citation rates across time. 
The mean citation rate decreased in 2011 (M = 69.93), 2012 (M = 66.65), 2013 (M = 
66.25), 2014 (M = 65.57), 2015 (M = 59.59), 2016 (M = 51.78), and 2018 (M = 51.08) 
when compared to the previous year. The mean citation rate was significantly lower in 
2015 (MD = 11.93, p = .006; MD = 10.34, p = .007; MD = 7.06, p = .05; MD = 6.67, p = 





11.44, p = .002; MD = 11.04, p = .002; MD = 10.36, p = .001), 2017 (MD = 19.74, p < 
.001; MD = 18.15, p < .001; MD = 14.87, p < .001; MD = 14.47, p < .001; MD = 13.79, p 
< .001), 2018 (MD = 19.01, p < .001; MD = 17.42, p < .001; MD = 14.14, p = .001; MD = 
13.74, p = .001; MD = 13.06, p < .001), and 2019 (MD = 20.44, p < .001; MD = 18.85, p 
< .001; MD = 15.57, p < .001; MD = 15.17, p < .001; MD = 14.49, p < .001) when 
compared to 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively (see Table 5). Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean citation rate across time. 
Thus, of the statistically significant time points in this study, the number of citations 
issued between 2015 and 2019 had significantly lower mean citation rate when compared 







Mean Differences in Citation Rates 
 Year 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. 
2010 - - -.64 1.00 .10 1.00 -.14 1.00 .78 1.00 7.32 .07 8.41 .02 12.27 .001 11.44 .01 13.06 .001 
2011 .64 1.00 - - .74 1.00 .50 1.00 1.43 1.00 7.96 .01 9.05 .001 12.91 .001 12.09 .001 13.70 .001 
2012 -.10 1.00 -.74 1.00 - - -.24 1.00 .68 1.00 7.22 .04 8.31 .01 12.17 .001 11.34 .01 12.96 .001 
2013 .14 1.00 -.50 1.00 .24 1.00 - - .92 1.00 7.46 .02 8.55 .001 12.41 .001 11.59 .001 13.20 .001 
2014 -.78 1.00 -1.43 1.00 -.68 1.00 -.92 1.00 - - 6.54 .001 7.62 .001 11.49 .001 10.66 .001 12.28 .001 
2015 -7.32 .07 -7.96 .01 -7.22 .04 -7.46 .02 -6.54 .001 - - 1.09 1.00 4.95 1.00 4.12 1.00 5.74 1.00 
2016 -8.41 .02 -9.05 .001 -8.31 .01 -8.55 .001 -7.62 .001 -1.09 1.00 - - 3.86 1.00 3.04 1.00 4.65 1.00 
2017 -12.27 .001 -12.91 .001 -12.17 .001 -12.41 .001 -11.49 .001 -4.95 1.00 -3.86 1.00 - - -.83 1.00 .79 1.00 
2018 -11.44 .01 -12.09 .001 -11.34 .01 -11.59 .001 -10.66 .001 -4.12 1.00 -3.04 1.00 .83 1.00 - - 1.62 1.00 






Search rates. The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the 
sphericity assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .006, χ2(2) = 
390.87, p < .001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-
Geisser ε value of .44 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart 
substantially from sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was closer to 0, it 
is the most accurate method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees 
of freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean search rate across the ten points in time 
were not statistically significant: F(3.98, 314.30) = 1.35, p = .25; the corresponding effect 
size was a partial η2 of .02. Therefore, because the differences were not significant, we 
should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is an equal difference in the means of 
search rates across time. In other words, there is no evidence of statistically significant 
changes in search rates across time. 
Contraband Hit Rates 
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .029, χ2(2) = 269.39, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .56 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was closer to 0, it is the most accurate 





The overall F for differences in the mean search rate across the ten points in time 
were statistically significant: F(5.08, 401.06) = 17.28, p < .001; the corresponding effect 
size was a partial η2 of .18. In other words, after individual differences in the mean 
citation rates were taken into account, about 18% of the variance in the mean citation 
rates were related to time. Note that even if the ε correction factor is applied to the 
degrees of freedom for F, the obtained value of F for differences in the mean contraband 
hit rates across time remains statistically significant.  
Planned contrasts were obtained to compare the mean contraband hit rates across 
time. The mean contraband hit rates decreased in 2015 (MD = 5.51, p = .03; MD = 5.90, 
p = .003; MD = 5.37, p = .008), 2016 (MD = 9.67, p = .001; MD = 10.06, p = .001; MD = 
9.53, p < .001), 2017 (MD = 112.06, p < .001; MD = 12.45, p < .001; MD = 11.91, p < 
.001), 2018 (MD = 10.92, p < .001; MD = 111.31, p < .001; MD = 10.02, p < .001), and 
2019 (MD = 10.16, p < .001; MD = 10.55, p < .001; MD = 10.12, p < .001) when 
compared to 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. The mean contraband hit rates also 
decreased in 2016 (MD = 8.22, p = .005; MD = 7.24, p = .04), 2017 (MD = 10.61, p < 
.001; MD = 9.62, p < .001), 2018 (MD = 9.47, p < .001; MD = 8.48, p < .001), and 2019 
(MD = 8.71, p = .001; MD = 7.73, p < .001) when compared to 2013 and 2014, 
respectively (see Table 46). The mean contraband hit rates also decreased in 2017 (MD = 
6.55, p = .001) and 2018 (MD = 5.41, p = .04) when compared to 2015. Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean contraband hit rates across 





rates between 2015 and 2019 had significantly lower contraband hit rates before 2014, 
indicating some de-policing may be taking place. 
Traffic Arrest Rates 
The Mauchly test was performed to assess possible violation of the sphericity 
assumption; this was statistically significant: Mauchly’s W = .002, χ2(2) = 464.16, p < 
.001. The assumption of sphericity is therefore violated. The Greenhouse-Geisser ε value 
of .33 suggested that the sample variance/covariance matrix did depart substantially from 
sphericity. Because the Greenhouse-Geisser ε value was closer to 0, it is the most 
accurate method to evaluate the F ratio's significance by adjusting the degrees of 
freedom. 
The overall F for differences in the mean search rate across the ten points in time 
were statistically significant: F(2.93, 231.28) = 5.14, p = .002; the corresponding effect 
size was a partial η2 of .06. In other words, after individual differences in the mean traffic 
arrest rates were taken into account, about 6% of the variance in the mean traffic arrest 
rates were related to time. Note that even if the ε correction factor is applied to the 
degrees of freedom for F, the obtained value of F for differences in the mean contraband 
hit rates across time remains statistically significant.  
Planned contrasts were obtained to compare the mean traffic arrest rates across 
time. The mean traffic arrest rates decreased between 2010 and 2019. The mean decrease 
is statistically significant in 2016 (MD = 1.77, p = .02), 2017 (MD = 1.94, p = .02), 2018 





we reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in mean traffic arrest rates across 
time. Thus, of the statistically significant time points in this study, the traffic arrest rates 
between 2016 and 2019 had significantly lower traffic arrest rates than in 2010. However, 
the mean differences in traffic arrest rates between 2015 and 2019, when compared to 








Mean Differences in Contraband Hit Rates 
 
 Year 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
 MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. MD Sig. 
2010 






































2.53 1.00 2.43 1.00 1.76 1.00 - - -.81 1.00 -
4.20 








3.33 .69 3.23 .73 2.56 1.00 .81 1.00 - - -
3.40 




.001 -9.57  .001 
2015 6.73  .001 6.63  .001 5.96  .001 4.20 .25 3.40 .38 - - -5.62 .36 -8.31  .001 -7.03  .001 -6.18  .04 
2016 12.35  .001 12.25  .001 11.58  .001 9.82  .001 9.02  .01 5.62 .36 - - -2.69 1.00 -1.41 1.00 -.55 1.00 
2017 15.04  .001 14.94  .001 14.27  .001 12.51  .001 11.71  .001 8.31  .001 2.69 1.00 - - 1.28 1.00 2.13 1.00 
2018 13.76  .001 13.66  .001 12.99  .001 11.23  .001 10.42  .001 7.03  .001 1.41 1.00 -1.28 1.00 - - .85 1.00 






Conclusion of the Analysis 
When evaluating data related to crime (i.e., total crime, violent crime, property 
crime, murder, and LEOKA, several conclusions may be drawn from the data. Alterations 
in crime were not found to be statistically significant, despite fluctuations in crime rates. 
In general, crime rates pertaining to total crime, property crimes, and LEOKA decreased 
over time. However, there has been a general upward trend in violent crimes and murder 
rates since 2013, with the largest increase occurring between 2014 and 2015.  
The data pertaining to de-policing (i.e., criminal arrests, traffic stops, citation 
rates, search rates, contraband hit rates, and traffic stop arrests) produced mixed results. 
Decreases in criminal arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, contraband hit rates, and traffic 
arrest rates were statistically significant, indicating that the null hypothesis of no 
difference should be rejected. Mean differences in search rates were not statistically 
significant, causing us to fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference. Therefore, 
data conclusions support the premise that the null hypothesis of no difference should be 
rejected as a majority of the variables analyzed demonstrated statistically significant 
mean differences across time. When viewing the aggregate data from the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan area, one may conclude that the entire region has experienced statistically 
significant differences in policing activities, with no statistically significant difference in 
crime rates. Therefore, it may not be proved that there is a statistically significant 






RQ2 addressed how policing practices and crime different between regions for a 
given year. The research question builds upon the first research question by comparing 
regions at a specific point in time to identify regional differences in policing and crime. 
To evaluate whether the geographical differences in crime and policing existed within a 
given year, a one-way MANOVA was performed to assess the 11 continuous dependent 
variables (i.e., total crime, violent crime, property crime, murder, LEOKA, criminal and 
traffic arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, search rates, and contraband hit rates) across an 
eight-level factor of region using SPSS general linear model (GLM) with data derived 
from the MSHP UCR database and the MOAG VSR. An analysis using MANOVA was 
employed because it allowed me to assess 11 different dependent variables across a 
categorical fixed independent variable of region. 
 The variables and analysis are identical to those conducted for the first research 
question; however, data for this analysis were divided by region and compared for each 
year. The dependent variables of total crime, violent crime, property crime, murder were 
continuous measures of rates calculated based on population (i.e., rate per 1,000 
residents), while LEOKA was a function of the number of LEOs for a given department. 
Criminal arrests and traffic stops comprised total outcomes measured. The dependent 
variables of citation rates, search rates, contraband hit rates, and vehicle stop arrests were 
expressed as a function of the total number of traffic stops (i.e., citations, searches, 





respectively). The fixed factor (i.e., independent variable) was a categorical measure of 
region with eight levels within the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region: Jefferson County, 
St. Charles County, St. Louis City, St. Louis County, Unincorporated St. Louis County, 
St. Louis County – East-Central Corridor, North St. Louis County, South St. Louis 
County, and West St. Louis County. A separate analysis was conducted for each of the 10 
years (i.e., 2010-2019) studied in this research study. Tables 7-16 depict the regional 
differences in each of the independent and dependent variables for each of the 10 years 
evaluated for this study. 
The research question for this analysis is: What are the annual differences in the 
quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and 
assaults and fatal injuries to law enforcement officers between geographical regions in 
the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time? The null hypothesis is: There are no 
annual differences in the quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, 
crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to law enforcement officers 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time. The 
alternative hypothesis is: There are annual differences in the quantities of traffic stops, 
search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries 
to law enforcement officers between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO 







Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, 
approximate F(11, 60) = 127.54, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .96 
indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(77, 366.99) = 5.33, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .47) with a moderate association. A pairwise comparison  
of means revealed statistically significant differences in means across the dependent 
variables associated with total crime, violent crime, property crime, criminal arrests, 



















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 31.3 9.3 8 26.6 18.5 8 105.9 - 1 24.3 - 1 
Violent Crime 3.0 1.5 8 1.6 .4 8 19.4 - 1 2.4 - 1 
Property Crime 28.2 8.7 8 25.0 18.3 8 86.5 - 1 21.9 - 1 
Murder .1 .3 8 .1 .2 8 4.5 - 1 .4 - 1 
LEOKA .2 .3 8 .2 .1 8 .3 - 1 .4 - 1 
Criminal Arrests 1219.5 1689.2 8 1966.0 1818.0 8 24201.0 - 1 24239.0 - 1 
Traffic Stops 3232.0 2909.7 8 8429.4 5029.8 8 72510.0 - 1 91091.0 - 1 
Citation Rate 63.2 31.7 8 58.1 17.2 8 37.6 - 1 66.0 - 1 
Search Rate 11.3 11.7 8 15.3 4.6 8 18.5 - 1 17.6 - 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 16.3 9.5 8 26.8 9.9 8 14.3 - 1 21.6 - 1 






















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 28.2 23.0 13 51.4 26.9 37 22.1 1.3 2 21.0 11.7 8 39.4 26.3 78  
Violent Crime 1.4 1.1 13 9.2 9.0 37 .9 1.3 2 .8 .4 8 5.4 7.4 78  
Property Crime 26.9 22.3 13 42.2 20.0 37 21.2 2.7 2 20.2 11.7 8 34.0 20.7 78  
Murder .1 .3 13 1.8 5.7 37 .6 .8 2 .1 .4 8 1.0 4.0 78  
LEOKA .1 .2 13 .2 .2 37 .1 .1 2 .1 .1 8 .2 .2 78  
Criminal Arrests 636.6 503.2 13 937.6 937.9 37 250.5 326.0 2 731.7 356.8 8 1580.1 3851.7 78  
Traffic Stops 4858.0 2302.6 13 3217.4 3311.3 37 1888.5 2421.8 2 5823.0 4283.9 8 6275.0 12960.1 78  
Citation Rate 69.8 14.2 13 76.7 25.4 37 62.3 4.3 2 75.5 16.5 8 71.1 23.1 78  
Search Rate 6.2 4.1 13 9.7 7.4 37 6.5 .6 2 7.0 3.0 8 9.7 7.2 78  
Contraband Hit 
Rate 
18.2 6.8 13 17.1 11.3 37 4.4 6.2 2 16.6 5.0 8 17.8 10.1 78  
Traffic Arrest 
Rate 





Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 70) = 4.61, p < .001, η2 = .32. For the variable, total crime, there 
was a statistically significant difference between St. Louis City and St. Charles County 
(MD = 79.26, p = .05), the East-Central Corridor of St. Louis County (MD = 77.68, p = 
.05), and West St. Louis County (MD = 84.95, p = .02). A statistically significant 
difference in total crime is also present between North St. Louis County and West St. 
Louis County (MD = 30.44, p = .03). While there is a statistically significant difference 
between regional means (M  = 39.4), there is less of a difference between North St. Louis 
County (M  = 51.4) and West St. Louis County (M  = 21.0) and St. Louis City (M  = 
105.9) and West St. Louis County. The significance, then, is indicative of greater 
differences in total crime in the city of St. Louis as compared to St. Charles County and 
West St. Louis County. 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(5, 70) = 4.51, p < .001, η2 = .31. For the variable, violent 
crime, there was a statistically significant difference between St. Charles County (MD = 
7.58, p = .10), East-Central Corridor (MD = 7.83, p = .01), and West St. Louis County 
(MD = 8.43, p = .04) when compared to North St. Louis County when adjusting the p-
value to .10. The most significant difference lies between West St. Louis County (M = 
0.8) and North St. Louis County (M = 9.2) when evaluating regional means (M  = 5.4). 





(M = 1.4), though significant when compared to North St. Louis County, were less than 
the observed values for West St. Louis County. 
Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 3.64, p = .01, η2 = .27. When adjusting the p-
value to .10, there is a statistically significant difference in the means of property crimes 
in St. Charles County (MD = 61.47, p = .07), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 59.60, p = 
.08), and West St. Louis County (MD = 66.26, p = .04) when compared to St. Louis City. 
There is also a statistically significant difference of means between North St. Louis 
County and West St. Louis County (MD = 22.01, p = .01). The greatest difference in 
means occurs between West St. Louis County (M = 20.2) and St. Louis City (M = 86.5, 
though there are significant differences found in the East-Central Corridor (M = 26.9) and 
St. Charles County (M = 25.0) when compared to the region (M  = 34.0). The mean value 
of property crime in North St. Louis County (M = 42.2) was also significantly above the 
regional mean. Therefore, one may conclude that West St. Louis County experienced the 
lowest property crime when compared to St. Louis City and North St. Louis County. 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 70) = .55, p = .79, η2 = .05. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates between regions. Murder rates in St. Louis City (M  = 4.5) 
and North St. Louis County (M  = 1.8) were noted to be significantly higher than any 
other region analyzed and when compared to the regional mean (M  = 1.0). In 2010, the 





LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = .82, p = .58, η2 = .08. 
Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. Mean rates 
for LEOKA in 2010 were lowest in South St. Louis County (M  = 0.1) and highest in the 
independent city of St. Louis (M  = 0.3) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M  = 0.4). 
Moreover, most regions did not differ significantly from the regional mean (M  = 0.2). Of 
all the 1258 law enforcement officers assaulted in 2010, only one officer was killed in the 
line of duty. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 70) = 134.94, p < .001, η2 = .93. There was a statistically 
significant difference between St. Louis City and Jefferson County (MD = 22981.50, p < 
.001), St. Charles County (MD = 22235.00, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 
23564.39, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 23263.41, p < .001), South St. Louis 
County (MD = 23950.50, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 23469.25, p < 
.001). There were also statistically significant differences in criminal arrests in 
unincorporated St. Louis County and Jefferson County (MD = 23019.50, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 22273.00, p < .001),  the East-Central Corridor (MD = 23602.39, 
p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 23301.41, p < .001), South St. Louis County 
(MD = 23988.50, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 23507.25, p < .001).  
The most significant differences were experienced in South St. Louis County (M = 250.5) 





= 24239.0). The disparity in means is also prevalent when analyzing the other mean 
values for criminal arrests in the region (M  = 1580.08): Jefferson County (M = 1219.5), 
St. Charles County (M = 1966.0), the East-Central Corridor (M = 636.6), North St. Louis 
County (M = 937.6), and West St. Louis County (M = 731.8). While the population 
differences associated with the law enforcement agencies between South St . Louis 
County and other regions may explain the mean difference when compared to other 
regions, differences in the population do not necessarily account for the statistically 
significant differences between other regions when compared to St. Louis City or 
unincorporated St. Louis County. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops were statistically significant, 
where F(7, 70) = 146.00, p < .001, η2 = .94. There was a statistically significant 
difference between St. Louis City and Jefferson County (MD = 69278.00, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 64080.63, p < .001), unincorporated St. Louis County (MD = 
18581.00, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 67652.00, p < .001), North St. 
Louis County (MD = 69292.57, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 70.621.50, p < 
.001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 66687.00, p < .001). There were also 
statistically significant differences found between unincorporated St. Louis County and 
Jefferson County (MD = 87859.00, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 82661.63, p < 
.001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 86233.00, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD 
= 87873.57, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 89202.50, p < .001), and West St. 





traffic stops conducted were also observed between North St. Louis County and St. 
Charles County (MD = 5211.94, p = .01). The most significant differences was noted 
between unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 91091.0) and Jefferson (M = 3232.0), 
North St. Louis Counties (M = 3217.4) and South St. Louis County (M = 1888.5), 
especially when compared to the regional mean (M  = 6275.0). A disparity in means was 
also observable in St. Charles County (M = 8429.4), the East-Central Corridor, West St. 
Louis County (M = 5823.0), and the independent city of St. Louis (M = 72510.0). 
Differences in traffic stops, then, in the region were found to vary significantly. 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.22, p = .301, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were 
no observable statistically significant differences in the citation rates between regions. 
The fewest mean number of citations were issued in St. Louis City (M  = 37.6), while the 
most were issued in West (M  = 75.5) and North (M  = 76.7) St. Louis County, which 
greatly differed from the regional mean (M  = 71.1). 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.93, p = .07, η2 = .16. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in search rates between regions. Mean search rates were lowest in 
the East-Central Corridor (M  = 6.2), South St. Louis County (M  = 6.5), West St. Louis 
County (M  = 7.0) and highest in St. Charles County (M  = 15.3), unincorporated St. 
Louis County (M  = 17.5), and St. Louis City (M  = 18.5), which differed significantly 





Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.62, p = .34, η2 = .10. Therefore, there were 
no statistically significant observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. 
Most of the regional contraband hit rates were at or near the regional mean (M  = 17.9); 
however, search rates were much lower in South St. Louis County (M  = 4.4) when 
compared to unincorporated St. Louis County (M  = 21.6) and St. Charles County (M  = 
26.8). 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.15, p = .34, η2 = .10. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in traffic arrest rates between regions. Traffic arrest rates were 
significantly lower in South St. Louis County (M  = 2.76) and the East-Central Corridor 
(M  = 2.9) when compared to the region (M  = 5.0), as well as to unincorporated St. Louis 
County (M  = 5.5), St. Charles County (M  = 5.5), and North St. Louis County (M  = 5.8). 
Conclusion. When evaluating crime and policing rates across regions in 2010, 
there were statistically different rates of total crime, violent crime, and property crime, 
with the most significant differences occurring between the independent city of St. Louis 
and North St. Louis County when compared to West St. Louis County. Observable 
differences were also found in St. Charles County and the East Central Corridor when 
compared to St. Louis City and North St. Louis County. No statistically significant 
differences were found in murder rates per 10,000 persons or LEOKA rates. When 





differences of criminal arrests and traffic stops, which were not adjusted for population. 
The most considerable differences were observed between the City of St. Louis and 
unincorporated St. Louis County and the rest of the region. All other measures of policing 
being equal, it is evident that crime rates are higher in St. Louis City and North County, 
lowest in West St. Louis County, and levels of policing across the region are relatively 
constant in 2010, indicating no regional disparities in policing. 
2011 
 Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, 
approximate F(11, 77) = 142.94, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .96 
indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(77, 378.97) = 5.58, p < .001; this corresponded 



















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 31.3 12.3 9 28.8 19.2 8 99.6 . 1 23.6 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.9 2.0 9 1.5 .9 8 18.6 . 1 2.3 . 1 
Property Crime 28.2 11.3 9 27.3 19.6 8 81.0 . 1 21.3 . 1 
Murder 0 0 9 0 .1 8 3.6 . 1 .4 . 1 
LEOKA .2 .3 9 .2 .2 8 .3 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 1128.0 1488.1 9 2132.3 1638.3 8 26842.0 . 1 26468.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 3709.9 3294.0 9 8855.5 5336.7 8 73720.0 . 1 89151.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 72.4 17.8 9 57.1 19.0 8 34.0 . 1 68.2 . 1 
Search Rate 12.7 14.5 9 13.7 6.5 8 27.6 . 1 17.5 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 17.1 10.9 9 25.7 8.0 8 17.7 . 21.9 21.6 . 1 




















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 29.7 25.1 13 50.6 22.5 38 16.3 9.3 2 21.9 14.8 8 39.4 24.3 80 
 
Violent Crime 1.3 1.1 13 8.2 6.6 38 .7 .4 2 .7 .4 8 5.0 5.9 80 
 
Property Crime 28.5 24.4 13 42.4 18.2 38 14.9 8.2 2 21.1 14.7 8 34.4 20.4 80 
 
Murder .1 .3 13 1.2 2.7 38 0 0 2 .1 .3 8 .7 1.9 80 
 
LEOKA .1 .2 13 .3 .4 38 .1 .1 2 0 0 8 .2 .3 80 
 
Criminal Arrests 679.8 580.6 13 1008.6 1040.8 38 255.5 313.2 2 743.3 354.8 8 1676.7 4171.6 80 
 
Traffic Stops 4779.5 2602.3 13 3174.8 3417.1 38 1924.0 2450.8 2 5657.4 4140.5 8 6237.3 12773.8 80 
 
Citation Rate 67.7 15.1 13 73.0 30.6 38 71.5 10.7 2 73.2 16.9 8 69.9 24.6 80 
 














 Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 72) = 4.84, p < .001, η2 = .32. There was a statistically significant 
difference between St. Louis City and South St. Louis County (MD = 83.28, p = .05) and 
West St. Louis County (MD = 77.75, p = .02). There was also a statistically significant 
difference between the means of North St. Louis County and West St. Louis County (MD 
= 28.73, p = .02). The most significant differences were noted between St. Louis City (M 
= 99.6) and South St. Louis County (M = 16.3). A lesser difference is also present 
between St. Louis City and West St. Louis County (M = 21.9) as well as between North 
St. Louis County (M = 50.6)  and West St. Louis County, especially when considering the 
regional mean (M = 39.4). In other words, the greatest differences in means of total crime 
lie between St. Louis City and South St. Louis County. While South St. Louis County is 
policed by two agencies, adding statistics for all of unincorporated St. Louis County, 
which comprises a large portion of the Southern part of St. Louis County, does not 
greatly alter the mean difference indicating a disparity in total crime between the 
independent city of St. Louis and South St. Louis County. 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 6.75, p < .001, η2 = .40. There was a statistically 
significant difference between St. Louis City and St. Charles County (MD = 17.13, p = 
.03), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 17.38, p = .02), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
17.1392, p = .02). There was a statistically significant difference between North St. Louis 





6.97, p = .01), and West St. Louis County (MD = 7.51, p = .01). The largest mean 
differences lies between St. Louis City (M = 18.6) and West St. Louis County (M = 0.7). 
Less of a mean difference lies between North St. Louis County (M = 8.2) when compared 
to St. Charles County (M = 1.50), the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.3), and the entire 
region (M = 5.0). In other words, St. Louis City has the highest rates of violent crime per 
1,000 residents, while West St. Louis County has the lowest levels. 
Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 3.38, p = .01, η2 = .25. There was a statistically 
significant difference between St. Louis City and West St. Louis County (MD = 59.84, p 
= .09) when adjusting the p-value to a .10 level of significance. When comparing the 
means of property crime per 1,000 residents in St. Louis City (M = 81.0) with West St. 
Louis County (M = 21.1) and the entire region (M = 34.4), the disparity becomes obvious. 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 72) = 1.34, p = .25, η2 = .12. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. In 2011, the entire 
region experienced 161 murders, with 114 murders taking place in the city of St. Louis—
a decrease when compared to 2010. Nonetheless, mean murder rates in the city of St. 
Louis (M = 3.6) and North St. Louis County (M = 1.2) were much greater than the 
regional mean (M = 0.7). 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 





.08. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA rates between regions. 
The mean rate of LEOKA did not vary significantly across the region (M = 0.20) where 
South (M = 0.1) and West (M = 0.1) St. Louis County experienced the lowest levels and 
St. Louis City (M = 0.3) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 0.3) had the highest 
mean rates of LEOKA. In 2011, only one law enforcement officer was killed in the line 
of duty, despite 1264 law enforcement officers injured or assaulted during the year. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 72) = 162.99, p < .001, η2 = .94. There was a statistically 
significant difference between St. Louis City and St. Charles County (MD = 24709.75, p 
< .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 26162.23, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 25833.45, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 26586.50, p < .001), and 
West St. Louis County (MD = 26098.75, p < .001). There was a statistically significant 
difference between unincorporated St. Louis County and Jefferson County (MD = 
25340.00, p < .001) St. Charles County (MD = 24335.75, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 25788.23, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 25459.48, p < .001), 
South St. Louis County (MD = 26212.50, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
25724.75, p < .001). The largest means difference lies between St. Louis City (M = 
26842.0) and St. Louis County (M = 255.5), the East-Central Corridor (M = 679.8), and 
West St. Louis County (M = 743.3). The means of Jefferson County (M = 1128.0), St. 
Charles County (M = 2132.3), and North St. Louis County (M = 1008.6) are also of 





the region (M = 1676.7), the number of agencies, population, and law enforcement 
officers policing the region may be an underlying factor in the mean disparity of criminal 
arrests. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 72) = 132.98, p < .001, η2 = .93. There was a statistically significant difference 
between St. Louis City and Jefferson County (MD = 70010.11, p < .001), St. Charles 
County (MD = 64864.50, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 68940.54, p < 
.001), North St. Louis County (MD = 70545.34, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
71796.00, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 68062.63, p < .001). Statistically 
significant differences also lie between unincorporated St. Louis County and Jefferson 
County (MD = 85441.11, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 80295.50, p < .001), the 
East-Central Corridor (MD = 84371.54, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 
85976.24, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 87277.00, p < .001), and West St. 
Louis County (MD = 83493.63, p < .001). The greatest differences of means lies between 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 89151.00) and Jefferson County (M = 3709.9), St. 
Charles County (M = 80295.5), the East-Central Corridor (M = 4779.5), North St. Louis 
County (M = 3174.8), South St. Louis County (M = 1924.0), and West St. Louis County 
(M = 5657.4). In other words, the difference between unincorporated St. Louis County 
and the rest of the region (M = 6237.3) is greater than the difference between St. Louis 





Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 0.74, p = .64, η2 = .07. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in the number of citations issued per traffic stop between regions. 
The highest mean rate of citations issued was found in Jefferson County (M = 72.4), 
North St. Louis County (M = 73.0), and West St. Louis County (M = 73.2), while the 
mean rate of citations issued was lowest in St. Louis City (M = 34.0), especially when 
considering the regional mean (M = 69.9). 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 2.35, p = .03, η2 = .19. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Mean search rates in South (M 
= 5.5) and West (M = 5.7) were far lower than the regional mean (M = 8.9) as well as the 
mean search rate in the independent city of St. Louis (M = 27.6). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 1.34, p = .24, η2 = .12. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates per traffic stop between regions. 
Contraband hit rates varied significantly from the regional mean (M = 17.5) in South St. 
Louis County (M = 4.0) and St. Charles County (M = 25.7) and unincorporated St. Louis 
County (M = 21.9). 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was not 





observable differences in traffic arrests per traffic stop between regions. Traffic arrest 
rates were significantly lower in South St. Louis County (M = 2.4) and the East-Central 
Corridor (M = 2.7) when compared to the region (M = 4.7) and North St. Louis County 
(M = 5.5), Jefferson County (M = 5.7), and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 6.0). 
Conclusion. While criminal arrest rates and traffics stops were measured as total 
counts, one would expect a mean disparity across regions. However, crime rates (i.e., 
total, violent, and property crime), which were measured per 1,000 residents, did vary 
significantly across regions indicating measurable differences between the regions of St. 
Louis County. The most significant differences in crime were found between St. Louis 
City and South and West St. Louis County. Elevated crime rates were also observed in 
North St. Louis County, where levels of policing were at or near the mean for the region. 
2012 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .05, 
approximate F(10, 63) = 122.35, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .95 





implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(70, 374.17) =5.75, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .46) with a moderate association  
Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 72) = 2.78, p = .01, η2 = .21. However, when reviewing the 
regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was significant even 
when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Total crime was highest in the city of St. Louis 
(M = 87.3) and North St. Louis County (M = 48.3). The lowest mean levels of total crime 
were noted in South St. Louis County (M = 15.9), West St. Louis County (M = 20.4), and 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 21.0), especially when considering the mean for 
the region (M = 37.6). 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 2.77, p = .01, η2 = .21. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Mean levels of violent crime 
were highest in the city of St. Louis (M = 17.73) and North St. Louis County (M = 9.4), 
when compared to the region (M = 5.5), West (M = 0.8) and South (M = 1.1) St. Louis 



















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 30.5 13.6 9 25.5 11.9 8 87.3 . 1 21.0 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.5 1.2 9 1.6 1.1 8 17.7 . 1 2.2 . 1 
Property Crime 28.0 12.8 9 23.9 11.1 8 69.6 . 1 18.8 . 1 
Murder .1 .2 9 0 .1 8 3.5 . 1 .2 . 1 
LEOKA .2 .2 9 .2 .2 8 .4 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 1090.3 1658.9 9 2216.4 1587.8 8 24966.0 . 1 26231.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 389.1 3512.0 9 8440.4 4801.9 8 64084.0 . 1 90528.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 69.0 18.3 9 52.9 19.1 8 32.5 . 1 68.2 . 1 
Search Rate 11.0 10.8 9 18.4 17.5 8 33.1 . 1 16.7 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 20.4 5.3 9 27.8 7.8 8 15.7 . 1 21.9 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 30.0 34.6 13 48.3 28.0 38 15.8 4.6 2 20.4 15.3 8 37.6 27.6 80 
 
Violent Crime 1.5 1.1 13 9.3 11.6 38 1.1 .4 2 .8 .4 8 5.5 9.0 80 
 
Property Crime 28.5 33.6 13 39.0 19.8 38 14.7 5.0 2 19.6 14.9 8 32.1 14.9 80 
 
Murder .4 1.0 13 1.9 5.6 38 .6 .8 2 0 0 8 1.1 4.0 80 
 
LEOKA .2 .2 13 .2 .4 38 0 .1 2 0 0 8 .2 .3 80 
 
Criminal Arrests 647.4 604.2 13 1023.7 1170.9 38 262 335.2 2 742.4 364.5 8 1656.5 4037.0 80 
 
Traffic Stops 4684.5 2682.6 13 3066.5 3400.3 38 1939.5 2544.9 2 6275.1 4366.4 8 6099.0 12276.4 80 
 
Citation Rate 68.6 16.6 13 67.4 34.4 38 80.0 19.2 2 71.7 12.5 8 66.7 26.9 80 
 














Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 1.97, p = .07, η2 = .16. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in rates of property crime per 1,000 residents between regions. 
Similar to other types of crime, mean rates of property crime were higher in the city of St. 
Louis (M = 69.6) and North St. Louis County (M = 39.0) when compared to the region 
(M = 32.1), South St. Louis County (M = 14.7), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
18.8), and West St. Louis County (M = 19.6). 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 72) =0 .58, p = .77, η2 = .05. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. Consistent with 
previous years, mean murder rates in St. Louis City (M = 3.4) and North St. Louis 
County (M = 1.3) were higher than the regional mean (M = 1.1) and the means for West 
St. Louis County (M = 0.0), St. Charles County (M = 0.1), and Jefferson County (M = 
0.1). Moreover, the entire metropolitan region experienced 167 murders, a slight increase 
over 2011, with 113 of the murders committed in the city of St. Louis. 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 0.48, p = .84, η2 = 
.05. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA rates between regions. 
Mean rates of LEOKA varied little across the region (M = 0.2), where the fewest mean 





highest mean were found in unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 0.3) and St. Louis 
City (M = 0.4). No officers were killed in the line of duty during 2012. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 72) = 127.93, p < .001, η2 = .93. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in Jefferson County (MD = 23875.67, p < .001; 
MD = 25140.67, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 22749.63, p < .001; MD = 
24014.63, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 24318.62, p < .001; MD = 
25583.62, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 23942.26, p < .001; MD = 25207.26, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 24704.00, p < .001; MD = 25969.00, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 24223.63, p < .001; MD = 25488.63, p < .001) when 
compared to St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively. When 
evaluating the means, there appears to be a wide variance between St. Louis City (M = 
24966.0) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 26231.0) and Jefferson County (M = 
1090.33), St. Charles County (M = 2216.4), the East-Central Corridor (M = 647.4), North 
St. Louis County (M = 1023.7), South St. Louis County (M = 262.0), West St. Louis 
County (M = 742.4), and the entire region (M = 1656.5). The largest variance in criminal 
arrests, therefore, is between West St. Louis County, the East-Central Corridor, and 
South St. Louis County and unincorporated St. Louis County and the independent city of 
St. Louis. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 





traffic stops in Jefferson County (MD = 60274.89, p < .001; MD = 86718.89, p < .001), 
St. Charles County (MD = 55643.63, p < .001; MD = 82087.63, p < .001), the East-
Central Corridor (MD = 59399.54, p < .001; MD = 85843.54, p < .001), North St. Louis 
County (MD = 61017.50, p < .001; MD = 87461.50, p < .001), South St. Louis County 
(MD = 62144.50, p < .001; MD = 88588.50 p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
57808.88, p < .001; MD = 84252.88, p < .001) when compared to St. Louis City and 
unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively. There was a statistically significant 
difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and North St. Louis County (MD = 
5373.88, p = .01). There appears to be a wide variance in mean levels of traffic stops 
between St. Louis City (M = 64084.0) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
90528.0) and the mean for the region (M = 6099.0), Jefferson County (M = 3809.1), St. 
Charles County (M = 8440.4), the East-Central Corridor (M = 4684.5), North St. Louis 
County (M = 3066.5), South St. Louis County (M = 1939.5), and West St. Louis County 
(M = 6275.1). A significant difference was also observed when comparing North St. 
Louis County to St. Charles County. Also of note is the low number of traffic stops 
conducted in North St. Louis County when compared to the rest of the region. 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 0.64, p = .72, η2 = .21. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in the number of citations issued per traffic stop between regions. 





of citations when compared to the region (M = 66.7) and West (M = 71.7) and South (M 
= 80.0) St. Louis County. 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 2.66, p = .02, η2 = .21. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Search rates were below the 
regional mean (M = 9.2) in West St. Louis County (M = 5.60), West St. Louis County (M 
= 6.2), and the East-Central Corridor (M = 6.3) and well above the regional mean in St. 
Charles County (M = 18.4) and St. Louis City (M = 33.1). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 2.02, p = .06, η2 = .16. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. Searches yielded the 
highest mean rates of contraband in St. Charles County (M = 27.8), unincorporated St. 
Louis County (M = 21.9), and West St. Louis County (M = 21.6). Contraband hit rates 
were far below the regional mean (M = 18.0) in South St. Louis County (M = 5.7). 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 72) = 0.87, p = .53, η2 = .08. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in the number of traffic arrest rates between regions. Mean rates 
for traffic arrests were below the regional mean (M = 4.55) in the East-Central Corridor 





regional mean in St. Charles County (M = 6.9), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
5.5), St. Louis City (M = 5.5), and Jefferson County (M = 5.2). 
Conclusion. No statistically significant regional variances in crime rates were 
observed in 2013. Moreover, consistent with previous years, the mean differences in 
criminal arrests and traffics stops made across the region varied the greatest between the 
independent city of St. Louis and unincorporated St. Louis County and the rest of the 
region. All other measures of policing (i.e., citation rates, search rates, contraband hit 
rates, and traffic arrests) appear to be constant across the region. 
2013 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, 
approximate F(10, 62) = 129.86, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .95 
indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 





significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(70, 368.34) =5.68, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .46) with a moderate association.  
 Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 71) = 4.27, p = .01, η2 = .30. There was a statistically significant 
difference in total crime in North St. Louis County when compared to St. Charles County 
(MD = 25.20, p = .05) and West St. Louis County (MD = 25.79, p = .04). The greatest 
mean differences of significance, then, are between North St. Louis County (M = 45.7) 
and West St. Louis County (M = 19.9), though there is a similar means difference 
between North St. Louis County and St. Charles County (M = 20.5) as well. The mean 
level of total crime in the city of St. Louis (M = 83.0) was also well above the mean level 
for the entire metropolitan region (M = 35.2), though the difference was not considered 
significant compared to other regions. Moreover, the highest significant level of disparity 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 31.7 16.8 9 20.5 8.5 8 83.0 . 1 20.00 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.5 1.9 9 1.0 .7 8 16.0 . 1 2.3 . 1 
Property Crime 29.2 16.9 9 19.6 8.5 8 67.0 . 1 17.7 . 1 
Murder .1 .3 9 .1 .1 8 3.8 . 1 .2 . 1 
LEOKA .1 .2 9 .2 .1 8 .3 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 1113.1 1443.9 9 2147.0 1530.1 8 23620.0 . 1 232.65.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 4021.3 34462.5 9 8695.4 4630.5 8 67984.0 . 1 85895.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 69.0 17.8 9 52.1 17.5 8 38.2 . 1 60.9 . 1 
Search Rate 11.1 12.0 9 14.8 5.9 8 29.2 . 1 18.1 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 22.9 8.9 9 27.8 11.6 8 13.7 . 1 19.0 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 26.3 22.7 13 45.7 21.9 37 18.3 4.0 2 19.9 16.9 8 35.2 22.7 79 
 
Violent Crime 1.2 .8 13 8.3 9.6 37 1.6 .7 2 .6 .2 8 4.8 7.6 79 
 
Property Crime 25.1 22.0 13 37.4 17.2 37 16.6 4.7 2 19.3 16.9 8 30.4 18.7 79 
 
Murder .1 .1 13 2.3 11.0 37 0 0 2 .3 .6 8 1.2 7.6 79 
 
LEOKA .1 .1 13 .2 .2 37 0 .1 2 0 0 8 .1 .2 79 
 
Criminal Arrests 590.2 562.7 13 909.8 1027.9 37 249.0 302.6 2 673.0 306.2 8 1544.8 3711.7 79 
 
Traffic Stops 4714.2 2357.2 13 3195.9 3604.2 37 1537.0 2023.7 2 5889.4 4153.4 8 6193.4 12180.4 79 
 
Citation Rate 70.1 16.5 13 68.7 34.5 37 70.9 5.1 2 71.1 13.9 8 67.1 26.6 79 
 














Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 71) = 2.85, p = .01, η2 = .22. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. The mean levels of property 
crime were highest in St. Louis City (M = 67.0) and North St. Louis County (M = 37.4) 
and lowest in South St. Louis County (M = 16.6), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
17.7), West St. Louis County (M = 19.3), and St. Charles County (M = 19.6), when 
compared to the regional mean (M = 30.4). 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 71) = 0.24, p = .97, η2 = .02. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. In 2013, there were 166 
murders, one fewer murder than in 2012. Of those homicides, 121 occurred in the city of 
St. Louis, an increase of eight murders over the previous year. Consistent with the high 
number of homicides, St. Louis City‘s (M = 3.8) mean murder rate was more than three 
times the regional mean (M = 1.2). North St. Louis County (M = 2.3) also experienced a 
high mean rate of homicides, especially when compared to South St. Louis County (M = 
0.0), the East-Central Corridor (M = 0.1), and St. Charles County (M = 0.1). 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 71) = 1.50, p = .18, η2 = 
.13. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. There 





to previous years, with no law enforcement officers killed in the line of duty. St. Louis 
City (M = 0.3) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 0.3) experienced rates well 
above the regional mean (M = 0.1), while West (M = 0.1) and South (M = 0.1) St. Louis 
County had rates below the regional mean. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 71) = 133.93, p < .001, η2 = .93. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 22506.89, p < .001; 
MD = 22151.89, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 21473.00, p < .001; MD = 
21118.00, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 23029.77, p < .001; MD = 
22674.77, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 22690.22, p < .001; MD = 22335.22, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 23371.00, p < .001; MD = 23016.00, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 22506.89, p < .001; MD = 22506.89, p < .001). There 
is also a statistically significant difference in criminal arrests between St. Charles County 
and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 1556.77, p < .001). The greatest mean differences 
of significance in the total number of criminal arrests in the region is between South St. 
Louis County (M = 249.0), the East-Central Corridor (M = 590.23), and West St. Louis 
County (M = 673.0) when compared to the independent city of St. Louis (M = 23620.0), 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 23265.0), and the region (M = 1544.8), though the 
differences in criminal arrest rates in Jefferson (M = 1113.1), St. Charles (M = 2147.0) 





largest observed difference of significance is criminal arrests lies between the 
independent city of St. Louis and unincorporated St. Louis County and South St. Louis 
County, the East-Central Corridor, and West St. Louis County. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 71) = 119.53, p < .001, η2 = .92. There was a statistically significant difference in 
traffic stops in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to Jefferson County (MD = 63962.67, p < .001; MD = 81873.67, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 59298.63, p < .001; MD = 77209.63, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 63269.77, p =.02; MD = 17911.00, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 64788.08, p < .001; MD = 82699.08, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
66447.00, p < .001; MD = 84358.00, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
62094.63, p < .001; MD = 80005.63, p < .001). There is also a statistically significant 
difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and North St. Louis County (MD = 
5489.46, p < .001). When viewing regional means, unincorporated St. Louis County (M 
= 85.895.0) and St. Louis city (M = 67984.0) had the highest mean value for traffic stops 
(M = 85.895.0), while South St. Louis County (M = 1537.0), North St. Louis County (M 
= 3195.9), Jefferson County (M = 4021.3), the East-Central Corridor (M = 4714.2), West 
St. Louis County (M = 5889.4), and St. Charles County (M = 8685.4) had the fewest 
mean traffic stops when considering the mean for the region (M = 6193.4). Therefore, the 
most statistically significant disparity lies between unincorporated St. Louis County and 





Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 71) = 0.60, p = .76, η2 = .06. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in the number of citations issued per traffic ticket between 
regions. Similar to previous years, St. Louis City (M = 38.19) issued a below-average 
number of citations per traffic stop when considering mean rates for the region (M = 
67.1) as well as rates in the East-Central Corridor (M = 70.1) and South (M = 70.9) and 
West (M = 71.1) St. Louis County. 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 71) = 2.69, p = .02, η2 = .21. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Mean search rates for the 
East-Central Corridor (M = 5.2) and South (M = 5.6) and West (M = 5.9) St. Louis 
County were also noted to be well below the regional mean (M = 8.5) and mean rates in 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 18.1) and St. Louis City (M = 29.2). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 71) = 1.19, p = .32, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates per traffic stop between regions. Less 
contraband was identified in traffic stops in South St. Louis County (M = 4.6) when 






Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 71) = 0.96, p = .47, η2 = .09. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in traffic arrest rates per traffic stop between regions. The East-
Central Corridor (M = 2.0) and South St. Louis County (M = 2.6) effected fewer arrests 
during traffic stops when compared to the entire region (M = 4.7) and mean rates in 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 5.2), St. Louis City (M = 5.2), North St. Louis 
County (M = 5.4), St. Charles (M = 5.6) and Jefferson (M = 6.2) Counties. 
Conclusion. When comparing means for total crime, North St. Louis County 
demonstrated significantly higher means compared to West St. Louis and St. Charles 
Counties. Similarly, mean levels of violent crime were also statistically significant when 
comparing North St. Louis County to the East-Central Corridor and West St. Louis 
County. There were no statistically significant differences in means in property crime, 
murder, or LEOKA. Criminal arrests and traffic stops were also higher in the independent 
city of St. Louis and unincorporated St. Louis County when compared to the rest of the 
region, though this may be a function of agency size, policy, and resources rather than 
regional differences. 
2014 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 





measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, 
approximate F(10, 61) = 135.97, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .96 
indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .02, approximate F(70, 362.51) = 5.10, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .44) with a moderate association.  
Total Crime.  The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 70) = 4.33, p < .001, η2 = .30. There was a statistically significant 
difference in total crime in St. Louis City and North St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to West St. Louis County (MD = 63.64, p = .05; MD = 25.95, p = .02). The 
highest means for total crime per 1,000 residents in the region was found in the city of St. 
Louis (M = 80.5) and North St. Louis County (M = 42.8), the lowest levels of total crime 
are found in West St. Louis County (M = 16.8), which was well below the regional mean 




















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 27.1 14.1 9 22.0 17.6 8 80.5 . 1 19.8 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.7 1.9 9 1.4 1.0 8 16.9 . 1 2.9 . 1 
Property Crime 24.4 13.4 9 20.6 16.6 8 63.6 . 1 17.0 . 1 
Murder 0 .1 9 0 .1 8 5.0 . 1 .3 . 1 
LEOKA .2 .2 9 .2 .1 8 .3 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 1046.3 1317.2 9 1958.9 1414.4 8 19702.0 . 1 19783.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 3675.9 3763.5 9 9792.8 5384.1 8 57150.0 . 1 61592.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 68.6 19.8 9 50.4 16.6 8 40.3 . 1 61.6 . 1 
Search Rate 11.4 8.1 9 13.9 4.2 8 22.1 . 1 16.4 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 20.9 5.7 9 30.6 8.2 8 11.9 . 1 21.2 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 24.5 19.4 13 42.8 20.7 36 20.4 7.1 2 16.8 11.0 8 32.8 21.2 78 
 
Violent Crime 1.2 1.2 13 7.2 7.2 36 2.9 2.8 2 .6 .2 8 4.4 5.8 78 
 
Property Crime 23.3 18.4 13 25.6 16.6 36 17.5 9.9 2 16.2 11.0 8 28.4 17.5 78 
 
Murder 0 0 13 2.3 5.5 36 0 0 2 0 0 8 1.1 3.9 78 
 
LEOKA 0 .1 13 .2 .3 36 .1 .1 2 0 .1 8 .2 .2 78 
 
Criminal Arrests 510.8 488.3 13 846.3 891.1 36 219.5 280.7 2 624.4 368.4 8 1373.3 3151.9 78 
 
Traffic Stops 4147.0 1920.4 13 3323.8 3407.0 36 1689.5 2215.4 2 5867.0 4409.4 8 5821.1 9613.0 78 
 
Citation Rate 68.9 14.9 13 69.8 30.0 36 70.0 8.0 2 71.8 9.9 8 67.3 23.8 78 
 




19.0 10.7 13 20.0 14.7 36 8.1 11.4 2 21.8 7.7 8 20.8 12.2 78 
 






Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 4.18, p = .01, η2 = .30. There was a statistically 
significant difference in violent crime in North St. Louis County when compared to the 
East-Central Corridor (MD = 5.92, p = .02). At the same time, the largest mean difference 
lies between the independent city of St. Louis (M = 16.9) and West St. Louis County (M 
= 0.6), given the regional mean (M = 4.4). However, the most significant difference in 
means of violent crime per capita is present between the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.2) 
and North St. Louis County (M = 7.2). 
Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 3.13, p = .01, η2 = .24. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, the mean differences in property 
crime between North St. Louis County and West St. Louis County (MD = 19.418, p = 
.08) were significant when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Although the independent 
city of St. Louis has the highest property crime per capita (M = 63.6), given the regional 
mean (M = 28.4), the mean difference between North St. Louis County (M = 35.6) and 
West St. Louis County (M = 16.2) yields the most significant difference in property crime 
means. 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.05, p = .41, η2 = .10. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. In 2014, homicide rates 





years of this analysis. Of the number of homicides recorded in the region, the city of St. 
Louis logged 159 murders leading to the highest mean murder rate in the region (M = 
5.0). North St. Louis County (M = 2.3) was more than twice the regional mean (M = 1.1) 
rate for murders. Moreover, three regions (i.e., the East-Central Corridor, South St. Louis 
County, and West St. Louis County) recorded no murders, yielding a zero mean. 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.21, p = .31, η2 = 
.11. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. There 
was a decrease in the number of LEOKA in the region, with zero law enforcement 
officers killed in the line of duty that year. The mean rates for LEOKA were highest in 
the St. Louis City (M = 0.3) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 0.3) and lowest in 
the East-Central Corridor (M = 0.1) and West St. Louis County (M = 0.1) when compared 
to the regional mean (M = 0.2). 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 70) = 118.43, p < .001, η2 = .92. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 18655.67, p < .001; 
MD = 18736.67 p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 17743.13, p < .001; MD = 
17824.13, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 19191.23, p < .001; MD = 
19272.23, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 18855.67, p < .001; MD = 18936.67, 





and West St. Louis County (MD = 19077.63, p < .001; MD = 19158.63, p < .001). There 
is also a statistically significant difference in criminal arrests between St. Charles County 
and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 1448.11, p = .02). The greatest mean number of 
criminal arrests were in unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 19783.0) and the 
independent city of St. Louis (M = 19702.0), respectively, because these regions are 
comprised of a single agency. When comparing the means of other agencies in the region 
(M = 1373.3), St. Charles County (M = 1958.9) had the highest mean when compared to 
Jefferson County (M = 1046.3). the East-Central Corridor (M = 510.8), North St. Louis 
County (M = 846.3), South St. Louis County (M = 219.5), and West St. Louis County (M 
= 624.4). 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 70) = 68.39, p < .001, η2 = .87. There was a statistically significant difference in 
traffic stops in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to Jefferson County (MD = 53474.11, p < .001; MD = 57916.11, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 47357.20, p < .001; MD = 51799.25, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 53003.00, p < .001; MD = 57445.00, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 53826.25, p < .001; MD = 58268.25, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
55460.50, p < .001; MD = 59902.50, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
51283.00, p < .001; MD = 55725.00, p < .001). There is also a statistically significant 
difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and Jefferson County (MD = 





Louis County (MD = 6469.00, p =.01). When viewing regional means, unincorporated St. 
Louis County (M = 61592.0) and St. Louis city (M = 57150.0) had the highest mean rate 
of traffic stops, likely because the regions comprised of a single agency, while South St. 
Louis County (M = 1689.5), North St. Louis County (M = 3323.8), Jefferson County (M 
= 3675.9), the East-Central Corridor (M = 4147.0), West St. Louis County (M = 5867.0), 
and St. Charles County (M = 9792.8) had the fewest mean traffic stops when considering 
the region as a whole (M = 5821.1). 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.22, p = .301, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in the number of traffic citations issued per traffic stop between 
regions. The mean rate of the number of citations issued per traffic stop were lowest in 
St. Louis City (M = 40.3) and St. Charles County (M = 50.4) when compared to the entire 
region (M = 67.3) and rates in the Jefferson County (M = 68.6), the East-Central Corridor 
(M = 69.0), and North (M = 69.8), South (M = 70.0) and West (M = 71.8) St. Louis 
County. 
Search rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 2.46, p = .53, η2 = .08. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in search rates between regions. Mean search rates were well 
below the regional mean rate (M = 8.7) in the East-Central Corridor (M = 4.1) and West 





St. Charles County (M = 13.9), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 16.4), and St. 
Louis City (M = 22.2). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.22, p = .31, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. Contraband hit rates in 
South St. Louis County (M = 8.1) and St. Louis City (M = 11.9) were below the mean for 
the region (M = 20.8), while hit rates in St. Charles County (M = 30.6) were significantly 
above the regional mean. 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 70) = 1.26, p = .28, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in traffic arrest rates between regions. Mean levels of traffic arrest 
rates were far below the regional mean (M = 4.8) in the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.7) 
and well above the regional mean in Jefferson County (M = 5.7) and North St. Louis 
County. 
Conclusion. Consistent with previous years, St. Louis City and County have the 
highest rates of criminal arrests and traffic stops due to a single agency when compared 
to multiple smaller agencies in the various regions. However, when viewing per capita 
crime rates, total crime, violent crime, and property crime rates in the independent city of 
St. Louis and North St. Louis County were consistently higher when compared to other 
regions. The most significant differences were present between North St. Louis County 





significant differences among regions in citation, search, contraband hit, and traffic arrest 
rates across the region in 2014, despite wide variances in the rates. 
2015 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the assumption of 
multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations between quantitative 
outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not conducted because there 
were two instances where regions contained fewer than two measures (i.e., St. Louis city 
and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall MANOVA, all four multivariate 
tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the criterion). For the crime and 
policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, approximate F(11, 59) = 137.82, p < 
.001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .96 indicated a strong effect for this interaction. 
The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ implies a strong association between scores 
related to crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and region type (Warner, 2013). 
The main effect for region type was also statistically significant, with Λ = .01, 
approximate F(77, 361.00) = 5.66, p < .001; this corresponded to a moderate effect size 
(η2 = .49) with a moderate association.  
Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 69) = 3.92, p = .01, η2 = .29. There was a statistically significant 
difference in total crime in North St. Louis County when compared to St. Charles County 
(MD = 30.00, p = .04). The highest means for total crime per 1,000 residents in the region 





County (M = 48.7), the lowest levels of total crime are found in St. Charles County (M = 
18.7), West St. Louis County (M = 20.1), and South St. Louis County (M = 20.8). 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 69) = 2.42, p = .03, η2 = .20. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. As with other crime, mean 
levels of violent crime were lowest in Jefferson (M = 2.6) and St. Charles (M = 2.0) 
Counties as well as West St. Louis County (M = 0.7), when compared to the St. Louis 
City (M = 18.24) and North St. Louis County (M = 9.8), where crime levels are the 
highest per capita when considering the mean levels of violent crime for the region (M = 
5.8). 
Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 69) = 3.42, p = .01, η2 = .26. There was a statistically 
significant difference in property crime in North St. Louis County when compared to St. 
Charles County (MD = 22.22, p = .04). The mean levels of property crime were lowest in 
St. Charles County (M = 16.7), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 17.2), South St. 
Louis County (M = 17.5), and West St. Louis County (M = 19.4) when compared to the 
entire region (M = 30.7) as well as to St. Louis City (M = 64.4) and North St. Louis 



















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 27.1 12.4 9 18.7 12.0 8 82.6 . 1 20.6 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.6 1.9 9 2.0 2.9 8 18.2 . 1 3.5 . 1 
Property Crime 24.5 11.9 9 16.7 9.8 8 64.4 . 1 17.2 . 1 
Murder .3 .6 9 .1 .1 8 5.9 . 1 .6 . 1 
LEOKA .1 .1 9 .1 .1 8 .3 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 901.1 1094.0 9 1700.1 1197.9 8 20866.0 . 1 17005.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 3482.4 3571.9 9 9254.8 5723.1 8 53897.0 . 1 56790.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 63.0 19.7 9 47.3 15.6 8 41.5 . 1 56.1 . 1 
Search Rate 13.1 9.6 9 14.5 3.7 8 20.3 . 1 16.5 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 25.1 10.0 9 36.4 5.4 8 14.9 . 1 24.4 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M 
Total Crime 29.5 25.1 12 48.7 27.1 36 20.8 9.5 2 20.1 11.6 8 36.4 25.7 77 
 
Violent Crime 1.6 1.7 12 9.8 12.5 36 3.3 2.2 2 .7 .4 8 5.8 9.6 77 
 
Property Crime 27.9 23.7 12 38.9 18.1 36 17.5 11.8 2 19.4 11.2 8 30.6 19.7 77 
 
Murder 0 .1 12 1.4 3.0 36 .6 .8 2 .2 .4 8 .8 2.2 77 
 
LEOKA .1 .1 12 .2 .3 36 .3 .2 2 0 .1 8 .2 .2 77 
 
Criminal Arrests 428.8 456.5 12 601.8 722.7 36 212.5 276.5 2 533.6 292.5 8 1182.9 3047.3 77 
 
Traffic Stops 3471.0 1865.3 12 2618.7 3208.4 36 2073.5 2669.3 2 5187.3 3765.8 8 5164.1 9120.9 77 
 
Citation Rate 61.3 21.8 12 64.0 30.0 36 60.2 1.6 2 665.2 11.1 8 61.4 24.3 77 
 














Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 69) = 1.70, p = .12, η2 = .15. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. Despite a lack of 
significance, mean murder rates per 10,000 residents varied between the East-Central 
Corridor and St. Charles County (M = 0.0 and M = 0.1), respectively, when compared to 
entire region (M = 0.82), North St. Louis County (M = 1.4), and the city of St. Louis (M = 
6.0). Also, of note, murder rates increased across all regions in 2015, from 202 in 2014 to 
261 in 2015, or a 29% increase in the number of homicides in the metropolitan area. St. 
Louis City experienced 188 murders in the calendar year 2015. 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 69) = 1.11, p = .37, η2 = 
.10. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. The 
mean number of LEOKA in the region is relatively stable, ranging from the lowest mean 
level in West St. Louis County (M = 0.0) to the highest mean levels in St. Louis City (M 
= 0.3), unincorporated St . Louis County (M = 0.3), and South St. Louis County (M = 
0.3). Of the 1068 LEOKAs in 2015, none were killed in the line of duty. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 69) = 160.36, p < .001, η2 = .94. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 19964.89, p < .001; 





15304.88, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 20437.25, p < .001; MD = 
16576.25, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 20264.17, p < .001; MD = 16403.17, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 20653.50, p < .001; MD = 16792.50, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 20332.38, p < .001; MD = 16471.38, p < .001). There 
is also a statistically significant difference in criminal arrests between the independent 
city of St. Louis and unincorporated St. Louis County (MD = 3861.00, p = .02), and St. 
Charles County and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 1271.38 p = .02) and North St. 
Louis County (MD = 1098.29, p = .01). Moreover, criminal arrest rates were highest in 
St. Louis City (M = 20866.0) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 17005.0) due to 
rates for a single agency. However, when comparing the means for the region (M = 
1183.0), South St. Louis County (M = 252.5), the East-Central Corridor (M = 428.8), 
West St. Louis County (M = 533.6), and North St. Louis County (M = 601.8) had the 
fewest mean number of criminal arrests in the region. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 69) = 164.67 p < .001, η2 = .87. There was a statistically significant difference in 
traffic stops in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to Jefferson County (MD = 50414.56, p < .001; MD = 53307.56, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 44642.25, p < .001; MD = 47535.25, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 50426.00, p < .001; MD = 53319.00, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 51278.33, p < .001; MD = 54171.33, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 





48709.75, p < .001; MD = 51602.75, p < .001). There is also a statistically significant 
difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and Jefferson County (MD = 
5772.31, p = .03), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 5783.75, p = .02), and North St. 
Louis County (MD = 6636.08, p < .001). When viewing regional means, unincorporated 
St. Louis County (M = 56790.0) and St. Louis city (M = 53897.0) had the rate of traffic 
stops, likely because the regions comprised of a single agency, while South St. Louis 
County (M = 2073.5), North St. Louis County (M = 2618.7), the East-Central Corridor 
(M = 3471.0), Jefferson County (M = 3482.4), West St. Louis County (M = 5187.3, and 
St. Charles County (M = 9254.8) had the fewest mean traffic stops when compared to the 
entire region (M = 5164.1). 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 69) = 0.56, p = .79, η2 = .05. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in the number of citations issued per traffic stop between regions. 
When considering the mean citation rates for the entire region (M = 61.4), the fewest 
mean rate for issuing citations occurred in St. Louis City (M = 41.5) and St. Charles 
County (M = 47.3), while the highest mean number of citations were issued in Jefferson 
County (M = 63.0), North St. Louis County (M = 64.0), and West St. Louis County (M = 
65.2). 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 69) = 1.90, p = .08, η2 = .16. Therefore, there were no 





the region (M = 9.5), the greatest mean search rates per traffic stop were found in St. 
Louis City (M = 20.3), while the lowest mean search rates occurred in the East-Central 
Corridor (M = 5.1) and West St. Louis County (M = 6.1). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 69) = 1.52, p = .18, η2 = .13. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. The lowest mean 
levels of contraband hits were found in South St. Louis County (M = 6.9), while the 
highest rates were found in St. Charles County (M = 36.5) when comparing the regions to 
the mean contraband hit rate for the entire region (M = 23.9). 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 69) = 2.20, p = .04, η2 = .18. However, when reviewing the 
regional pairwise comparison of regions, two sets of the interactions were significant 
when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. The mean levels of traffic arrest rates between 
Jefferson County and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 4.23, p = .06) and North St. Louis 
County and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 3.09, p = .08). The lowest mean number of 
traffic arrest rates effected in the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.9), and West St. Louis 
County (M = 2.9) and the highest mean traffic arrest rates occurring in Jefferson County 
(M = 6.1) when compared to the entire region (M = 4.3). 
Conclusion. As crime rates trended upward across the entire metropolitan region, 
St. Louis City and North St. Louis County experienced the highest total crime, violent 





significant differences in mean levels of total and property crime between North St. Louis 
County and St. Charles County. Crime rates were also found to be the lowest in West St. 
Louis County, the East-Central Corridor, and St. Charles County. Criminal arrests and 
traffic stops were also varied across the region with statistically significant mean 
differences between St. Charles County and the East-Central Corridor, North St. Louis 
County, and West St. Louis County. St. Charles County also issued a low number of 
citations while conducting a higher-than-average mean number of searches per traffic 
stop, achieving the highest mean number of contraband hits, and a higher than average 
arrest rate per traffic stop. Conversely, North St. Louis County agencies effected 
considerably fewer traffic stops and criminal arrests and issued fewer citations. 
2016 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .03, 
approximate F(11, 56) = 154.68, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .97 
indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 





region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(77, 343.02) = 6.15, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .52) with a moderate association.   
Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 66) = 3.28, p = .01, η2 = .26. However, when reviewing the 
regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was significant even 
when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Given the overall mean levels of total crime 
for the region (M = 44.9), the mean levels of total crime remained the highest for the 
independent city of St. Louis (M = 80.0) and North St. Louis County (M = 44.9) and the 
lowest in South (M = 16.4) and West (M = 20.5) St. Louis County. 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 66) = 6.54 p < .001, η2 = .41. There was a statistically 
significant difference in mean values of violent crime in St. Louis City and North St. 
Louis County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 16.81, p = 
.05; MD = 6.18 p = .04), St. Charles County (MD = 17.98, p = .03; MD = 7.34, p = .01), 
the East-Central Corridor (MD = 17.52, p = .03; MD = 6.89, p = .01), and West St. Louis 
County (MD = 18.54, p = .02; MD = 7.91, p = .01). The highest means for violent crime 
per capita were seen in the independent city of St. Louis (M = 19.3) and North St. Louis 
County (M = 8.6) and the lowest were found in West St. Louis County (M = 0.7), St. 
Charles County (M = 1.3), and the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.7), given the regional 



















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 26.0 12.6 9 22.2 18.8 8 80.0 . 1 22.7 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.4 1.7 9 1.3 .6 8 19.2 . 1 3.9 . 1 
Property Crime 23.6 11.9 9 18.7 12.8 8 60.7 . 1 18.9 . 1 
Murder .4 .8 9 .2 .2 8 6.1 . 1 .6 . 1 
LEOKA .1 .1 9 .1 .1 8 .3 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 909.4 901.7 9 1639.1 1083.7 8 20626.0 . 1 19660.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 3801.7 4167.0 9 7719.9 4504.8 8 51806.0 . 1 59616.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 60.8 17.5 9 46.6 15.2 8 45.6 . 1 63.2 . 1 
Search Rate 13.7 9.3 9 17.2 6.6 8 15.6 . 1 13.5 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 27.2 12.9 9 43.3 26.1 8 15.4 . 1 27.3 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 32.3 23.1 13 44.9 23.1 32 16.4 5.2 2 20.5 14.3 8 34.7 22.8 74 
 
Violent Crime 1.7 1.5 13 8.6 7.0 32 2.0 1.2 2 .7 .4 8 4.9 6.1 74 
 
Property Crime 30.6 21.8 13 36.6 18.2 32 14.4 6.3 2 19.7 14.2 8 29.5 18.4 74 
 
Murder .0 .0 13 4.3 12.3 32 .0 .0 2 .0 .0 8 2.0 8.3 74 
 
LEOKA .1 .1 13 .2 .2 32 .1 .2 2 .1 .1 8 .2 .2 74 
 
Criminal Arrests 377.2 371.2 13 530.1 771.7 32 142.5 178.9 2 487.0 299.6 8 1184.2 3280.1 74 
 
Traffic Stops 2942.8 1869.0 13 3067.0 3535.4 32 1793.0 2279.7 2 4535.1 3680.6 8 5184.6 9253.3 74 
 
Citation Rate 56.4 21.9 13 64.7 27.9 32 67.4 4.7 2 56.4 9.2 8 59.7 22.6 74 
 




33.0 17.3 13 27.9 20.4 32 12.9 18.2 2 27.5 16.8 8 29.8 19.4 74 
 






Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 66) = 2.40, p = .03, η2 = .20. However, when 
reviewing the regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was 
significant even when adjusting the p-value upward to .10. Considering the regional mean 
property crime rate per 1,000 residents (M = 29.5), the city of St. Louis (M = 60.2) and 
North St. Louis County (M = 36.3) were above the mean for the region, while South St. 
Louis County (M = 14.4), St. Charles County (M = 18.7), unincorporated St. Louis 
County (M = 18.9, and West St. Louis County (M = 19.8) were all below the regional 
mean. 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 66) = 0.65, p = .71, η2 = .07. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. Given the mean murder 
rate for the region (M = 2.0), homicide rates in the city of St. Louis (M = 6.0) and North 
St. Louis County (M = 4.3) were significantly greater than the rest of the region. For the 
third straight year, homicide rates increased. Of the 269 homicides in the region, 188 
occurred in the city of St. Louis, which was no change over the previous year. 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 66) = 0.99, p = .46, η2 = 
.10. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. The 
mean values for LEOKA were relatively stable and were lowest in West St. Louis County 





(M = 0.3) when compared to the regional mean (M = 0.2). Despite an overall decrease in 
LEOKA since 2010, one law enforcement officer was killed in the line of duty. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 66) = 199.17, p < .001, η2 = .96. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 19716.56, p < .001; 
MD = 18750.56, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 18986.88, p < .001; MD = 
18020.88, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 20248.85, p < .001; MD = 
19282.85, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 20095.91, p < .001; MD = 19129.91, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 20483.50, p < .001; MD = 19517.50, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 20139.00, p < .001; MD = 19173.00, p < .001). There 
is also a statistically significant difference in criminal arrests between St. Charles County 
and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 1261.97, p = .01) and North St. Louis County (MD 
= 1109.03, p = .01). Although the city of St. Louis (M = 20626.0) and unincorporated St. 
Louis County (M = 19660.0) had the highest number of criminal arrests, there was a 
significant mean difference between South St. Louis County (M = 142.5), the East 
Central Corridor (M = 377.2), West St. Louis County (M = 487.0), and North St. Louis 
County (M = 530.1) when compared to St. Charles County (M = 1639.1), when compared 
to the mean for the entire metropolitan area (M = 1184.2). 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 





traffic stops in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to Jefferson County (MD = 44004.33, p < .001; MD = 55814.33, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 44086.13, p < .001; MD = 51896.13, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 48863.23, p < .001; MD = 56673.23, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 48739.03, p < .001; MD = 56549.03, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
50013.00, p < .001; MD = 57823.00, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
47270.88, p < .001; MD = 55080.88, p < .001). There is also a statistically significant 
difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and North St. Louis County (MD = 
4652.91, p = .04). The mean number of traffic stops conducted in the region in 2016 was 
the lowest since 2010 (M = 5184.6), where St. Louis City (M = 51806.0) and 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 59616.0) effected the highest mean number of 
traffic stops and South St. Louis County (M = 1793.0), the East-Central Corridor (M = 
2942.8), North St. Louis County (M = 3067.0), and Jefferson County (M = 3801.7) 
conducted the fewest mean number traffic stops. 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 66) = 0.74, p = .64, η2 = .07. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in the number of citations issued per traffic strop between regions. 
Mean citation rates in St. Louis City (M = 45.7) and St. Charles County (M = 46.6) were 
the lowest when compared to North (M = 64.7) and South (M = 67.4) St. Louis County, 





Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 66) = 2.58, p = .02, η2 = .22. There was a statistically 
significant difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 11.95, p = .04), indicating a disparity in mean search rates between the 
two regions. Moreover, search rates were found to be the highest in Jefferson (M = 13.7) 
and St. Charles (M = 17.2) Counties, St. Louis City (M = 15.6), and unincorporated St. 
Louis County (M = 13.5) and lowest in South St. Louis County (M = 3.2), the East-
Central Corridor (M = 5.2), and West St. Louis County (M = 5.2) when compared to the 
entire region (M = 9.4). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 66) = 0.98, p = .45, η2 = .09. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. The region with the 
greatest contraband hit rate mean was St. Charles County (M = 43.3), while the lowest 
mean contraband hit rates were experienced in South St. Louis County (M = 12.9) and the 
independent city of St. Louis (M = 15.4), which differed significantly from the regional 
mean (M = 29.8). 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 66) = 3.21, p = .01 η2 = .25. There was a statistically significant 
difference in traffic stops between Jefferson and St. Charles Counties, respectively, and 
the East-Central Corridor (MD = 4.12, p  = .01; MD = 3.76, p = .02). In other words, 





compared to the East-Central Corridor. Additionally, mean traffic arrest rates were lowest 
in the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.5) and highest in St. Charles (M = 5.3) and Jefferson 
(M = 5.7) Counties, respectively, given the regional mean (M = 3.8). 
Conclusion. Consistent with previous years, the highest levels of crime were 
found in North St. Louis County and the independent city of St. Louis, while the lowest 
levels of crime were generally found in the East-Central Corridor and South and West St. 
Louis County. Measures of policing (i.e., arrests, traffic stops, citation, search, 
contraband hit, and vehicle stop arrest rates) varied among regions. However, the regions 
with the fewest number of criminal and traffic arrests, traffic stops, and vehicle searches 
were the East-Central Corridor and South St. Louis County. Criminal arrests, traffic 
stops, vehicle searches, and contraband hit rates were also below regional means in North 
St. Louis County. 
2017  
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, 





indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(77, 325.04) = 5.80, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .52) with a moderate association.  
Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 3.46, p = .01, η2 = .28. However, when reviewing the 
regional pairwise comparison of regions, several interactions became significant when 
adjusting the p-value upward to .10. When comparing the independent city of St. Louis to 
Jefferson (MD = 58.27 p  = .10) and St. Charles (MD = 61.24, p  = .10) Counties and 
West St. Louis County (MD = 62.94, p  = .05), the interactions were significant. St. Louis 
City’s mean rate of total crime (M = 82.6) was far above the mean rate for the region (M 
= 31.1), while South (M = 16.4) and West (M = 19.7) St. Louis County were well below 
the mean rate of total crime per 1,000 persons. Jefferson (M = 24.3) and St. Charles (M = 
21.4) Counties were also below the regional mean, while North St. Louis County (M = 




















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 24.3 10.8 9 21.4 16.6 8 82.6 . 1 22.0 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.3 1.0 9 1.8 .8 8 21.0 . 1 4.1 . 1 
Property Crime 22.2 10.2 9 19.6 15.9 8 61.6 . 1 17.9 . 1 
Murder .0 .1 9 .1 .1 8 6.7 . 1 .7 . 1 
LEOKA .1 .2 9 .1 .1 8 .3 . 1 .3 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 751.8 724.7 9 1475.3 964.2 8 19424.0 . 1 18373.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 3519.3 3346.2 9 7558.6 5125.9 8 44756.0 . 1 53427.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 49.5 22.2 9 43.1 14.2 8 44.5 . 1 59.9 . 1 
Search Rate 13.6 11.8 9 23.4 7.3 8 15.4 . 1 12.6 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 29.1 12.6 9 41.5 8.5 8 17.7 . 1 32.1 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 27.0 23.5 13 40.5 19.0 29 16.4 5.0 2 19.7 15.4 8 31.1 20.5 71 
 
Violent Crime 1.6 1.6 13 6.8 4.3 29 2.7 1.2 2 .9 .4 8 4.1 4.3 71 
 
Property Crime 25.4 22.1 13 33.7 16.8 29 13.7 6.2 2 18.8 15.1 8 27.1 17.8 71 
 
Murder .4 .6 13 2.0 4.0 29 .0 .0 2 .0 .0 8 1.0 2.8 71 
 
LEOKA .1 .2 13 .2 .3 29 .2 .3 2 .1 .1 8 .2 .2 71 
 
Criminal Arrests 338.5 382.9 13 602.7 892.0 29 179.5 231.2 2 473.1 307.2 8 1160.4 3142.1 71 
 
Traffic Stops 3001.4 1748.0 13 3110.3 3797.8 29 2129.5 2751.4 2 4604.1 3494.5 8 5079.4 8432.6 71 
 
Citation Rate 56.6 18.0 13 64.5 25.8 29 68.8 10.3 2 53.4 14.2 8 57.3 21.9 71 
 




34.7 12.3 13 34.4 24.1 29 10.9 15.5 2 30.3 10.1 8 33.2 18.1 71 
 






Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 11.72, p < .001, η2 = .57. There was a 
statistically significant difference in violent crime rates in St. Louis City, when compared 
to Jefferson County (MD = 18.71, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 19.20, p < .001), 
unincorporated St. Louis County (MD = 16.84, p = .01), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 
19.38, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 14.17, p < .001), South St. Louis County 
(MD = 18.23, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 20.07, p < .001). There was 
also a statistically significant difference in violent crime rates in Jefferson County (MD = 
4.54, p = .01), St. Charles County (MD = 5.03, p = .01), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 
5.21, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 5.90, p < .001) when compared to 
North St. Louis County. The mean rate of violent crime in St. Louis City (M = 21.0) and 
North St. Louis County (M = 6.8) were above the regional mean rate (M = 4.1) for violent 
crime, while West St. Louis County (M = 0.9), the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.6), and 
Jefferson (M = 2.3) and St. Charles (M = 1.8) Counties were well below the regional 
average. Unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 4.1) was near the regional average in 
terms of the mean rate of violent crime experienced by the region. 
Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 2.08, p = .06, η2 = .19. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in property crime between regions. However, when reviewing the 
regional pairwise comparison of regions, none of the interactions was significant even 





the independent city of St. Louis (M = 61.6) and North St. Louis County (M = 33.7) and 
lowest in South St. Louis County (M = 13.7), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
17.9), West St. Louis County (M = 18.8), St. Charles County (M = 19.6), and Jefferson 
County (M = 22.2), while the East-Central Corridor (M = 25.4) was slightly below the 
regional mean (M = 27.1). 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.80, p = .10, η2 = .17. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. While most of the 
metropolitan region experienced murder rates well below the regional mean (M = 1.0), 
the independent city of St. Louis (M = 6.8) and North St. Louis County (M = 2.0) 
experienced higher mean rates for murder per 10,000 residents as well as the largest 
increase in total homicides. In 2017, the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area logged 308 
homicides, while the independent city of St. Louis experienced 208 homicides. 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.00, p = .44, η2 = 
.10. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. St. 
Louis City (M = 0.30), unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 0.3), and North St. Louis 
County (M = 0.2) all experienced higher mean rates of LEOKA when compared to the 
rest of the region (M = 0.2). Moreover, the number of LEOKA continued to decline for 





Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 166.39, p < .001, η2 = .95. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 18672.22, p < .001; 
MD = 17621.22, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 17948.75, p < .001; MD = 
16897.75, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 19085.46, p < .001; MD = 
18034.46, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 18821.31, p < .001; MD = 17770.31, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 19244.50, p < .001; MD = 18193.50, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 18950.88, p < .001; MD = 17899.88, p < .001). There 
is also a statistically significant difference in criminal arrests between St. Charles County 
and the East-Central Corridor (MD = 1136.71, p = .04). Consistent with previous years 
and due to the agency size and single agency within the region, St. Louis City (M = 
19424.0) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 18373.0) had the highest number 
and mean rates of criminal arrests in the region. The rest of the region remained well 
below the region mean (M = 1160.4), with the exception of St. Charles County (M = 
1475.3). Regionally, South (M = 179.5) and West (M = 473.1) St . Louis County and the 
East-Central Corridor (M = 338.5) experienced the fewest mean number of criminal 
arrests in the region. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 63) = 46.51, p < .001, η2 = .84. There was a statistically significant difference in 





compared to Jefferson County (MD = 41236.67, p < .001; MD = 49907.67, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 37197.38, p < .001; MD = 45868.38, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 41754.62, p < .001; MD = 50425.62, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 41645.66, p < .001; MD = 50316.66, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
42626.50, p < .001; MD = 51297.50, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
40151.88, p < .001; MD = 48822.88, p < .001). Consistent with previous years and due 
to the agency size and single agency within the region, St. Louis City (M = 44756.0) and 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 53427.0) had the highest number and mean rates 
of traffic stops in the region. St. Charles County (M = 7558.6) conducted a higher mean 
rate of traffic stops, when compared to the rest of the region (M = 5079.38), whereas 
South (M = 2129.5) St. Louis County, the East-Central Corridor (M = 3001.38), and 
North St. Louis County (M = 3110.3) conducted fewer traffic stops. 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.29, p = .27, η2 = .13. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in citation rates between regions. A majority of the region was 
below the regional mean rate (M = 57.3) for citations issued per traffic stop; however, 
North (M = 64.5) and South (M = 68.8) St. Louis County issued higher mean rates of 
traffic citations, especially when compared to Jefferson (M = 49.5) and St. Charles (M = 
43.1) Counties and the independent city of St. Louis (M = 44.5). 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 





significant difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 18.50, p = .01), North St. Louis County (MD = 13.26, p = .01), and West 
St. Louis County (MD = 16.37, p = .02), indicating a disparity in mean search rates 
between the regions. Moreover, search rates were found to be the highest in St. Charles 
County (M = 23.4), St. Louis City (M = 15.4), and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
12.6) and lowest in the East-Central Corridor (M = 4.8), South St. Louis County (M = 
5.0), and West St. Louis County (M = 7.0). North St. Louis County (M = 10.1) conducted 
searches on traffic stops at a rate nearly identical to the regional mean rate for searches 
(M = 10.7). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 0.90, p = .51, η2 = .09. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. The mean rate of 
contraband identification rates in St. Charles County (M = 41.5) far exceeded the mean 
rate for the region (M = 33.2), while South St. Louis County (M = 10.9) and St. Louis 
City (M = 17.8) experienced lower than average mean rates of contraband hits. 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 2.62, p = .02, η2 = .23. There was a statistically significant 
difference in traffic arrest rates between St. Charles County and the East-Central Corridor 
(MD = 4.72, p  = .01). The significant relationship between the two regions is further 





the rest of the region (M = 3.7), especially the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.7), which had 
the lowest mean rate of traffic arrests in the region. 
Conclusion. The highest mean rates for all types of crime were experienced in St. 
Louis City and North St. Louis County. However, St. Louis City experienced lower than 
average citation issuance, contraband hit, and traffic arrest rates compared to the rest of 
the region, though they conducted a higher-than-average mean number of searches for the 
entire metropolitan region. Compared to the rest of the region, North St. Louis County 
made fewer criminal arrests, conducted fewer traffic stops, and searched fewer vehicles 
than mean rates for the region despite experiencing above-average levels of citation 
issuance, contraband hit, and traffic stop arrest rates. St. Charles County also experienced 
among the lowest levels of all types of crime with higher than mean rates for the number 
of criminal arrests, traffic stops, searches, contraband hits, and traffic stop arrests. 
Preliminary conclusions, then, indicate a relationship between crime and policing. 
2018 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 





approximate F(10, 55) = 131.22, p < .001. The corresponding η2 effect size of .96 
indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and 
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(70, 327.52) = 5.51, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .48) with a moderate association.  
Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 64) = 4.85, p < .001, η2 = .35. There was a statistically significant 
difference in total crime in North St. Louis County, when compared to Jefferson County 
(MD = 24.58, p = .04), St. Charles County (MD = 28.13, p = .02), and West St. Louis 
County (MD = 27.78, p = .02). Total crime per 1,000 residents was determined to be the 
highest in St. Louis City (M = 78.7) and North St. Louis County (M = 48.2), when 
compared to the mean for the region (M = 34.7). The lowest mean rate of crime was 
found in St. Charles County (M = 20.1) and West St. Louis County (M = 20.4). 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 64) = 4.61, p < .001, η2 = .34. There was a statistically 
significant difference in violent crime rates in North St. Louis County, when compared to 
the East-Central Corridor (MD = 6.77, p = .01) and West St. Louis County (MD = 7.39, p 
= .03). Mean values for violent crime were the highest in St. Louis City (M = 18.2) and 





Louis County, the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.4), and St. Charles County (M = 2.0) 
when compared to the regional mean levels of violent crime (M = 4.6). 
Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 64) = 3.62, p = .01, η2 = .28. There was a statistically 
significant difference in violent crime rates in North St. Louis County when compared to 
St. Charles County (MD = 22.01, p = .04). Mean rates of property crime were well above 
average in St. Louis City (M = 60.5) and North St. Louis County (M = 40.1) when 
compared to the regional mean rate for property crime (M = 30.1). Conversely, St. 
Charles County (M = 18.1), West St. Louis County (M = 19.7), Jefferson County (M = 
20.8), South St. Louis County (M = 21.5), and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
21.9) were far below the regional mean. 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 64) = 0.58, p = .77, η2 = .06. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates per 10,000 residents between regions. Similar to crime rates, 
mean murder rates in St. Louis City (M = 6.3) and North St. Louis County (M = 1.8) far 
exceeded the regional mean (M = 0.9) and means for the East-Central Corridor (M = 0.1), 
West St. Louis County (M = 0.1), and St. Charles (M = 0.2) and Jefferson (M = 0.2) 
Counties. Consistent with a small decrease in the total number of homicides (N = 304) in 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 23.6 10.2 9 20.0 17.3 8 78.7 . 1 24.2 . 1 
Violent Crime 2.8 1.8 9 2.0 1.4 8 18.2 . 1 2.4 . 1 
Property Crime 20.8 9.8 9 18.0 16.1 8 60.5 . 1 21.8 . 1 
Murder .2 .5 9 .2 .3 8 6.2 . 1 .5 . 1 
LEOKA .2 .3 9 .1 .1 8 .2 . 1 .2 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 692.1 636.1 9 1121.8 1003.7 8 17370.0 . 1 15880.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 3919.9 4828.9 9 7741.0 4968.4 8 54943.0 . 1 58820.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 59.9 19.3 9 41.7 13.0 8 41.0 . 1 59.2 . 1 
Search Rate 15.2 12.1 9 21.7 5.5 8 16.4 . 1 10.2 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 37.1 8.8 9 36.7 4.8 8 19.2 . 1 32.9 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 28.3 23.1 13 48.2 21.9 30 22.4 1.8 2 20.4 11.3 8 34.7 22.8 72 
 
Violent Crime 1.4 1.1 13 8.1 7.9 30 .9 1.3 2 .7 .4 8 4.6 6.3 72 
 
Property Crime 27.0 22.4 13 40.1 16.9 30 21.5 3.1 2 19.7 11.3 8 30.1 18.7 72 
 
Murder .1 .3 13 1.8 6.4 30 .4 .8 2 .1 .4 8 .9 4.2 72 
 
LEOKA .1 .1 13 .2 .2 30 .3 .3 2 .0 .0 8 .2 .2 72 
 
Criminal Arrests 336.5 343.9 13 608.4 798.2 30 136.0 173.9 2 451.2 363.0 8 1041.2 2746.6 72 
 
Traffic Stops 3209.0 2438.2 13 3484.1 4224.7 30 1835.0 2429.6 2 5194.4 4229.8 8 5589.4 9675.6 72 
 
Citation Rate 56.5 14.5 13 64.5 28.7 30 67.1 15.1 2 53.3 16.5 8 58.4 22.8 72 
 




29.1 12.8 13 32.4 20.0 30 5.3 7.5 2 32.7 14.5 8 32.0 15.9 72 
 







LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 64) = 1.59, p = .15, η2 = 
.15. Therefore, there were no observable differences in LEOKA between regions. Mean 
LEOKA rates were relatively constant in the region (M = 0.2) and ranged from a low in 
West St. Louis County (M = 0.0) to a high in South St. Louis County (M = 0.3). The rate 
of LEOKA continued to decline in 2018, and no law enforcement officers were killed in 
the line of duty during 2018. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 64) = 148.13, p < .001, η2 = .94. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 16677.89, p < .001; 
MD = 15187.88, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 16248.25, p < .001; MD = 
14758.25, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 17033.46, p < .001; MD = 
15543.46, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 16761.57, p < .001; MD = 15271.57, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 17234.00, p < .001; MD = 15744.00, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 116918.75, p < .001; MD = 15428.75, p < .001). 
Consistent with previous years and due to the agency size and single agency within the 
region, St. Louis City (M = 17370.0) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 15880.0) 
had the highest number and mean rates of criminal arrests in the region. The rest of the 
region remained well below the region mean (M = 1041.2), with the exception of St. 





Louis County and the East-Central Corridor (M = 336.5) experienced the fewest mean 
number of criminal arrests in the region. 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 64) = 47.16, p < .001, η2 = .84. There was a statistically significant difference in 
traffic stops in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to Jefferson County (MD = 51023.11, p < .001; MD = 54900.11, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 47202.00, p < .001; MD = 51079.00, p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 51734.00, p < .001; MD = 50425.62, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 41645.66, p < .001; MD = 55611.00, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
53108.00, p < .001; MD = 56985.00, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
49748.63, p < .001; MD = 53625.63, p < .001). Consistent with previous years and due 
to the agency size and single agency within the region, St. Louis City (M = 54943.0) and 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 58820.0) had the highest number and mean rates 
of traffic stops in the region. St. Charles County (M = 7741.0) conducted a higher mean 
rate of traffic stops, when compared to the rest of the region (M = 5589.4), whereas South 
St. Louis County (M = 1835.0), the East-Central Corridor (M = 3209.0), and North St. 
Louis County (M = 3484.1) conducted fewer traffic stops. 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 64) = 1.14, p = .35, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in citation rates between regions. The highest mean rate for 





while the lowest rates were present in St. Louis City (M = 41.0) and St. Charles County 
(M = 41.7) when compared to the mean for the region (M = 58.4). 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 64) = 3.87, p = .01, η2 = .30. There was a statistically 
significant difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 17.49, p <  .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 11.02, p = .04), and 
West St. Louis County (MD = 14.52, p = .03), indicating a disparity in mean search rates 
between the regions. Moreover, search rates were found to be more than double the 
regional rate (M = 10.8) in St. Charles County (M = 21.7). Search rates were also higher 
than the regional mean in St. Louis City (M = 16.4) and Jefferson County (M = 15.2) and 
lowest in the East-Central Corridor (M = 4.2), South St. Louis County (M = 5.4), and 
West St. Louis County (M = 7.2). North St. Louis County (M = 10.7) conducted searches 
on traffic stops at a rate nearly identical to the regional mean rate for searches (M = 10.8). 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 64) = 1.23, p = .30, η2 = .12. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. Contraband hit rates 
varied across the region (M = 32.0), where South St. Louis County (M = 5.3) had the 
lowest mean for identifying contraband during vehicle stops and Jefferson (M = 37.1) and 
St. Charles (M = 36.7) Counties had the highest mean rates for locating contraband. 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was not 





observable differences in traffic arrest rates between regions. Traffic stop arrests varied 
across regions where the East-Central Corridor (M = 1.8) experienced the lowest mean 
rate while Jefferson (M = 5.2) and St. Charles (M = 6.0) Counties had the highest rates 
when compared to the regional mean rate (M = 3.8). 
Conclusion. Statistically significant differences in means were identified in crime 
rates between North St. Louis County and St. Charles County, though there were large 
numerical differences when comparing North St. Louis County to the rest of the 
metropolitan area. Measures of policing (i.e., criminal arrests, traffic stops, search rates, 
and traffic stop arrest rates) were also lower in North St. Louis County and higher in St. 
Charles County when compared to the rest of the region. Preliminary conclusions, then, 
indicate a relationship between crime and policing. 
2019 
Preliminary data screening did not indicate any serious violations of the 
assumption of multivariate normality or the assumption of linearity of associations 
between quantitative outcome variables. The Box M test and post hoc tests were not 
conducted because there were two instances where regions contained fewer than two 
measures (i.e., St. Louis city and unincorporated St. Louis County). For the overall 
MANOVA, all four multivariate tests were statistically significant (using α = .05 as the 
criterion). For the crime and policing by region type interaction, Wilks’ Λ = .04, 





indicated a strong effect for this interaction. The low value associated with Wilks’ Λ 
implies a strong association between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) and  
region type (Warner, 2013). The main effect for region type was also statistically 
significant, with Λ = .01, approximate F(70, 321.69) = 5.30, p < .001; this corresponded 
to a moderate effect size (η2 = .47) with a moderate association.  
Total Crime. The main effect for total crime per 1,000 residents was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 0.71, p = .67, η2 = .07. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in total crime rates between regions. For the first time across this 
10-year analysis, mean total crime was higher in North St. Louis County (M = 128.1) 
when compared to St. Louis City (M = 73.9) and the rest of the region (M = 68.7). The 
lowest mean rate for total crime was found in unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 
17.2), Jefferson County (M = 22.5), West St. Louis County (M = 24.1), and St. Charles 
County (M = 24.8). 
Violent Crime. The main effect for violent crime per 1,000 residents was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.16, p = .34, η2 = .11. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in violent crime rates between regions. Although violent crime 
was the highest in St. Louis City (M = 19.5), North St. Louis County’s (M = 14.9) mean 
rate for violent crime far exceeded the regional mean (M = 7.6). Consistent with previous 
years, the lowest mean levels of violent crime were experienced in West St. Louis County 



















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Total Crime 22.5 9.2 9 24.8 18.2 8 73.9 . 1 17.2 . 1 
Violent Crime 3.9 3.4 9 2.0 1.3 8 19.5 . 1 4.0 . 1 
Property Crime 18.6 9.0 9 22.8 17.3 8 54.3 . 1 13.3 . 1 
Murder .8 2.1 9 .1 .1 8 7.0 . 1 1.0 . 1 
LEOKA .2 .2 9 .2 .1 8 .3 . 1 .2 . 1 
Criminal Arrests 609.7 512.2 9 788.4 630.6 8 16600.0 . 1 11954.0 . 1 
Traffic Stops 4328.7 6327.1 9 9382.4 8720.3 8 57948.0 . 1 52121.0 . 1 
Citation Rate 52.9 10.9 9 39.2 13.5 8 43.8 . 1 55.5 . 1 
Search Rate 15.7 10.4 9 24.4 6.8 8 14.1 . 1 10.5 . 1 
Contraband Hit Rate 33.4 14.7 9 36.5 5.6 8 23.7 . 1 29.0 . 1 





















Variable M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD N  
Total Crime 29.7 23.5 13 128.0 282.1 29 45.3 63.2 2 24.1 17.8 8 68.7 17.8 71 
 
Violent Crime 1.3 1.0 13 14.9 28.5 29 4.4 6.0 2 1.0 .6 8 7.6 19.2 71 
 
Property Crime 28.4 22.6 13 113.2 254.7 29 409. 57.2 2 23.1 17.5 8 61.0 167.6 71 
 
Murder .3 .7 13 4.2 10.9 29 .0 .0 2 .1 .4 8 2.0 7.2 71 
 
LEOKA .1 .1 13 .2 .2 29 .0 .0 2 .0 .1 8 .1 .2 71 
 
Criminal Arrests 305.9 322.4 13 510.5 671.6 29 111.5 143.5 2 490.3 421.6 8 891.2 2393.8 71 
 
Traffic Stops 3204.5 2358.9 13 3471.4 4082.9 29 1653.5 2137.6 2 5234.0 4612.2 8 5797.1 9862.3 71 
 
Citation Rate 55.5 16.3 13 65.8 26.3 29 67.8 18.7 2 54.0 23.5 8 57.6 22.2 71 
 




26.8 15.8 13 32.3 20.8 29 10.1 14.3 2 36.3 10.4 8 31.6 16.8 71 
 







Property Crime. The main effect for property crime per 1,000 residents was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 0.67, p = .70, η2 = .07. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in property crime rates between regions. Similar to total crime, the 
mean rate for property crime in North St. Louis County (M = 113.2) far exceeded the 
independent city of St. Louis (M = 54.3) and the region (M = 61.0). The lowest mean 
rates for property crime were found in unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 13.3) and 
Jefferson County (M = 18.6). 
Murder. The main effect for murders per 10,000 residents was not statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 0.74, p = .64, η2 = .08. Therefore, there were no observable 
differences in murder rates between regions. While not all regions demonstrated an 
increase in the number or mean rate of murder per 10,000 residents, the entire region 
showed an increase over previous years. Only St. Charles County (M = 0.1) and South St. 
Louis County (M = 0.0) logged fewer murders than the previous year. Both North St. 
Louis County (M = 4.2) and the independent city of St. Louis (M = 7.0) far exceeded the 
regional mean rate (M = 2.0) of murders. Unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 1.0) 
more than doubled its rate over the previous year, reaching a 10-year high. In addition, 
the region experienced 312 total homicides, with 210 occurring within the city of St. 
Louis. 
LEOKA. The main effect for LEOKA per total number of officers employed at a 
given department was not statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.52, p = .18, η2 = 





to other years, LEOKA remained relatively stable and ranged from means near zero in 
South (M = 0.0) and West (M = 0.1) St. Louis County and the East-Central Corridor (M = 
0.1) when compared to the rest of the region (M = 0.2). St. Louis City (M = 0.3), 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 0.2), Jefferson (M = 0.2) and St. Charles County 
(M = 0.0), and North St. Louis County (M = 0.2) all experienced elevated levels of 
LEOKA when compared to the rest of the region. In addition to a slight increase in the 
number of LEOKA in the region, two law enforcement officers were killed in the line of 
duty. 
Criminal Arrests. The main effect for criminal arrests was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 171.30, p < .001, η2 = .95. There was a statistically 
significant difference in criminal arrests in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis 
County, respectively, when compared to the Jefferson County (MD = 15990.33, p < .001; 
MD = 11344.33, p < .001), St. Charles County (MD = 15811.63, p < .001; MD = 
11165.63, p < .001), the East-Central Corridor (MD = 16294.08 p < .001; MD = 
11648.08, p < .001), North St. Louis County (MD = 16089.52, p < .001; MD = 11443.52, 
p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 16488.50, p < .001; MD = 11842.50, p < .001), 
and West St. Louis County (MD = 16109.75, p < .001; MD = 11463.75, p < .001). 
Consistent with previous years and due to the agency size and single agency within the 
region, St. Louis City (M = 16600.0) and unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 11954.0) 
had the highest number and mean rates of criminal arrests in the region. South St. Louis 





the entire region (M = 891.2), including Jefferson (M  = 609.7) and St. Charles County 
(M = 788.4). 
Traffic Stops. The main effect for traffic stops was statistically significant, where 
F(7, 63) = 146.0030.80, p < .001, η2 = .77. There was a statistically significant difference 
in traffic stops in St. Louis City and unincorporated St. Louis County, respectively, when 
compared to Jefferson County (MD = 53619.33, p < .001; MD = 47792.33, p < .001), St. 
Charles County (MD = 48565.63, p < .001; MD = 42738.63 p < .001), the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 54743.46, p < .001; MD = 48916.46, p < .001), North St. Louis County 
(MD = 54476.59, p < .001; MD = 48649.59, p < .001), South St. Louis County (MD = 
56294.50, p < .001; MD = 50467.50, p < .001), and West St. Louis County (MD = 
52714.00, p < .001; MD = 46887.00, p < .001). Consistent with previous years and due 
to the agency size and single agency within the region, St. Louis City (M = 57948.00) and 
unincorporated St. Louis County (M = 52121.0) had the highest number and mean rates 
of traffic stops in the region. South St. Louis County (M = 1653.5) conducted a lower 
mean number of traffic stops when compared to the entire region (M = 5797.1) and St. 
Charles County (M = 9382.4). 
Citation Rates. The main effect for citations issued per traffic stop was not 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.68, p = .13, η2 = .16. Therefore, there were no 
observable differences in citation rates between regions. Citation issuance rates varied 





traffic stop and South (M = 67.8) and North (M = 65.8) St. Louis County issuing the 
most. 
Search Rates. The main effect for searches conducted per traffic stop was 
statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 2.72, p = .02, η2 = .23. There was a statistically 
significant difference in traffic stops between St. Charles County and the East-Central 
Corridor (MD = 20.12, p =  .01). Search rates were the lowest in South St. Louis County 
(M = 4.2) and the East-Central Corridor (M = 4.3) when compared to the region (M = 
12.0), while St. Charles County (M = 24.4) conducted the highest mean number of 
searches per traffic stop. 
Contraband Hit Rates. The main effect for contraband hits per traffic stop was 
not statistically significant, where F(7, 63) = 0.85, p = .55, η2 = .09. Therefore, there were 
no observable differences in contraband hit rates between regions. Contraband hit rates 
were relatively stable across the region (M = 31.6); however, South St. Louis County (M 
= 10.1) law enforcement agencies were less successful and locating contraband when 
compared to the rest of the region, including St. Charles County (M = 36.5) and West St. 
Louis County (M = 36.3). 
Traffic Arrest Rates. The main effect for arrests per traffic stop was statistically 
significant, where F(7, 63) = 1.99, p = .07, η2 = .18. However, when reviewing the 
regional pairwise comparison of regions, one set of the interactions was significant when 
adjusting the p-value upward to .10—the mean difference in the East-Central Corridor 





rates varied across the region (M = 3.9) where agencies in the East-Central Corridor (M = 
1.9) arrested fewer individuals on traffic stops when compared to Jefferson (M = 5.5) and 
St. Charles (M = 6.2) Counties. 
Conclusion. Crime rates in North St. Louis County were far greater than the rest 
of the region, especially when compared to previous years, though rates in the 
independent city of St. Louis were also well above the mean for the metropolitan area. 
The number of criminal arrests and traffic stops in North St. Louis County were also at 
lower levels compared to previous years and other parts of the metropolitan region; 
however, the number of citations issued, rate of vehicles searched on traffic stops, 
contraband identified, and the number of arrests made on traffic stops were at or above 
the mean rate for the region, while St. Louis City demonstrated sub-mean levels for the 
same variables. St. Charles County further demonstrated some of the highest traffic stops, 
criminal and traffic arrests, searches, and contraband identification rates. Moreover, the 
data for 2019 does establish a relationship between levels of crime and policing. 
Conclusion of the Analysis 
 When analyzing the data pertaining to crime (i.e., total crime, violent crime, 
property crime, murder, LEOKA), trends remained consistent across time and regions. 
The independent city of St. Louis and North St. Louis County possessed the highest mean 
levels of crime per capita when compared to all other regions. Until 2019, St. Louis City 
had the highest mean for all measures of crime. However, in 2019, mean levels of total 





including the city of St. Louis. Levels of violent crime and homicide also rose 
significantly in North St. Louis County. Conversely, the lowest means levels of crime 
generally occurred in St. Charles County and West St. Louis County, with moderate to 
low mean levels of crime were recorded in unincorporated St. Louis County and the East-
Central Corridor. 
 Levels of policing (i.e., criminal and traffic arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, 
search rates, and contraband hit rates) across the region were more varied than trends in 
crime across regions and time. Before 2014, the highest levels of policing were found in 
Jefferson County, North St. Louis County, and to some extent, St. Charles County. 
However, after 2014, the highest mean levels of policing were consistently seen in St. 
Charles County. Moderate levels of policing were recorded in North St. Louis County 
and Jefferson County. The lowest mean levels of policing varied little across time where 
St. Louis City, the East-Central Corridor, and West St. Louis County had the lowest mean 
levels of policing for the region.  
 When looking specifically at levels of policing in 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019 
when there were significant increases in crime rates accompanied by measurable 
decreases in policing across the region, the independent city of St. Louis and North St. 
Louis County both recorded increases in all types of crime, most significantly in the 
number of homicides. Interestingly, the city of St. Louis has experienced a general 
decrease in total, violent, and property crimes while logging record or near-record 





in all types of crime following 2014, except during 2017 when all types of crime, except 
for homicide, decreased before dramatically increasing in 2018 and 2019. 
 Measures of policing in St. Louis City and North St. Louis County also altered 
their course over the 10-year analysis yielding distinct trends. Through 2014, levels of 
policing remained relatively constant in the city of St. Louis, with a distinct decrease in 
criminal arrests, traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, and traffic arrest rates in 
2014. In 2015, most measures of policing increased before gradually decreasing through 
2017. In 2018 and 2019, the city logged more traffic stops, increased the number of 
citations issued, and contraband identified during searches. Since 2015, the city has 
experienced a yearly decrease in criminal arrests, searches conducted, and arrests made 
during traffic stops. Given the data for the city of St. Louis, it is difficult to establish a 
connection between crime and policing as levels of policing and crime have decreased 
over time. 
 When evaluating data related to North St. Louis County, levels of crime decreased 
between 2010 and 2014 before increasing in 2015, 2018, and 2019. Through the year 
2014, criminal arrests, traffic stops, citation issuance rates, search rates, and traffic arrest 
rates decreased. In 2015, 2018, and 2019,  the region experienced significant decreases in 
criminal arrests, traffic stops, the number of citations issued, searches conducted, and 
arrests made during traffic stops when compared to the previous year resulting in a 





above the regional mean for measures of policing. It is plausible, then, that decreases in 
policing over time may be related to increases in crime across time. 
 An evaluation of policing and crime in St. Charles County and West St. Louis 
County, which recorded the lowest mean and total levels of all crime for the region, 
indicate a general decrease in criminal arrests and citations issued across time, with 
notable increases in 2018 and 2019. In St. Charles County in 2019, there were 
significantly higher levels of total crime and property crime, while West St. Louis County 
experienced a moderate decrease in total and property crime. During that time, St. 
Charles County effected a significantly lower number of criminal and traffic arrest rates 
while also issuing fewer citations per traffic stop and fewer instances of contraband 
identification during searches. In comparison, West St. Louis County made more criminal 
and traffic arrests, traffic stops, searches, and contraband hits. Both regions decreased 
their rates for issuing traffic citations during traffic stops in 2019. Given the data, it is 
plausible that levels of policing may be related to trends in crime across time. 
 To better explore the relationship between crime and policing across time and 
geographical regions, research question three evaluated the effects of mediating variables 
on crime and policing. By building upon the results attained from the first two research 
questions, this final analysis will yield additional insight into how policing and crime 
have changed over the past 10 years in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area and the 





will prove useful for redesigning policy and policing practices to reduce crime and 
improve officer safety moving forward effectively. 
RQ3 
RQ3 addressed how policing practices and crime different between regions for a 
given year while evaluating the effects of three independent variables (i.e., race/ethnic 
make-up, socioeconomic index, and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens). The 
research question builds upon the first two research questions by comparing regions at a 
specific point in time to identify regional differences in policing and crime while also 
evaluating the intervening factors. To evaluate whether the differences in crime and 
policing existed within a given year, a multiple regression was performed to assess the 11 
continuous dependent variables (i.e., total crime, violent crime, property crime, murder, 
LEOKA, criminal and traffic arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, search rates, and 
contraband hit rates) across three continuous variables relating to race/ethnic make-up, 
socioeconomic index, and the number of officers employed per 1,000 citizens using SPSS 
with data derived from the MSHP UCR database, the MOAG VSR, and the U.S. Census 
Bureau.  
For the third research question, the multiple regression analysis allowed me to 
analyze the influence of the three new variables on the outcome or dependent variables 
(Warner, 2013). The dependent variables of total crime, violent crime, property crime, 
murder were continuous measures of rates calculated based on population (i.e., rate per 





department. Criminal arrests and traffic stops comprised total outcomes measured. The 
dependent variables of citation rates, search rates, contraband hit rates, and vehicle stop 
arrests were a function of the total number of traffic stops (i.e., citations, searches, 
contraband hit rates, and vehicle stop arrests divided by the total number of traffic stops, 
respectively). Each of the 11 variables were analyzed separately for each of the ten years 
evaluated. The analysis will help determine whether the covariates mediate the 
relationship between crime and policing (i.e., dependent variables) over time. Similar to 
research question 2, the analyses were conducted on a year-by-year basis, creating ten 
individual analyses to assist me in determining the relationship between crime and de-
policing in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area while examining the effects of the three 
new independent variables.  
The research question for the final analysis is what effect do differences in race, 
socioeconomic index, and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens have on the annual 
differences in quantities of traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and 
arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to law enforcement officers in the St. Louis, 
MO metropolitan area across time to determine the extent of de-policing occurring 
within the region? The null hypothesis states that there are no differences in quantities of 
traffic stops, search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and 
fatal injuries to law enforcement officers in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across 
time when accounting for race, socioeconomic index, and the number of officers per 





alternative hypothesis states that there are differences in quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries to law 
enforcement officers in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time when accounting 
for race, socioeconomic index, and the number of officers per 1,000 citizens, thereby 
indicating that de-policing is not occurring within the region. 
Crime and policing rates were individually predicted for race (i.e., percentage of 
the population that identifies as non-White), socioeconomic index (i.e., the average 
calculated value of the percentage of unemployed persons, persons who live below the 
poverty level, and persons over 25 who have attained less than a high school education), 
and number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens. Each outcome variable was evaluated separately, 
thereby leading to differences in sample size for each year. Preliminary data screening 
included the examination of histograms for all three predictor variables. Univariate 
distributions were reasonably normal with no extreme outliers, and all slopes had the 
expected signs unless specifically denoted in the analysis. Standard multiple regression 
was performed in that all predictor variables were entered in one step. Zero-order, part, 
and partial correlations of each predictor with the outcome variable were requested in 
addition to the default statistics.  
2010 
The mean value for race was M = 34.2, where 34.2% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 12.1 and the 





metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 
significance. Tables 17 and 18 display descriptive statistics and correlations, respectively. 
Table 17 
 
Descriptive Statistics, 2010 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 34.2 25.3 78 
Socioeconomic Index 12.1 4.4 78 
LEOs 4.1 3.3 78 
Total Crime 39.4 26. 3 78 
Violent Crime 5.44 7.4 78 
Property Crime 34.0 20.7 78 
Murder 1.0 4.0 78 
LEOKA .2 .2 78 
Criminal Arrests 1552.9 3807.0 78 
Traffic Stops 6159.2 12815.7 78 
Citation Rate 71.5 23.0 78 
Search Rate 9.8 7.2 78 
CB Hit Rate 17.9 10.2 78 













 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.48 .51 .30 -7.17 -.58 13.79 -3.16 
-
1.45 
5.46 .02 .20 .00 
Violent 
Crime 
.51 .53 .34 .05 .56 .38 .89 1.85 1.62 .38 .07 .11 
Property 
Crime 
.42 .46 .26 .05 1.71 .75 .33 1.90 1.08 .75 .06 .28 
Murder .21 .20 .35 .01 .07 .38 .11 .40 2.67 .92 .69 .01 
LEOKA .19 .25 -.07 .0.0 .02 -.01 -.11 1.61 -1.37 .91 .11 .18 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.08 .15 -.14 -11.50 246.21 -242.80 -.37 1.41 -1.73 .71 .16 .09 
Traffic 
Stops 
.20 .12 -.07 14.93 237.09 -822.00 .14 .40 -1.71 .89 .69 .09 
Citation 
Rate 
.20 .12 -.07 .36 -.86 -1.17 1.93 -.82 -1.38 .06 .42 .17 
Search 
Rate 
.04 .12 -.20 -.03 .49 -.56 -.54 1.50 -2.13 .59 .14 .04 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.22 .25 -.01 .02 .18 -.14 .50 .97 -.93 .62 .34 .36 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 39.4. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .53, 
R2 = .29, adjusted R2 = .26, F(3, 74) = 9.82, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 





law enforcement officers, t(74) = 2.07, p = .04. Therefore, in 2010, total crime could be 
predicted from this set of three variables. 
The nature of the positive predictive relationship of the number of LEOs on total 
crime was also not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .02 for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample 
and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was both the only and the 
strongest predictor of total crime. 
The other two predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic index) were not 
significantly related to total crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; 
their partial slopes were not significant. Neither race nor socioeconomic index was 
predictive of total crime in this regression, even though these two variables had 
significant zero-order correlations with total crime; apparently, the information that they 
contributed to the regression was redundant with other predictors. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 5.4. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.56, R2 = .32, adjusted R2 = .29, F(3, 74) = 11.42, p < .001. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
However, none of the predictors were statistically significant; therefore, violent crime 





Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
34.0. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .48, R2 = .23, adjusted R2 = .20, F(3, 74) = 7.20, p < .001. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
However, none of the predictors were statistically significant; therefore, property crime 
could not be predicted from this set of three variables. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 1.0. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .36, R2 = .13, 
adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 74) = 3.68, p = .02. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Only one of 
the three predictors was significantly predictive of murder: the number of law 
enforcement officers, t(74) = 2.67, p = .01. Therefore, in 2010, murder could be predicted 
from this set of three variables. 
 The nature of the positive predictive relationship of the number of LEOs on 
murder was also not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .08 for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample 
and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was both the only and the 
strongest predictor of murder. 
The other two predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic index) were not 





partial slopes were not significant. Neither race nor socioeconomic index was predictive 
of murder in this regression, even though these two variables had significant zero-order 
correlations with murder; apparently, the information that they contributed to the 
regression was redundant with other predictors. 
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .36, 
R2 = .13, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 75) = 2.42, p = .01.  
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1552.1. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .26, 
R2 = .07, adjusted R2 = .03, F(3, 76) = 1.83, p = .15.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 6159.2. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .20, R2 = 
.04, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 76) = 1.04, p = .38.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 71.5. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .27, R2 = 
.07, adjusted R2 = .03, F(3, 76) = 1.92, p = .13.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 9.8. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .29, R2 = 





Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 17.9. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.21, R2 = .05, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 76) = 1.25, p = .30.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 5.3. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .27, R2 = 
.07, adjusted R2 = .04, F(3, 76) = 1.97, p = .13.  
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and the 
number of law enforcement officers on crime and policing rates across regions in 2010, 
only the number of law enforcement officers had an effect on total crime and murder 
rates. None of the other predictor variables effectively predicted levels of crime and 
policing across regions in 2010. 
2011 
The mean value for race was M = 36.7, where 36.7% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 12.0 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.9, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 







Descriptive Statistics, 2011 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 36.7 25.7 80 
Socioeconomic Index 12.0 3.9 80 
LEOs 3.9 2.9 80 
Total Crime 39.4 24.3 80 
Property Crime 34.4 20.7 80 
Violent Crime 4.95 5.88 80 
Murder .7 1.9 80 
LEOKA .20 .30 80 
Criminal Arrests 1676.7 4171.6 80 
Traffic Stops 6237.3 12773.8 80 
Citation Rate 69.9 24.6 80 
Search Rate 8.9 8.1 80 
CB Hit Rate 14.5 10.5 80 















 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.43 .47 .49 -.15 3.02 3.30 -.68 2.21 4.02 .50 .03 .001 
Violent 
Crime 
.54 .58 .47 -.02 .81 .65 -.33 2.58 3.47 .74 .01 .001 
Property 
Crime 
.36 .40 .45 -.127 2.20 2.65 -.67 1.80 3.62 .50 .08 .001 
Murder .29 .29 .24 .01 .09 .10 .24 .71 1.34 .81 .48 .19 
LEOKA .16 .20 .05 -.00 .03 .00 -.47 1.20 -.03 .64 .24 .98 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.06 .13 -.13 -45.41 462.97 -240.99 -1.03 1.63 -1.41 .31 .11 .16 
Traffic 
Stops 
-.02 .02 -.16 -70.99 660.30 -761.09 -.52 .75 -1.43 .61 .46 .16 
Citation 
Rate 
.09 .09 .03 .06 .23 -.07 .22 .13 -.07 .83 .90 .94 
Search 
Rate 
-.08 .01 -.16 -.15 1.02 -.41 -.175 1.84 -.124 .08 .07 .22 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.13 .17 .20 -.03 .33 .25 -.78 1.15 1.49 .44 .25 .14 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 39.4. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .60, 
R2 = .36, adjusted R2 = .34, F(3, 76) = 14.25, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Two 
of the three predictors were significantly predictive of total crime: socioeconomic index 





p < .001, respectively. Therefore, in 2011, total crime could be predicted from the 
socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The nature of the socioeconomic index's positive predictive relationship was as 
predicted, where higher socioeconomic indices (i.e., increased economic disparity) 
resulted in higher crime rates. The number of LEOs on total crime was not as predicted, 
where more officers translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely 
explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: 
sr2 = .04 for socioeconomic index and sr2 = .14 for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this 
sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was the strongest 
predictor of total crime. 
The other predictor variable (i.e., race) was not significantly related to total crime 
when other predictors were statistically controlled; their partial slopes were not 
significant. Moreover, race was predictive of total crime in this regression, even though 
this variable had a significant zero-order correlation with total crime; apparently, the 
information that they contributed to the regression was redundant with other predictors. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for violent crime per 1,000 persons was M = 5.0. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .65, 
R2 = .43, adjusted R2 = .40, F(3, 76) = 18.77, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Two 
of the three predictors were significantly predictive of violent crime: socioeconomic 





3.47, p < .001, respectively. Therefore, in 2011, violent crime could be predicted from the 
socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The nature of the socioeconomic index's positive predictive relationship was as 
predicted, where higher socioeconomic indices (i.e., increased economic disparity) 
resulted in higher crime rates. The number of LEOs on violent crime was not as 
predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The proportions of variance 
uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as 
follows: sr2 = .05 for socioeconomic index and sr2 = .09 for the number of LEOs. Thus, 
in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was the 
strongest predictor of violent crime. 
The other predictor variable (i.e., race) was not significantly related to violent 
crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; the partial slope was not 
significant. Moreover, race was predictive of violent crime in this regression, even 
though this variable had a significant zero-order correlation with violent crime; 
apparently, the information that they contributed to the regression was redundant with 
other predictors. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
34.4. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .53, R2 = .28, adjusted R2 = .25, F(3, 76) = 9.91, p < .001. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 





LEOs, where t(76) = 3.62, p = .01. When adjusting the p-value to .10, the socioeconomic 
index became a significant predictor of property crime, where t(76) = 1.80, p = .08. 
Therefore, in 2011, property crime could be predicted from both the number of LEOs and 
socioeconomic index. 
 The nature of the socioeconomic index's positive predictive relationship was as 
predicted, where higher socioeconomic indices (i.e., increased economic disparity) 
resulted in higher crime rates. The number of LEOs on property crime was not as 
predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The proportions of variance 
uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as 
follows: sr2 = .03 for socioeconomic index and sr2 = .13 for the number of LEOs. Thus, 
in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was the 
strongest predictor of property crime. The other predictor variable (i.e., race) was not 
significantly related to property crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; 
the partial slope was not significant, despite having a high zero-order correlation. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 0.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .33, R2 = .11, 
adjusted R2 = .07, F(3, 76) = 3.12, p = .03. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. However, none 
of the predictors were statistically significant; therefore, murder could not be predicted 





LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .21, 
R2 = .05, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 76) = 1.18, p = .32.  
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1676.7. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .25, 
R2 = .06, adjusted R2 = .03, F(3, 76) = 1.66, p = .18.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 6237.3. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .18, R2 = 
.03, adjusted R2 = -.04, F(3, 76) = 0.90, p = .48.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 69.9. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .09, R2 = 
.01, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 76) = 0.22, p = .88.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 8.9. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .26, R2 = 
.07, adjusted R2 = .03, F(3, 76) = 1.85, p = .15.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 17.5. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.26, R2 = .07, adjusted R2 = .03, F(3, 76) = 1.88, p = .14.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 4.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .25, R2 = 





Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and the 
number of law enforcement officers on crime and policing rates across regions in 2011, 
both socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers had an effect on 
total, violent, and property crime and murder rates. None of the other predictor variables 
effectively predicted levels of crime and policing across regions in 2011. While the 
number of LEOs was most predictive of rates for total and property crime and murder, 
the relationship between the socioeconomic index and total and violent crime should not 
be ignored, especially as the socioeconomic index was the sole predictor of violent crime. 
2012  
The mean value for race was M = 36.0, where 36.0% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 11.8 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.7, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 







Descriptive Statistics, 2012 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 36.0 26.3 80 
Socioeconomic Index 11.8 4.9 80 
LEOs 3.7 2.7 80 
Total Crime 37.6 27.6 80 
Violent Crime 5.5 9.0 80 
Property Crime 32.1 21.9 80 
Murder 1.1 4.0 80 
LEOKA .2 .32 80 
Criminal Arrests 1656.5 4037.0 80 
Traffic Stops 6099.0 12276.4 80 
Citation Rate 66.7 26.9 80 
Search Rate 9.2 10.0 80 
CB Hit Rate 18.0 11.2 80 














 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.39 .43 .32 .01 2.00 2.14 .03 1.68 1.97 .98 .10 .05 
Violent 
Crime 
.43 .44 .28 .05 .51 .51 .61 1.32 1.44 .55 .19 .16 
Property 
Crime 
.32 .36 .29 -.04 1.49 1.63 -.20 1.52 1.83 .84 .13 .07 
Murder .22 .21 .43 .00 .06 .58 .07 .37 3.62 .95 .72 .001 
LEOKA .13 .17 -.08 -.00 .02 -.02 -.20 1.09 -1.16 .84 .28 .25 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.07 .09 -.14 .91 114.07 -265.28 .03 .59 -1.50 .98 .56 .14 
Traffic 
Stops 
-.02 -.04 -.17 64.94 -271.04 -811.01 .58 -.46 -1.51 .57 .65 .14 
Citation 
Rate 
.01 -.01 .00 ..06 -.34 -.01 .25 -.26 -.01 .80 .80 .99 
Search 
Rate 
-.08 -.01 -.11 -.12 .59 -.35 -1.27 1.23 -.79 .21 .22 .43 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.05 .09 .04 -.02 .18 .05 -.13 .20 .03 .60 .42 .82 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 37.6. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .47, 
R2 = .22, adjusted R2 = .19, F(3, 76) = 7.28, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 





enforcement officers, where t(76) = 1.97, p = .05. Therefore, in 2012, total crime could 
be predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on total crime was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .04 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of total crime. 
The other predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic index) were not significantly 
related to total crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; their partial 
slopes were not significant, though the slope of the socioeconomic index was significant 
when adjusting the p-value upwards to .10, especially when considering the zero-order 
correlation was higher for the socioeconomic index when compared to the number of 
LEOs. Race also had a high zero-order correlation, though neither the socioeconomic 
index nor race were individually predictive of rates of total crime across the region. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 5.5. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .47, 
R2 = .22, adjusted R2 = .19, F(3, 76) = 7.28, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
However, none of the three predictors were significantly predictive of violent crime, even 





Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
32.1. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .41, R2 = .16, adjusted R2 = .13, F(3, 76) = 4.98, p = .01. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
When adjusting the p-value to .10, the number of LEOs became a significant predictor of 
property crime, where t(76) = 2.92, p = .01. Therefore, in 2012, property crime could be 
predicted from the number of LEOs. 
 The number of LEOs on property crime was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .04 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of property crime. The other predictor 
variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic index) were not significantly related to property 
crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; their partial slopes were not 
significant.  
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 1.1. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .43, R2 = .19, 
adjusted R2 = .16, F(3, 76) = 5.89, p = .01. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Only one of 





enforcement officers, t(76) = 3.62, p = .01. Therefore, in 2012, murder could be predicted 
from this set of three variables. 
 The nature of the positive predictive relationship of the number of LEOs on 
murder was also not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .14 for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample 
and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was both the only and the 
strongest predictor of murder.  
The other two predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic index) were not 
significantly related to murder when other predictors were statistically controlled; their 
partial slopes were not significant. Neither race nor socioeconomic index was predictive 
of murder in this regression, even though these two variables had moderate zero-order 
correlations with murder; apparently, the information that they contributed to the 
regression was redundant with other predictors. 
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .22, 
R2 = .05, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 76) = 1.29 p = .28.  
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1656.5. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .19, 





Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 6099.0. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .18, R2 = 
.03, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 76) = 0.84, p = .48.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 66.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .03, R2 = 
.01, adjusted R2 = -.04, F(3, 76) = 0.02, p = 1.00.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 9.2. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .18, R2 = 
.03, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 76) = 0.87, p = .46.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 18.0. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.28, R2 = .08, adjusted R2 = .04, F(3, 76) = 2.08, p = .11.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 4.6. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .11, R2 = 
.01, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 76) = 0.31, p = .82.  
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and the 
number of law enforcement officers on crime and policing rates across regions in 2012, 
only the number of LEOs had an effect on total crime, property crime, and murder rates. 
None of the other predictor variables effectively predicted levels of crime and policing 







The mean value for race was M = 36.0, where 36.0% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 10.5 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 4.0, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 
significance. Tables 23 and 24 display descriptive statistics and correlations, respectively. 
Table 23 
Descriptive Statistics, 2013 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 36.0 26.4 79 
Socioeconomic Index 10.5 4.3 79 
LEOs 4.0 4.0 79 
Total Crime 35.2 22.7 79 
Violent Crime 4.8 7.6 79 
Property Crime 30.4 18.7 79 
Murder 1.2 7.6 79 
LEOKA .1 .2 79 
Criminal Arrests 1544.8 3711.7 79 
Traffic Stops 6193.4 12180.7 79 
Citation Rate 67.1 26.6 79 
Search Rate 8.5 8.4 79 
CB Hit Rate 19.6 12.3 79 












 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.46 .52 .49 -.05 2.47 2.21 -.30 2.62 4.13 .76 .01 .000 
Violent 
Crime 
.46 .48 .67 .01 .54 1.13 .16 1.99 7.30 .88 .05 .000 
Property 
Crime 
.37 .43 .32 -.05 1.93 1.09 -.37 2.20 2.18 .71 .03 .03 
Murder .15 .14 .75 -.03 .08 1.48 -.75 .28 9.73 .45 .78 .000 
LEOKA .26 .28 .121 .00 .01 .00 .22 1.06 .42 .83 .30 .68 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.06 .12 -.12 -15.73 217.79 -140.12 -.49 1.11 -1.26 .62 .27 .21 
Traffic 
Stops 
-.01 -.00 -.14 -.39 107.52 -470.62 -.00 .17 -1.28 1.00 .87 .20 
Citation 
Rate 
.04 .02 -.17 .13 -.24 -1.33 .55 -.17 -1.68 .58 .87 .10 
Search 
Rate 
-.07 .04 -.11 -.12 .75 -.20 -1.63 1.70 -.83 .11 .09 .41 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.12 .19 .03 -.03 .37 -.01 -.70 1.44 -.09 .49 .15 .93 
  
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 35.2. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .63, 
R2 = .40, adjusted R2 = .38, F(3, 75) = 16.83, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Two 
of the three predictors were significantly predictive of total crime: the socioeconomic 





4.13, p < .001, respectively. Therefore, total crime could be predicted from both the 
socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher levels of crime. The number of LEOs 
on total crime was not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .05 for the socioeconomic index and sr2 = .14 for 
the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of total crime. 
The other predictor variable (i.e., race) was not significantly related to total crime 
when other predictors were statistically controlled; their partial slopes were not 
significant. Race also had a high zero-order correlation, though neither the 
socioeconomic index nor race were individually predictive of rates of total crime across 
the region. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 4.8. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .74, 
R2 = .55, adjusted R2 = .54, F(3, 75) = 30.92, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Two 
of the three predictors were significantly predictive of violent crime: the socioeconomic 





7.30, p < .001, respectively. Therefore, violent crime could be predicted from both the 
socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher levels of crime. The number of LEOs 
on violent crime was not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .02 for the socioeconomic index and sr2 = .31 for 
the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of violent crime. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
30.4. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .49, R2 = .24, adjusted R2 = .21, F(3, 75) = 7.74, p < .001. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
Two of the three predictors were significantly predictive of property crime: the 
socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers, where t(75) = 2.20, p 
= .03 and t(75) = 2.18, p = .03, respectively. Therefore, property crime could be predicted 
from both the socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher levels of crime. The number of LEOs 
on property crime was not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. 





the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .05 for the socioeconomic index and sr2 = .05 
for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, 
the socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor of property crime because of its 
higher zero-order value. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 1.2. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .75, R2 = .57, 
adjusted R2 = .55, F(3, 75) = 32.85, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Only one of 
the three predictors was significantly predictive of murder: the number of law 
enforcement officers, t(75) = 9.73, p < .001. Therefore, in 2013, murder could be 
predicted from this set of three variables. 
 The nature of the positive predictive relationship of the number of LEOs on 
murder was also not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .55 for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample 
and in the context of this set of predictors, the number of LEOs was both the only and the 
strongest predictor of murder.  
The other two predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic index) were not 
significantly related to murder when other predictors were statistically controlled; their 





LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.1. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .29, 
R2 = .08, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 75) = 2.30 p = .08.  
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1544.8. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .20, 
R2 = .04, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 75) = 1.04, p = .38.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 6193.4. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .15, R2 = 
.02, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 75) = 0.56, p = .64.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 67.1. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .19, R2 = 
.04, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 75) = 0.98, p = 0.41.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 8.5. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .22, R2 = 
.05, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 75) = 1.31, p = .28.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 19.6. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.22, R2 = .05, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 75) = 1.26, p = .30.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 4.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .20, R2 = 





Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and the 
number of law enforcement officers on crime and policing rates across regions in 2013, 
both socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers had an effect on 
total, violent, and property crime and murder rates. None of the other predictor variables 
effectively predicted levels of crime and policing across regions in 2013. While the 
number of LEOs was most predictive of rates for total and violent crime and murder, the 
relationship between the socioeconomic index and total and violent crime should not be 
ignored, especially as the socioeconomic index was the sole predictor of property crime. 
2014  
The mean value for race was M = 35.3, where 35.3% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 9.2 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 4.2, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 







Descriptive Statistics, 2014 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 35.2 25.6 78 
Socioeconomic Index 9.24 3.3 78 
LEOs 4.2 5.2 78 
Total Crime 35.8 21.2 78 
Violent Crime 4.4 5.8 78 
Property Crime 28.4 17.5 78 
Murder 1.1 3.9 78 
LEOKA .15 .21 78 
Criminal Arrests 1373.3 3151.9 78 
Traffic Stops 5821.1 9613.0 78 
Citation Rate 67.3 23.8 78 
Search Rate 8.7 7.8 78 
CB Hit Rate 20.8 12.2 78 













 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.47 .52 .41 .04 2.62 1.19 .30 2.53 3.00 .77 .01 .01 
Violent 
Crime 
.48 .52 .32 .02 .69 .22 .58 2.35 1.95 .57 .02 .06 
Property 
Crime 
.41 .46 .39 .02 1.93 .97 .15 2.14 2.82 .88 .04 .01 
Murder .29 .28 .11 .03 .16 .02 .89 .70 .24 .38 .49 .81 
LEOKA .21 .28 -.09 -.00 .02 -.01 -.04 1.74 -1.48 .97 .09 .14 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.07 .18 -.09 -26.13 362.60 -71.09 -1.08 1.96 -1.01 .29 .05 .32 
Traffic 
Stops 
-.02 .05 -15 -49.85 558.31 -295.12 -.66 .97 -1.35 .51 .33 .18 
Citation 
Rate 
.08 .04 -.38 .24 -.45 -1.98 1.39 -.35 -3.96 .17 .73 .000 
Search 
Rate 
.04 .19 -.16 -.09 1.10 -.28 -1.46 2.44 -1.62 .15 .02 .11 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.21 .26 -.07 .00 .43 -.14 .01 .29 -.14 .95 .14 .22 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 35.8. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .60, 
R2 = .35, adjusted R2 = .33, F(3, 74) = 13.54, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Two 
of the three predictors were significantly predictive of total crime: the socioeconomic 





3.00, p = .01, respectively. Therefore, total crime could be predicted from both the 
socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher levels of crime. The number of LEOs 
on total crime was not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .06 for the socioeconomic index and sr2 = .08 for 
the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of total crime. 
The other predictor variable (i.e., race) was not significantly related to total crime 
when other predictors were statistically controlled; their partial slopes were not 
significant. Race also had a high zero-order correlation, though neither the 
socioeconomic index nor race were individually predictive of rates of total crime across 
the region. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 4.4. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .56, 
R2 = .31, adjusted R2 = .29, F(3, 74) = 11.25, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
However, when increasing the p-value to .10, two of the three predictors were 
significantly predictive of violent crime: the socioeconomic index and the number of law 





Therefore, violent crime could be predicted from both the socioeconomic index and the 
number of law enforcement officers. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher levels of crime. The number of LEOs 
on violent crime was not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .05 for the socioeconomic index and sr2 = .04 for 
the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor of violent crime. 
The other predictor variable (i.e., race) was not significantly related to total crime 
when other predictors were statistically controlled; their partial slopes were not 
significant. Race also had a high zero-order correlation, though neither the 
socioeconomic index nor race were individually predictive of rates of total crime across 
the region. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
28.4. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .54, R2 = .29, adjusted R2 = .26, F(3, 74) = 9.99, p < .001. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 
Two of the three predictors were significantly predictive of property crime: the 





= .04 and t(74) = 2.82, p = .01, respectively. Therefore, property crime could be predicted 
from both the socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher levels of crime. The number of LEOs 
on property crime was not as predicted, where more officers translated to more crime. 
The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring 
the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .04 for the socioeconomic index and sr2 = .08 
for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, 
the socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor of property crime because of its 
higher zero-order value. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 1.1. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .30, R2 = 
.09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 74) = 2.48, p = .07.  
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .33, R2 
= .11, adjusted R2 = .07, F(3, 74) = 2.99 p = .04. However, none of the predictors were 
statistically significant; therefore, LEOKA could not be predicted from this set of three 
variables. 
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1373.3. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .25, 





Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 5821.1. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .19, R2 = 
.04, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 74) = 0.93, p = .43.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 67.3. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .43, R2 = .18, 
adjusted R2 = .15, F(3, 74) = 5.45, p = 0.01. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One of the 
three predictors was significantly predictive of property crime: the number of law 
enforcement officers, where t(74) =- 3.96, p < .001. Therefore, citation rates could be 
predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The effect of the number of LEOs on citations issued during traffic stops was as 
predicted, where more officers translated to more citations issued. The proportions of 
variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) 
were as follows: sr2 = .18 for the number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the 
context of this set of predictors, the number of law enforcement officers was the strongest 
predictor of citations issued. 
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 8.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .32, R2 = .11, 
adjusted R2 = .07, F(3, 74) = 2.88, p = .04. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One of the 





where t(74) = 2.44, p = .02. Therefore, search rates could be predicted from the 
socioeconomic index. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher search rates. The proportions of 
variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) 
were as follows: sr2 = .07 for the socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample and in the 
context of this set of predictors, the socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor of 
search rates. 
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 20.8. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.28, R2 = .08, adjusted R2 = .04, F(3, 74) = 2.12, p = .11.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 4.8. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .30, R2 = 
.09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 74) = 2.40, p = .08.  
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and the 
number of law enforcement officers on crime and policing rates across regions in 2014, 
both the socioeconomic index and the number of law enforcement officers had an effect 
on total, violent, and property crime as well as citation and search rates. None of the other 
predictor variables effectively predicted levels of crime and policing across regions in 
2014. While the number of LEOs was most predictive of crime and property crime rates, 





and search rates. Moreover, the relationship between the socioeconomic index and total 
and property crime should not be ignored, especially as the socioeconomic index was 
more predictive of violent crime. 
2015 
The mean value for race was M = 36.3, where 36.3% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 9.4 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.6, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 












 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 36.2 26.7 78 
Socioeconomic Index 9.4 3.8 78 
LEOs 3.6 3.6 78 
Total Crime 36.3 25.6 78 
Violent Crime 5.7 9.6 78 
Property Crime 30.6 18.9 78 
Murder .8 2.2 78 
LEOKA .1 .2 78 
Criminal Arrests 1183.0 3047.3 78 
Traffic Stops 5143.4 9063.3 78 
Citation Rate 61.1 24.2 78 
Search Rate 9.5 8.1 78 
CB Hit Rate 24.0 14.4 78 














 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.48 .49 .58 .12 1.79 3.46 .81 1.71 5.49 .42 .09 .000 
Violent 
Crime 
.42 .41 .74 .03 .50 1.81 .54 1.49 9.04 .60 .14 .000 
Property 
Crime 
.44 .45 .41 .10 1.29 1.64 .75 1.46 3.07 .46 .15 .01 
Murder .29 .31 .11 .01 .12 .02 .49 1.05 .30 .63 .30 .76 
LEOKA .22 .22 .34 .00 .01 .02 .22 .55 2.72 .83 .58 .01 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.04 .11 -.10 -16.50 202.67 -101.06 -.68 1.20 -1.00 .50 .23 .32 
Traffic 
Stops 
-.05 -.04 -.15 -15.08 82.63 -369.07 -.21 .16 -1.22 .84 .87 .23 
Citation 
Rate 
.09 .08 -.12 .10 .18 -1.02 .51 .13 -1.26 .61 .90 .21 
Search 
Rate 
-.01 .12 -.14 -.10 .94 -.35 -1.63 2.16 -1.33 .11 .03 .19 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.16 .30 -.09 -.03 .47 -.13 -1.42 2.89 -1.29 .16 .01 .20 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 36.3. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .68, 
R2 = .47, adjusted R2 = .44, F(3, 74) = 21.73, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 





enforcement officers, where t(74) = 5.49, p < .001. Therefore, total crime could be 
predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on total crime was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .22 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of total crime. 
The other predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic status) were not 
significantly related to total crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; 
their partial slopes were not significant. Race also had a high zero-order correlation, 
though neither the socioeconomic index nor race were individually predictive of rates of 
total crime across the region. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for violent crime per 1,000 persons was M = 5.7. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .78, 
R2 = .61, adjusted R2 = .60, F(3, 74) = 39.17, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 
of the three predictors was significantly predictive of violent crime: the number of law 
enforcement officers, where t(74) = 9.04, p < .001. Therefore, violent crime could be 
predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on violent crime was not as predicted, where more officers 





predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .42 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of violent crime. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
30.6. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .55, R2 = .30, adjusted R2 = .27, F(3, 74) = 10.58, p < .001. To assess the contributions 
of the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were 
examined. One of the three predictors was significantly predictive of property crime: the 
number of law enforcement officers, where t(74) = 3.07, p = .01. Therefore, property 
crime could be predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on property crime was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .09 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor of property 
crime. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 0.8. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .31, R2 = .10, 
adjusted R2 = .06, F(3, 74) = 2.67, p = .05. However, none of the predictors were 






LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .37, R2 
= .14, adjusted R2 = .10, F(3, 74) = 3.92 p = .01. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 
of the three predictors was significantly predictive of LEOKA: the number of law 
enforcement officers, where t(74) = 2.72, p = .01. Therefore, LEOKA could be predicted 
from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on LEOKA was as predicted, where more officers translated 
to more assaults on officers. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .08 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor. 
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1183.0. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .18, 
R2 = .03, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 74) = 0.83, p = .48.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 5143.4. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .15, R2 = 
.02, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 74) = 0.58, p = .63.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 61.1. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .17, R2 = 





Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 9.5. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .28, R2 = 
.08, adjusted R2 = .04, F(3, 74) = 2.10, p = .11.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 24.0. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.20, R2 = .04, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 74) = 1.08, p = .36.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 4.3. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .37, R2 = .14, 
adjusted R2 = .11, F(3, 74) = 4.02, p = .01. One of the three predictors was significantly 
predictive of traffic arrest rates: the socioeconomic index, where t(74) = 2.89, p = .01. 
Therefore, traffic arrest rates could be predicted from the socioeconomic index. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher traffic arrest rates. The proportions of 
variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) 
were as follows: sr2 = .10 for the socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample and in the 
context of this set of predictors, the socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor of 
traffic arrest rates. 
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and 
number of LEOs on crime and policing rates across regions in 2015, the number of law 
enforcement officers affected total, violent, and property crime and LEOKAs. 





rates across the region. While the relationship between the number of LEOs per capita 
and LEOKAs appears logical, where more LEOs result in higher rates of assault or 
injury, the positive relationship between the number of LEOs and crime rates seems less 
intuitive. Moreover, in 2015, the socioeconomic index was predictive of the total number 
of traffic arrests with no relationship to crime, indicating a potential underlying disparity. 
2016  
The mean value for race was M = 34.7, where 34.7% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 8.7 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.5, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 







Descriptive Statistics, 2016 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 34.7 26.1 74 
Socioeconomic Index 8.7 3.5 74 
LEOs 3.5 3.4 74 
Total Crime 35.7 22.8 74 
Violent Crime 4.9 6.1 74 
Property Crime 29.5 18.4 74 
Murder 2.0 8.3 74 
LEOKA .2 .2 74 
Criminal Arrests 1184.2 3280.1 74 
Traffic Stops 5184.6 9253.3 74 
Citation Rate 59.7 22.6 74 
Search Rate 9.4 8.6 74 
CB Hit Rate 29.8 19.4 74 














 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.43 .40 .23 .23 1.17 .85 1.61 1.12 1.15 .11 .27 .25 
Violent 
Crime 
.58 .55 .12 .09 .47 -.05 2.60 .189 -.31 .01 .06 .76 
Property 
Crime 
.35 .33 .21 .15 .79 .73 1.23 .90 1.18 .22 .37 .24 
Murder .25 .22 .28 .04 .20 .57 .71 .50 1.99 .48 .62 .05 
LEOKA .26 .24 .18 .00 .01 .01 .84 .64 1.04 .41 .52 .30 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.05 .07 -.09 1.40 79.27 -100.80 .06 .47 -.85 .95 .64 .40 
Traffic 
Stops 
.01 -.00 -.03 14.97 -76.89 -87.90 .23 -.16 -.26 .82 .87 .80 
Citation 
Rate 
.17 .19 .08 .05 .89 .27 .34 .78 .34 .74 .44 .74 
Search 
Rate 
-.06 .08 -.04 -.09 .69 -.06 -1.45 1.57 -.19 .15 .12 .85 
CB Hit 
Rate 
-.10 -.15 -.02 .03 -1.01 .01 .22 
-
1.02 




.03 .21 .01 -.03 .32 .00 -1.61 2.42 .04 .11 .02 .97 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 34.7. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .46, 
R2 = .21, adjusted R2 = .18, F(3, 70) = 6.29, p = .01. However, none of the predictors 
were statistically significant; therefore, total crime could not be predicted from this set of 






Violent Crime. The mean value for violent crime per 1,000 persons was M = 4.9. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .61, 
R2 = .37, adjusted R2 = .34, F(3, 70) = 13.48 p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 
of the three predictors was significantly predictive of violent crime: race, where t(70) = 
2.60, p = .01. However, when increasing the p-value to .10, the socioeconomic index also 
becomes significant, where t(70) = 1.89, p = .06. Therefore, violent crime could be 
predicted from race and the socioeconomic index. 
 Race was as predicted, where a higher rate of non-Whites translated to more 
crime. The socioeconomic index was also as predicted, where a higher index resulted 
from greater economic disparity, translated to more crime. The proportions of variance 
uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as 
follows: sr2 = .06 for race and sr2 = .03 for socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample 
and in the context of this set of predictors, race was the strongest predictor of violent 
crime. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
29.5. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .39, R2 = .15, adjusted R2 = .12, F(3, 70) = 4.16, p = .01. However, none of the 
predictors were statistically significant; therefore, property crime could not be predicted 
from this set of three variables, despite moderate zero-order correlations between 





Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 2.0. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .34, R2 = .11, 
adjusted R2 = .06, F(3, 70) = 2.98, p = .04. One of the three predictors was significantly 
predictive of murder: the number of law enforcement officers, where t(70) = 1.99, p = 
.05. Therefore, murder could be predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on murder was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more homicides. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .05 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor. 
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .30, 
R2 = .09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 70) = 2.24, p = .09.  
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1184.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .13, 
R2 = .02, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 70) = 0.37, p = .77.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 5184.6. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .04, R2 = 





Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 59.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .20, R2 = 
.04, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 70) = 0.98, p = 0.41.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 9.4. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .19, R2 = 
.04, adjusted R2 = -.01, F(3, 70) = 0.92, p = .44.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 29.8. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.15, R2 = .02, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 70) = 0.56, p = .64.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 3.8. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .28, R2 = 
.08, adjusted R2 = .04, F(3, 70) = 1.98, p = .13.  
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and 
number of LEOs on crime and policing rates across regions in 2016, race, and to a lesser 
degree, the socioeconomic index, had an effect on violent crime while the number of law 
enforcement officers had an effect on murder rates. The alterations in relationships 
between race, socioeconomic index, and number of LEOs varied more in 2016 when 
compared to previous years. 
2017  
The mean value for race was M = 35.5, where 35.5% of the total population 





number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.6, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 
significance. Tables 31 and 32 display descriptive statistics and correlations, respectively. 
Table 31 
Descriptive Statistics, 2017 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 35.5 27.6 72 
Socioeconomic Index 8.5 3.7 72 
LEOs 3.6 3.0 72 
Total Crime 34.3 33.7 72 
Violent Crime 4.9 8.5 72 
Property Crime 29.4 26.4 72 
Murder 1.6 5.6 72 
LEOKA .2 .2 72 
Criminal Arrests 1160.4 3142.1 72 
Traffic Stops 5244.9 8490.0 72 
Citation Rate 57.5 21.9 72 
Search Rate 10.6 10.1 72 
CB Hit Rate 33.2 17.9 72 













 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.36 .37 .76 -.07 1.82 8.04 -.35 1.24 8.84 .73 .22 .000 
Violent 
Crime 
.42 .43 .69 -.01 .58 1.74 -.10 1.46 7.04 .92 .15 .000 
Property 
Crime 
.33 .33 .75 -.07 1.26 6.30 -.41 1.07 8.59 .68 .29 .000 
Murder .28 .27 .65 -.00 .15 1.15 -.08 .52 6.34 .94 .61 .000 
LEOKA .27 .29 -.00 .00 .01 -.01 .37 .99 -.85 .71 .32 .40 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.07 .07 -.09 5.18 61.10 -177.37 .18 .29 -.99 .86 .78 .33 
Traffic 
Stops 
.03 -.00 -.01 39.70 
-
249.07 
-58.83 .50 -.43 -.16 .62 .67 .87 
Citation 
Rate 
.28 .24 .33 .18 -.20 1.92 .93 -.15 2.22 .36 .89 .03 
Search 
Rate 
-.08 -.03 -.10 -.09 .55 -.24 -.91 .80 -.57 .37 .43 .57 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.01 .07 .01 -.02 .19 .00 -.81 .98 .02 .42 .33 .99 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 34.3. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .77, 
R2 = .60, adjusted R2 = .58, F(3, 68) = 34.09, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 





enforcement officers, where t(68) = 8.84, p < .001. Therefore, total crime could be 
predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on total crime was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .46 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of total crime. 
The other predictor variables (i.e., race and socioeconomic status) were not 
significantly related to total crime when other predictors were statistically controlled; 
their partial slopes were not significant. Race also had a high zero-order correlation, 
though neither the socioeconomic index nor race were individually predictive of rates of 
total crime across the region. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for violent crime per 1,000 persons was M = 4.94 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .73, 
R2 = .53, adjusted R2 = .51, F(3, 68) = 25.66, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 
of the three predictors was significantly predictive of violent crime: the number of law 
enforcement officers, where t(68) = 7.04, p < .001. Therefore, violent crime could be 
predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on violent crime was not as predicted, where more officers 





predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .35 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of LEOs was the strongest predictor of violent crime. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
29.4. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .76, R2 = .58, adjusted R2 = .56, F(3, 68) = 30.87, p < .001. To assess the contributions 
of the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were 
examined. One of the three predictors was significantly predictive of property crime: the 
number of law enforcement officers, where t(68) = 8.59, p < .001. Therefore, property 
crime could be predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on property crime was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .46 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor of property 
crime. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 1.6. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .65, R2 = .42, 
adjusted R2 = .40, F(3, 68) = 16.63, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One of the 





officers, where t(68) = 6.34, p < .001. Therefore, murder could be predicted from the 
number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on murder was not as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more crime. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .34 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor of murder. 
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .31, 
R2 = .09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 68) = 2.352 p = .08.  
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1160.4. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .14, 
R2 = .02, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 68) = 0.45, p = .72.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 5244.9. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .06, R2 = 
.01, adjusted R2 = -.04, F(3, 68) = 0.09, p = .97.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 57.5. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .38, R2 = .14, 
adjusted R2 =.10, F(3, 68) = 3.75, p = 0.02. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One of the 





enforcement officers, where t(68) = 2.22, p = .03. Therefore, citation rates could be 
predicted from the number of law enforcement officers. 
 The number of LEOs on citation rates was as predicted, where more officers 
translated to more traffic citations. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by 
this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .06 for the 
number of LEOs. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, the 
number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor of citation 
rates. 
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 10.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .14, R2 = 
.02, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 68) = 0.47, p = .71.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 33.2. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.13, R2 = .02, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 68) = 0.40, p = .75.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 3.7. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .12, R2 = 
.01, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 68) = 0.32, p = .81.  
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and 
number of LEOs on crime and policing rates across regions in 2017, the number of law 
enforcement officers affected total, violent, and property crime and murder and citation 





only the number of LEOs per capita was predictive of only one measure of policing. 
While the number of LEOs had been positively correlated to measures of crime in past 
years, the strong correlation in 2017 indicates a potential shift in trends over previous 
years. 
2018  
The mean value for race was M = 35.4, where 35.4% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 8.3 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.7, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 







Descriptive Statistics, 2018 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 35.4 27.5 72 
Socioeconomic Index 8.3 3.8 72 
LEOs 3.7 3.8 72 
Total Crime 34.7 22.8 72 
Violent Crime 4.6 6.3 72 
Property Crime 30.1 18.7 72 
Murder .9 4.2 72 
LEOKA .2 .2 72 
Criminal Arrests 1041.2 2746.6 72 
Traffic Stops 5589.4 9675.6 72 
Citation Rate 58.4 22.8 72 
Search Rate 10.8 9.4 72 
CB Hit Rate 32.0 15.9 72 














 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.54 .54 .22 .19 .189 .35 .90 1.20 .54 .37 .23 .59 
Violent 
Crime 
.51 .55 .12 .01 .89 -.07 .13 2.06 -.40 .90 .04 .69 
Property 
Crime 
.48 .48 .23 .19 1.00 .42 1.01 .75 .76 .32 .46 .45 
Murder .20 .21 -.09 .01 .20 -.19 .30 .59 -1.40 .77 .56 .17 
LEOKA .14 .24 .39 .00 .03 .02 -2.41 2.72 3.47 .02 .01 .000 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.08 .10 -.06 -6.22 136.54 -71.7 -.20 .61 -.78 .84 .54 .44 
Traffic 
Stops 
.02 .02 -.05 11.17 12.99 -161.34 .10 .02 -.49 .92 .99 .62 
Citation 
Rate 
.21 .21 .26 .03 .67 1.32 .12 .37 .180 .91 .71 .08 
Search 
Rate 
-.04 .09 -.08 -.27 2.10 -.19 -2.69 2.86 -.61 .01 .01 .54 
CB Hit 
Rate 




.01 .12 .07 -.07 .58 .06 -2.26 2.44 .59 .03 .02 .56 
 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 34.7. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .55, 
R2 = .31, adjusted R2 = .28, F(3, 68) = 9.99, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 





not be predicted from this set of three variables, despite moderate zero-order correlations 
between total crime and race and socioeconomic index. 
Violent Crime. The mean value for violent crime per 1,000 persons was M = 4.6. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .55, 
R2 = .30, adjusted R2 = .27, F(3, 68) = 9.90, p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. One 
of the three predictors was significantly predictive of violent crime: the socioeconomic 
index, where t(68) = 2.06, p = .04. Therefore, violent crime could be predicted from the 
socioeconomic index. 
 The socioeconomic index's effect on violent crime was as predicted, where more a 
higher socioeconomic index, or more economic disparity, translated to more crime. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .04 for socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample 
and in the context of this set of predictors, the socioeconomic index was the strongest 
predictor of violent crime. 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
30.1. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R 
= .50, R2 = .25, adjusted R2 = .21, F(3, 68) = 7.43, p < .001. To assess the contributions of 
the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. 





could not be predicted from this set of three variables, despite moderate zero-order 
correlations between property crime and race and socioeconomic index. 
Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 1.0. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .27, R2 = 
.07, adjusted R2 = .03, F(3, 68) = 1.72, p = .17.  
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .49, R2 
= .24, adjusted R2 = .21, F(3, 68) = 7.11 p < .001. To assess the contributions of the 
individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. All 
three of the three predictors were significantly predictive of LEOKA, where t(68) = -2.41, 
p = .02 for race, t(68) = 2.72, p = .01 for the socioeconomic index, and t(68) = 3.47, p < 
.001 for the number of law enforcement officers. Therefore, LEOKA could be predicted 
from all three variables. 
 Race was not as predicted, as there was an inverse relationship on LEOKA, where 
a lower percentage of non-Whites led to higher numbers of assaults on LEOs. The 
socioeconomic index was as predicted, where higher index rates (i.e., more economic 
disparity) resulted in higher rates of assaults on LEOs. The number of LEOs on LEOKA 
was as predicted, where more officers translated to more assaults on officers. The 
proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the 
part correlation) was follows: sr2 = .07 for race, sr2 = .08 for socioeconomic index, and 





predictors, the number of law enforcement officers per capita was the strongest predictor 
of LEOKA. 
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 1041.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .14, 
R2 = .02, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 68) = 0.47, p = .74.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 5589.4. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .06, R2 = 
.00, adjusted R2 = -.04, F(3, 68) = 0.09, p = .97.  
Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 58.4. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .30, R2 = 
.09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 68) = 2.17, p = 0.10.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 10.8. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .34, R2 = .11, 
adjusted R2 = .07, F(3, 68) = 2.90, p = .04. To assess the contributions of the individual 
predictors, the t ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Two of the 
three predictors were significantly predictive of search rate: race and socioeconomic 
index, where t(68) = -2.69, p = .01 and t(68) = 2.86, p = .01, respectively. Therefore, 
search rates could be predicted from race and the socioeconomic index. 
 Race was as predicted, as there was an inverse relationship on search rate, where a 
lower percentage of non-Whites led to higher rates of searches. The socioeconomic index 





higher citation issuance rates. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this 
predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) were as follows: sr2 = .09 for race 
and sr2 = .11 for the socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this 
set of predictors, the socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor of search rate. 
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 32.0. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.12, R2 = .01, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 68) = 0.30, p = .82.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 3.8. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .29, R2 = 
.09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 68) = 2.11, p = .10. However, when adjusting the p-value to 
.10, two of the three predictors were significantly predictive of traffic arrest rates: race 
and the socioeconomic index, where t(68) = -2.26, p = .03 and t(68) = 2.44, p = .02, 
respectively. Therefore, traffic arrest rates could be predicted from race and 
socioeconomic index. 
 Race was not as predicted, as there was an inverse relationship on traffic arrest 
rate, where a lower percentage of non-Whites led to higher rates of traffic arrests. The 
socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a positive relationship was representative 
of a higher socioeconomic index (i.e., more economic disparity) resulted in higher traffic 
arrest rates. The proportions of variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by 





socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample and in the context of this set of predictors, 
race was the strongest predictor of traffic arrest rates. 
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and 
number of LEOs on crime and policing rates across regions in 2018, there was far more 
variance among indicators. The socioeconomic index was more predictive of violent 
crime and search rates, while the number of LEOs was most indicative of LEOKAs, and 
race was most associated with traffic arrest rates. Moreover, in 2018, race and 
socioeconomic index became more predictive of measures of policing when compared to 
the previous years. 
2019  
The mean value for race was M = 34.3, where 34.3% of the total population 
identified as non-White, while the mean socioeconomic index was M = 7.3 and the 
number of LEOs per 1,000 citizens was M = 3.5, for the entire St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region. Preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious 
violations of assumptions of normality or linearity. All coefficients reported here are 
unstandardized unless otherwise noted; α = .05 two-tailed is the criterion for statistical 
significance. Tables 35 and 36 display descriptive statistics and correlations, respectively. 
Total Crime. The mean value for total crime per 1,000 persons was M = 68.7. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 





Violent Crime. The mean value for violent crime per 1,000 persons was M = 7.6. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .36, 
R2 = .13, adjusted R2 = .01, F(3, 67) = 3.31, p = .03. However, none of the predictors 
were statistically significant; therefore, violent crime could not be predicted from this set 
of three variables, despite moderate zero-order correlations between violent crime and 
race and socioeconomic index. 
Table 35 
Descriptive Statistics, 2019 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Race 34.3 26.4 71 
Socioeconomic Index 7.3 2.7 71 
LEOs 3.5 1.7 71 
Total Crime 68.7 185.9 71 
Violent Crime 7.6 19.2 71 
Property Crime 61.0 167.6 71 
Murder 2.0 7.2 71 
LEOKA .1 .2 71 
Criminal Arrests 891.2 2393.8 71 
Traffic Stops 5797.1 9862.3 71 
Citation Rate 57.6 22.2 71 
Search Rate 12.0 12.1 71 
CB Hit Rate 31.6 16.8 71 














 Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO Race SI LEO 
Total 
Crime 
.26 .23 -.03 1.83 4.60 -10.08 1.31 .34 -1.15 .20 .73 .25 
Violent 
Crime 
.32 .32 -.01 .16 1.30 -1.02 1.15 .95 -1.15 .25 .34 .25 
Property 
Crime 
.25 .22 -.04 1.66 3.30 -9.07 1.32 .27 -1.15 .19 .79 .26 
Murder .26 .26 .01 .05 .40 -.26 .88 .75 -.77 .38 .46 .44 
LEOKA .16 .27 -.00 -.00 .03 -.01 -.73 2.11 -.64 .47 .04 .52 
Criminal 
Arrests 
.09 .19 -.06 -11.97 293.25 -107.33 -.66 1.66 -.94 .52 .10 .35 
Traffic 
Stops 
.00 .06 -.11 -29.36 578.32 -474.78 -.38 .78 -.99 .70 .44 .33 
Citation 
Rate 
.30 .26 .18 .20 .35 .72 1.19 .22 .70 .24 .83 .49 
Search 
Rate 
.00 .08 .02 -.08 .96 .08 -.85 1.05 .14 .40 .30 .89 
CB Hit 
Rate 




-.02 .08 .04 -.03 .30 .06 -1.21 1.29 .38 .23 .20 .70 
 
Property Crime. The mean value for property crime per 1,000 persons was M = 
61.0. The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically 






Murder. The mean value for murder per 10,000 persons was M = 2.0. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .29, R2 = 
.08, adjusted R2 = .04, F(3, 67) = 2.00, p = .12.  
LEOKA. The mean value for LEOKA per 1,000 persons was M = 0.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was statistically significant, R = .30, R2 
= .09, adjusted R2 = .05, F(3, 67) = 2.17 p = .10, when increasing the p-value to .10. To 
assess the contributions of the individual predictors, the t ratios for the individual 
regression slopes were examined. One of the three predictors was significantly predictive 
of LEOKA: the socioeconomic index, where t(67) = 2.11, p = .04. Therefore, LEOKA 
could be predicted from the socioeconomic index. 
 The socioeconomic index was as predicted, where a higher socioeconomic index 
(i.e., more economic disparity) translated to more assaults on officers. The proportions of 
variance uniquely explained by this predictor (obtained by squaring the part correlation) 
were as follows: sr2 = .06 for the socioeconomic index. Thus, in this sample and in the 
context of this set of predictors, the socioeconomic index was the strongest predictor. 
Criminal Arrests. The mean value for criminal arrests was M = 891.2. The 
overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .24, 
R2 = .06, adjusted R2 = .02, F(3, 67) = 1.35, p = .27.  
Traffic Stops. The mean value for traffic stops was M = 5797.1. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .15, R2 = 





Citation Rates. The mean value for citation rates was M = 57.6. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .31, R2 = 
.10, adjusted R2 = .06, F(3, 67) = 2.38, p =.08.  
Search Rates. The mean value for search rates was M = 12.0. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .13, R2 = 
.02, adjusted R2 = -.03, F(3, 67) = 0.38, p = .77.  
Contraband Hit Rates. The mean value for contraband hit rates was M = 31.6. 
The overall regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = 
.06, R2 = .01, adjusted R2 = -.04, F(3, 67) = 0.7, p = .98.  
Traffic Arrest Rates. The mean value for traffic arrests was M = 3.9. The overall 
regression, including all three predictors, was not statistically significant, R = .17, R2 = 
.03, adjusted R2 = -.02, F(3, 67) = 0.63, p = .60.  
Conclusion. When evaluating the effects of race, socioeconomic index, and 
number of LEOs on crime and policing rates across regions in 2019, the number of LEOs 
had an effect on the number of LEOKAs. No other indicators had a significant 
relationship with the variables related to crime or policing. Moreover, the variances in 
crime and policing statistics in 2019 when compared to previous years indicated that 
there might be other factors driving the change. 
Conclusion of the Analysis 
Within this analysis, two distinct trends in crime rates emerged. First, measures of 





total number of law enforcement officers between 2010 and 2015 and again in 2017 
where, despite the increased number of law enforcement officers, crime rates had a 
positive relationship with the number of LEOs per capita. In 2015, 2018, and 2019, there 
was also a positive relationship between the number of LEOKAs and the number of 
LEOs per capita. The third trend in crime rates emerged between 2011 and 2014, 2016, 
and 2018 when crime rates were positively correlated with the socioeconomic index 
indicating the higher scores on the socioeconomic index (i.e., more economic disparity) 
were related to higher levels of crime, more specifically total, violent, and property 
crimes. 
Based on this analysis, few trends in policing (i.e., criminal and traffic arrests, 
citation rates, search rates, and contraband hit rates) emerged. In 2014, the citation and 
search rates were driven by the socioeconomic index where more citations were issued 
and searches conducted in regions with more economic disparity. In 2015, the number of 
traffic arrests was positively correlated with the socioeconomic index. In 2017, the 
number of citations issued per traffic stop was correlated with the number of LEOs. 
However, in 2018, search rates and traffic arrest rates were associated with race and 
socioeconomic index.  
Moreover, race was not widely associated with crime or policing rates. The 
variable was statistically significant only four times during the entire 10-year evaluation 
of the 11 variables of crime and policing. Race was strongly associated with violent 





and traffic arrests. In other words, for the entire St. Louis, MO metropolitan region, race 
was not strongly associated with crime or policing between 2010 and 2019. The strongest 
predictor of crime is the number of LEOs per capita, while the socioeconomic index is 
most associated with measures of policing, with fewer relationships with factors related 
to crime. Therefore, based on the analysis of research question 3, the variables of race, 
socioeconomic index, and number of LEOs per capita are most associated with crime, not 
levels of policing between 2010 and 2019 for the entire metropolitan region. 
Summary 
RQ1 
 RQ1 was evaluated using repeated measures of ANOVA to compare mean levels 
of crime and policing across the entire St. Louis, MO metropolitan region. While the 
analysis revealed fluctuations in crime rates, they were not statistically significant. Levels 
of policing, however, did change over time. Moreover, there were distinct decreases in 
the number of criminal arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, contraband hit rates, and traffic 
arrest rates across the region between 2010 and 2019, indicating some degree of de-
policing. Despite evidence supporting de-policing across the region, the lack of statistical 
significance in crime rates indicated that there might not be a significant relationship 
between crime and policing. Nonetheless, data conclusions support rejecting the first null 
hypothesis of no difference in levels of crime or policing across the entire metropolitan 






 The analyses related to RQ2 evaluated regional differences in crime and policing 
practices on a year-by-year basis. A one-way MANOVA was utilized to assess 
geographical differences in crime and policing within the St. Louis, MO metropolitan 
region by analyzing the 11 continuous dependent variables (i.e., total crime, violent 
crime, property crime, murder, LEOKA, criminal and traffic arrests, traffic stops, citation 
rates, search rates, and contraband hit rates) across an eight-level factor of region using 
SPSS general linear model (GLM) with data derived from the MSHP UCR database and 
the MOAG VSR. 
 The analysis results indicated that crime rates were declining prior to 2014; 
however, after 2014, violent crime and homicide rates began to increase across the 
region. The most significant increases in crime were found in the independent city of St. 
Louis and North St. Louis County. Crime trends in Jefferson and St. Charles Counties, 
the East-Central Corridor, West St. Louis County generally remained the same. 
Alterations in policing practices were also noted in St. Louis City, North St. Louis 
County, and St. Charles County. In St. Louis city, levels of policing remained low when 
compared to other regions. Policing levels were at or above the regional mean in North 
St. Louis County before declining after 2016. Conversely, St. Charles County became 
more aggressive in its policing, leading to lower overall levels of crime. Therefore, given 
the results of the analysis related to the second research question, the second null 





be rejected as there is ample evidence of disparities related to crime and policing across 
the region, despite year-over-year differences. 
RQ3 
 An analysis of RQ3 was conducted using multiple regression to determine the 
effects of race/ethnic make-up, the socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs on 
crime and policing across the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region between 2010 and 2019. 
Trends related to crime were predicted more by the number of LEOs than race or the 
socioeconomic index, while levels of policing were weakly predicted by socioeconomic 
index. While there were clear trends in crime rates across the region, given the 
independent variables (i.e., race, socioeconomic index, number of LEOs), no real pattern 
emerged for levels of policing, indicating policing is influenced by factors not assessed in 
this study. Nonetheless, the null hypothesis for the third research may be rejected because 
there is proof that there are differences in crime rates and levels of policing when 
considering the effects of race, the socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs on 
crime and policing across the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area between 2010 and 2019, 





Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study is to understand the impact of the Ferguson 
Effect on crime trends in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. The intent of the study 
was to understand the extent of de-policing in the St. Louis area by analyzing crime data 
five years before and after the Michael Brown shooting (2010 to 2019). This study will 
use statistics from the MSHP UCR database and the MOAG’s VSR. Statistical analyses 
relating to offense type and frequency, arrests, and searches for contraband were also 
conducted to determine if there is a correlation between de-policing and crime rates in the 
region. 
This chapter includes a discussion of significant findings as they relate to the 
literature on the Ferguson Effect, de-policing, and crime, as well as implications that may 
alter the course of policing through policy and practice. This chapter also includes a 
discussion of study findings as they relate to Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism 
in an attempt to explain alterations in crime and policing across the region. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of this study's limitations and analysis, areas for additional 
and future research, and a brief synopsis. The analysis and discussion found in this 
chapter are related to the following research questions: 
RQ1: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 





RQ2: Are there annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, search 
rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for LEOs 
between geographical regions in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to 
determine the extent of de-policing occurring in the area? 
RQ3: Are there differences in race, socioeconomic index, and the number of 
officers per 1,000 citizens on annual differences in terms of quantities of traffic stops, 
search rates, contraband hit rates, crime and arrest rates, and assaults and fatal injuries for 
LEOs in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area across time to determine the extent of de-
policing occurring within the region? 
This study was based upon Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism, which is 
an extension of his social learning theory. The acquisition of new behaviors results from 
observing and imitating others as well as from vicarious reinforcement (i.e., observing 
the effects of rewards and punishment by those performing the new behavior; Bandura, 
1977). However, to better understand how LEOs alter their behavior in response to public 
and media scrutiny, fear of civil and criminal litigation, decreased organizational support, 
Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism was used to provide a plausible explanation 
for these changes in behavior. 
The theory of reciprocal determinism involves three interrelated factors that 
influence behavior: the environment, individual, and behavior (Bandura, 1978; Bernston 
& Cacioppo, 2005). The theory is based on the continual influence of these three 





one’s behavior, individual actions influence the environment while also altering their 
response to the environment (Bandura, 1978). The behavioral component is reinforced or 
shaped through environmental or social responses, while the environmental component 
contains reinforcing or punishing stimuli that influence the intensity and frequency of a 
behavior. The individual component is comprised of personality and cognitive factors 
that underlie behavior, such as expectations, motivations, beliefs, unique personality 
characteristics (Bandura, 1978). 
Behavioral change, then, in the context of the theory of reciprocal determinism, 
can be viewed as a contagion, wherein the changes in behavior are infectious. When 
officers in one agency or location are observed performing various behaviors in reaction 
to positive and negative stimuli and reinforcement from society or the environment, those 
officers evaluate their current behaviors and environment to modify their behaviors to 
match those officers they observed. For example, Ferguson police officers’ actions and 
reactions in 2014 may have resulted in changes in officer behavior and policing practices 
across the department and region due to internal forces and environmental shifts. As more 
officers begin altering their behaviors in response to observed behavioral changes and 
vicarious reinforcement, the phenomenon spreads, resulting in widespread changes in 
behavior resulting in generalized de-policing. 
Similarly, though not the focus of this study, criminals may also alter their 
behaviors in response to changes in LEOs’ behaviors. When offenders observe that fewer 





for committing a crime decreases, while the potential benefits of committing more 
profitable crimes increase. Lack of punishment or diminished risk for being apprehended 
is reinforced through new societal norms, policy, and de-policing, leading to the 
acceptance of criminal behavior via a lack of deterrence. Given this theoretical 
framework, not only is de-policing a consequence of increased public and media scrutiny, 
policy changes, and fears of civil and criminal liability, but increased crime rates. 
Increases in crime and the propensity for criminal to engage unlawful behavior due to 
decreases in deterrents are also consequences of the Ferguson Effect, even if the 
phenomena are not the direct result of de-policing efforts. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Law enforcement has evolved in response to challenges and policy changes 
following the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson in August 2014. Since the events in 
Ferguson, many agencies have altered their policies in response to public and media 
scrutiny, increased civil liability, and civil unrest, which has resulted in the Ferguson 
Effect (Adams, 2019; Capellan et al., 2020; Deuchar et al., 2019; Gaston et al., 2019; 
Marier & Moule, 2019; Oliver, 2017). The phenomenon has reportedly led to widespread 
de-policing by LEOs, resulting in increased levels of crime (Capellan et al., 2020; Hosko, 
2018; MacDonald, 2019; Maguire et al., 2017; Nix & Wolfe, 2018; Oliver, 2017; 
Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019). While there is some disagreement regarding the 
prevalence of de-policing and its relationship with crime, crime rates have been 





research findings associated with this study, findings were organized by research 
question. 
RQ1 
 RQ1 involved evaluating 11 measures of crime and policing (i.e., total crime, 
violent crime, property crime, homicide, LEOKA, criminal arrests, traffic stops, citation 
rates, search rates, contraband hit rates, and traffic stop arrests) over a 10-year period. 
Data were derived from Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. Louis Counties and the 
independent city of St. Louis. Each year was assessed individually to identify trends 
across the metropolitan area better, thereby leading to 10 separate analyses. In general, 
crime decreased over time, especially total and property crime. However, violent crime 
and murder rates rose steadily. All measures of crime increased in 2015 and 2019. Figure 





Note. Murder rates are actual counts.  
In evaluating crime, there was a notable increase in crime in 2015, which may 
have resulted from the Ferguson Effect. When assessing measures of policing, levels of 
policing decreased dramatically between 2014 and 2015 in all areas except search rates 
and contraband hit rates (see Figure 8). While the general rise in search rates and 
contraband hit rates across time runs counter to decreased levels of policing across time, 
this should be interpreted not as more policing taking place. Instead, officers were 
searching more vehicles relative to the number of vehicles stopped and becoming more 
effective in their search techniques by identifying more contraband during those searches. 
Searches and contraband identification are generally products of a traffic stop and cannot 
Figure 7 
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serve as a sole reason for stopping a vehicle, with some exceptions. Legally, LEOs 
cannot stop a vehicle because they believe there is contraband inside the vehicle; instead, 
officers must have probable cause to stop the vehicle because the vehicle committed a 
traffic violation or there is a reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is 
involved in criminal activity. Additionally, LEOs must also have a legal justification to 
search a vehicle, although obtaining consent from the vehicle owner or driver negates the 
need for a legal reason to search the vehicle despite protections under the Fourth 
Amendment. Nonetheless, traffic stops and subsequent searches of vehicles and persons 
inside the vehicle are legally justified under the Fourth Amendment and U.S. Supreme 
Court rulings (Kansas v. Glover, 2020; Prado Navarette v. California, 2014; Terry v. 
Ohio, 1968; U.S. v. Cortez, 1981; U.S. v. Sokolow, 1989).  
Moreover, based on the analysis, the general decrease in levels of policing 
between 2010 and 2019 indicates that de-policing may be occurring in the region. The 
number of criminal arrests in 2019 is less than half of what they were in 2010 and a third 
less than 2014 arrests. Additionally, the decrease in traffic arrest rates also indicated that 
fewer offenders were being arrested. Regarding traffic arrests, individuals arrested during 
traffic stops are generally not arrested for a traffic violation (with the exception of 
DWI/DUI); rather, they are arrested due to outstanding criminal arrest warrants or 
officers identifying contraband in the vehicle during the traffic stop. MacDonald (2019) 
said that arrest rates do not equate to de-policing; instead, they are a function of officer 





discretion as they are arresting a lower percentage of drivers. Policy changes may also be 
responsible for the decrease in arrest rates.  
Note. Criminal arrests and traffic stops are fractional counts (actual count/1,000) 
 When examining the analysis results, it becomes clear that there are differences in 
crime and policing between 2010 and 2019 in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of RQ1 is rejected. The results of this first analysis support 
Figure 8 
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the presumption that de-policing is occurring. However, changes in policing have been 
trending downward since 2010, not since the events in Ferguson in 2014.  
Additionally, the decrease in traffic stops and related measures of policing may 
have resulted from Missouri Senate Bill 765, which placed a ban on ticket quotas 
effective in August 2016. The bill was part of municipal reform as many law enforcement 
agencies within the state, especially those in North St. Louis County, relied on the 
revenue from traffic tickets and ordinance violations to fund the city government (Aton, 
2016; Curtis, 2016). While the bill eliminated ticket quotas, it did not limit officers’ 
ability to write tickets. Though not a factor in this analysis, Missouri legislators were 
pushing for significant changes to Missouri Senate Bill 5, restricting municipalities in St. 
Louis County from generating more than 12.5% of their general revenue from traffic 
fines and fees (Kohler, 2020; Rosenbaum, 2020). The revisions to Missouri Senate Bill 5 
also called for sweeping police and court reform stemming from the events in Ferguson 
in 2014 (Kohler, 2020; Rosenbaum, 2020). It is unclear when the state will begin 
enforcement of Senate Bill 5 as the ruling occurred while the final drafts of this document 
were written. 
RQ2 
The goal of RQ2 was to analyze the effects of region on the 11 measures of crime 
and policing over a 10-year period. Similar to the analysis of RQ1, this analysis aimed to 
uncover regional variances and trends. For this analysis, the St. Louis, MO metropolitan 





independent city of St. Louis, unincorporated St. Louis County, the East-Central 
Corridor, North St. Louis County, South St. Louis County, and West St. Louis County. 
Each year was assessed individually to identify trends across the metropolitan area better, 
thereby creating 10 separate analyses. 
Several regional trends in crime and policing were identified in this analysis. 
First, the independent city of St. Louis and North St. Louis County possessed the highest 
mean levels of crime per capita when compared to all other regions. The two regions also 
saw the largest annual increases in crime. In 2019, North St. Louis County possessed the 
largest mean levels for total and violent crime in the entire region. Violent crime and 
homicide levels also increased dramatically in the city and North St. Louis County after 
2014. More alarming are the crime per capita rates. St. Louis City is home to 11.02% of 
persons in the region analyzed and was responsible for 36.00% of total crime, 54.88% of 
violent crime, 32.04% of property crime, and 67.31% of murders for the entire region in 
2019. 
Similarly, North St. Louis County is home to 273,038 persons or 10.00% of this 
study's total population. However, the region logged 17.81% of all total crime, 13.59% of 
all violent crime, 18.69% of all property crime, and 11.54% of all murders for the entire 
region in 2019. Also, of note, St. Charles County experienced a disproportionate amount 
of total and property crime in 2019 compared to previous years. 
Levels of policing (i.e., criminal and traffic arrests, traffic stops, citation rates, 





crime across regions and time. Before 2014, the highest levels of policing were found in 
Jefferson County, North St. Louis County, and to some extent, St. Charles County. 
However, after 2014, the highest mean levels of policing were consistently seen in St. 
Charles County. The lowest levels of policing were found in the city of St. Louis. Low 
levels of policing were also reported in West St. Louis County, where crime rates were 
also low. 
Moreover, when evaluating measures of policing in 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019, 
which coincided with significant increases in crime across the region, levels of policing 
were lower when compared to previous years. Given the results, it is plausible that there 
is some connection between crime and policing in the region, especially when 
considering how crime and policing have changed in St. Louis City and North St. Louis 
County. Because of the mixed results and variance among regions, it is difficult to make 
a definite correlation between crime and policing in the region. Regional variances, then, 
may be the result of intervening or confounding factors. Therefore, given the second 
analysis results, there is enough evidence to dispute the null hypothesis of no regional 
differences in crime and policing across time. 
This conclusion is substantiated by the claim made by Rosenfeld and Wallman 
(2019), who asserted that nationwide increases in homicide rates and general decreases in 
arrest rates were not indicative of de-policing as there was no correlation between arrest 
and homicide rates between 2010 and 2015. Instead, fewer arrests equate to lower levels 





environmental factors and de-policing, which cannot be measured by arrest rates. The St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan area trends align with the research findings; however, one 
should use caution in concluding that fewer arrests equate to higher levels of crime, 
especially violent crime. Similarly, other scholars maintain that policing cannot be 
measured by traffic stops or arrests as increases in crime rates result from decreases in 
proactive policing efforts (i.e., Ferguson Effect; Capellan et al., 2020). Therefore, the 
results of this study are supported by the literature and are indicative of de-policing in the 
wake of increases in crime (i.e., Ferguson Effect; Capellan et al., 2020; Hosko, 2018; 
MacDonald, 2019; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017). Though there 
are differences in what factors constitute de-policing in literature, it is evident that 
decreases in the number of arrests and traffic stops demonstrate an inverse relationship 
with violent crime rates in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region despite regional and 
annual variances. 
RQ3 
 RQ3 was similar to RQ1 in that the research goal was to identify annual 
differences between measures of crime and policing across time for the entire region. 
However, the third research analysis introduced three new variables (i.e., race, 
socioeconomic index, number of LEOs per 1,000 persons) to determine their effects. 
Three distinct trends were identified.  
First, there was a clear relationship between crime (i.e., total, violent, and 





and 2015. The same relationship was identified in 2017, where, despite an increase in the 
number of LEOs, crime rates also increased. A second trend was observed in 2015, 2018, 
and 2019 when an observed relationship between the number of LEOKAs and the 
number of LEOs per capita. This observation is intuitive as more officers could plausibly 
lead to more assaults and injuries. The third trend in crime rates emerged between 2011 
and 2014, in 2016, and in 2018 where increased crime rates were associated with higher 
scores on the socioeconomic index, indicating that the higher levels of crime occur in 
regions with more economic disparity (i.e., levels of poverty, unemployment, educational 
attainment), especially when considering total, violent, and property crimes. 
However, trends in policing were not as clear as none of the new variables 
correlated with measures of policing. In fact, during the 10-year analysis across six 
measures of policing, there were only six instances (out of a possible 60) where 
relationships between variables were identified. In 2014, the citation and search rates 
were driven by the socioeconomic index where more citations were issued and searches 
were conducted in regions with more economic disparity. In 2015, the number of traffic 
arrests was associated with the socioeconomic index. In 2017, the number of citations 
issued per traffic stop was correlated with the number of LEOs. However, in 2018, search 
rates and traffic arrest rates were associated with both race and socioeconomic index.  
Interestingly, race was not widely associated with crime rates or measures of 
policing across the region. In fact, race was a factor in only four instances out of a 





was correlated with the number of LEOKAs, searches, and traffic arrests. Interestingly, in 
2018, there was an overall decrease in crime and a decrease in measures of policing 
where only the number of traffic stops increased. Additionally, in 2018, the number of 
LEOKA dropped by more than 11%, search rates decreased by more than 7%, and traffic 
arrests decreased over 6% compared to 2017. The same measures decreased again in 
2019, except for LEOKA, without any further association with race or socioeconomic 
index. 
Given the data, one may conclude that crime, not policing, is affected by race, 
economic disparity, and the number of LEOs per capita. While these findings are 
promising, there is still evidence that racial disparity exists in both crime and policing. 
Moreover, these findings indicated that policing practices in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region are not driven by race or socioeconomic indices; rather, they are a 
culmination of other factors. To further investigate and expand upon this conclusion, I 
suggest that additional research be conducted to identify both confounding variables and 
sources for racial disparity in both crime and policing. Nonetheless, the findings from this 
third analysis provide evidence that disputes the null hypothesis that race, the 
socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs per capita have no effect on measures of 
crime and policing. Despite mixed and varied results, the null hypothesis should be 
rejected. However, given the weak evidence on the effects of race, socioeconomic index, 
and number of LEOs on measures of policing, additional analyses should be conducted in 





Bandura’s Theory of Reciprocal Determinism 
 Learning new behaviors through observation and imitation while observing 
vicarious reinforcement provides a theoretical basis for behavioral change in response to 
internal loci and environmental factors. The findings of this research study support the 
premise that LEOs alter their behaviors in response to others' behavior and environmental 
influences. Moreover, the events in Ferguson in 2014 demarcate an apparent change in 
policing practices and crime rates across the entire St. Louis, MO metropolitan region, 
which was the primary focus of the second research question. 
 Not only did agencies in North St. Louis County demonstrate alterations in 
policing, but agencies across the region expressed similar trends in the measures of 
policing evaluated in this study. The literature is also congruent with this evidence. 
Alpert et al. (2005) determined that organizational characteristics, including the culture of 
police, influenced behavior in response to environmental factors. The similarity of 
behaviors exhibited by LEOs both across the region and the country in response to 
environmental influences (e.g., public and media scrutiny, lack of organizational support, 
fear of civil and criminal liability) also supported the presumption that behavioral 
modification is learned through observation and vicarious reinforcement (Adams, 2019; 
Capellan et al., 2020;  Deuchar et al., 2019); Marier & Moule, 2019; Nix & Pickett, 2017; 
Nix & Wolfe, 2018). In other words, Bandura’s theory of reciprocal determinism offers a 
plausible explanation for how and why LEOs modify their behavior in response to major 





emanating from the events in Ferguson in 2014 and the continued push to defund the 
police following several high-profile incidents in 2020 is the creation of a self-reinforcing 
equilibrium whereby officers continue to alter their behaviors to the point they are only 
performing essential police functions or leaving police work altogether. The equilibrium 
may also have some positive benefits leading to increased policing and community 
engagement when policing behaviors are rewarded by organizations and supported by the 
public (Alpert et al., 2005; Bishopp et al., 2016; Bradford et al., 2017; Deuchar et al., 
2019; Nix et al., 2019; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix & Wolfe, 2018). Similarly, societal and 
media distrust of police, new and more restrictive policing policies, and the increased 
prevalence of de-policing may also be a source for changes in offenders’ behavior as 
there are fewer risks and deterrents for engaging in criminal activity. 
Summary 
 This study was initially designed to replicate and expand upon Shjarback et al.’s 
2017 study investigating de-policing and crime among Missouri law enforcement 
agencies in 2014 and 2015. In the original study, Shjarback et al. concluded that de-
policing did not increase crime rates while also determining that regions with higher 
numbers of minority residents were more likely to experience de-policing. This study's 
findings were contrary to Shjarback et al.’s conclusions and similar to outcomes 
suggested by MacDonald (2016). 
 First, Shjarback et al. (2017) claimed that regions with higher minority 





disproportionately overrepresented in terms of arrests, traffic stops, and searches. In this 
analysis, there was limited and inconclusive evidence that race or socioeconomic 
disparity was associated with policing practices across the region and even less evidence 
supporting a claim of de-policing in areas with a higher number of minority residents. 
Confirming evidence, however, was discovered that supports the premise that crime rates 
tend to be higher in regions with a higher percentage of minorities and socioeconomic 
index (e.g., St. Louis City and North St. Louis County). In 2019, North St. Louis County 
had the highest percentage of non-White residents (64.61%), followed by St. Louis City 
(51.88%), unincorporated St. Louis County (32.13%), and West St. Louis County 
(19.94%), while Jefferson County (1.02%) and South St. Louis County (7.50%) had the 
lowest percentage of non-Whites. The highest socioeconomic indices for the region, in 
2019, were found in the city of St. Louis (12.83%), North St. Louis County (10.00%), 
and Jefferson County (8.03%), and the lowest socioeconomic indices were found in West 
St. Louis County (3.39%), St. Charles County (4.53%), South St. Louis County (4.93%), 
and the East-Central Corridor (5.08%). While race or socioeconomic index alone may not 
be indicators of increased crime or de-policing, the combined effects of the two variables 
in addition to other confounding variables may be the source of both increased crime and 
de-policing despite arguments citing race and socioeconomic indices as the root cause of 
crime (Hosko, 2018; MacDonald, 2019; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Shjarback et al., 2017; 





Additionally, evidence regarding measures of policing tend to be varied across the 
region. Although St. Louis City consistently had the lowest levels of policing across the 
region, North St. Louis County engaged in above-average levels of policing, indicating 
that race and socioeconomic indices may not be reliable indicators of policing, especially 
given low levels of crime in other regions expressing low levels of policing (e.g., South 
and West St. Louis County). 
 The limited temporal analysis conducted by Shjarback et al. (2017) further limited 
their findings as the researchers evaluated crime and policing eight months before and 
after the events in Ferguson in August 2014 while analyzing measures of policing 
between 2010 and 2015. Moreover, their analysis failed to identify any trends related to 
behavioral changes in policing post-Ferguson due to the limited comparison. The analysis 
conducted for this study revealed several trends in crime and policing with a potential 
correlation between crime rates and levels of policing. 
This study confirms that some crime rates and policing levels have decreased over 
time both across and within the regions evaluated for this analysis. However, the 
differences are not congruent, indicating that some causation or correlation may exist 
between crime and policing. Similarly, rates of violent crime and homicide have 
increased since 2014 when they were at a 5-year low, indicating that the events in 
Ferguson may have had some impact on crime rates and policing, though one should be 
cautioned as correlation does not equal causation. Conversely, levels of policing have 





legislative changes associated with Missouri Senate Bills 5, 656, and 765. The data also 
revealed that policing practices are not reactionary; that is, levels of policing increase 
following increases in crime.  
Though unrelated to de-policing, changes in gun laws may be responsible for 
increased crime rates, especially violent crime and murder. Under Missouri Senate Bill 
656, Missourians are authorized to carry concealed firearms without a permit (i.e., 
permitless carry), with some restrictions as long as the person carrying the gun can 
legally own a firearm (Mo. Rev. Stat. §570.030). Additionally, Missouri is considered an 
open-carry state, whereby there are no restrictions on openly carrying a firearm as long as 
the firearm is not displayed in an angry or threatening manner. Moreover, there are no 
restrictions on the type of weapons that may be open carried, nor are there restrictions on 
the type of weapons that may be carried concealed, with a valid concealed carry permit. 
Missouri state statutes also do not impose an age limit on who may carry a firearm. 
Statutes only restrict who may legally purchase a firearm and which individuals are 
barred from owning or possessing a firearm. In other words, it is completely legal for a 
12-year-old to openly carry a firearm in an unrestricted area, but it is not legal for that 
juvenile to purchase a firearm or conceal carry a firearm. The changes in gun laws, then, 
may be partly responsible for increases in crime rates across the region. 
Changes in legislation that placed limits on the revenue municipalities within St. 
Louis County are permitted to receive from traffic fines and ordinance violations may 





issued remained relatively constant across time. Therefore, traffic stops may not be an 
effective method to measure levels of policing. Instead, search rates and contraband hit 
rates might be a better, though a less representative, method to evaluate levels of 
policing. Another more effective measure of policing levels may be derived from 
engagement in preventative patrol (e.g., business checks and visibility in patrol) and 
community engagement initiatives, though these are difficult to measure. 
The decreases in measures of policing may also be a function of the total number 
of LEOs working in the region. Since 2015, the region has seen a steady decline in the 
number of LEOs, where there were 4,714 full-time officers to a low of 4,464 full-time 
officers in 2016. In 2019, agencies in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region employed 
4,508 full-time officers. The Ferguson Effect may be responsible for more than de-
policing; it may be a factor in increased crime rates and fewer LEOs. Oliver (2017) 
suggested that de-policing is a real phenomenon and may be more widespread now than 
prior to the events in Ferguson in 2014 due to fears of civil and criminal litigation, new 
and more restrictive laws and policies, and accusations of racial profiling. The decrease 
in the number of LEOs may be a result of the factors that lead to de-policing and agencies 
that fail to replace officers due to beliefs that officer presence fails to deter crime, despite 
increased calls for service (Oliver, 2017). The shortage in LEOs may also be a factor in 
de-policing as the officers may be less willing to engage in proactive activities due to fear 
of assault leading to death or injury (Maguire et al., 2017; Morin et al., 2017; Oliver, 





appear as de-policing as officers lack time to engage in proactive policing. To further 
address the issue of understaffing, there are reports that agencies are having difficulty in 
attracting and retaining interested and qualified individuals (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018; 
Hilal & Litsey, 2020; Sipes, 2021; Wilson, 2012). Therefore, one may conclude that 
replicating and expanding upon Shjarback et al.’s (2017) original study yielded additional 
insight into crime and policing across the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area, though there 
are still several questions left unanswered. 
Limitations of the Study 
 No research study is without limitations. Because this research study employed 
secondary data, the study possessed its own unique set of limitations. The use of 
secondary data was a limiting factor in that it was collected for a primary purpose and did 
not necessarily align with the specific goal of a research project. For this analysis, data 
were collected by the State of Missouri for multiple statistical and analytical purposes to 
produce counts and measures. While the data were not collected for my research study, 
the data were somewhat limiting in that I was not able to obtain additional measures of 
crime and policing that may have assisted me in this analysis. Secondary data also limited 
my ability to identify confounding variables or alternative explanations for study 
findings. 
 An additional limitation is the time constraints imposed on this project as data 
collection and analysis are time-consuming. As a result, only three research questions 





to make additional inquiries into the meaning of the data while conducting additional 
analyses to understand the relationship between variables better. 
 The study was further limited by threats to validity, which were mitigated to the 
best of my ability. Validity is the veracity of an inference or the truthfulness of 
conclusions. The accuracy of causal claims from analytical findings constitute internal 
validity, while generalizability refers to external validity (Langbein, 2012; Price et al., 
2017). 
Internal Validity 
Threats to internal validity were addressed by carefully selecting the dependent 
variables are ensuring consistency in how they were measured while also controlling for 
confounding variables that convoluted causal assumptions (Langbein, 2012; Price et al., 
2017). Instrument calibration effectively ameliorated variable measurements and issues 
resulting from data collection. Because the state of Missouri has utilized the data 
instrument for this analysis for over 20 years, it can be assumed that the instrument itself 
did not create any threats to validity and is, therefore, reliable.  
While three confounding variables (i.e., race, socioeconomic index, and number 
of LEOs) were part of the third analysis, the variables provided limited information 
regarding crime and policing. Introducing additional confounders would contribute to a 
better understanding of the Ferguson Effect. Therefore, additional statistical analyses that 
remove the effects of mediating variables should be conducted to ameliorate improper 





threat to internal validity may stem from the subdivision of regions based on regional 
traditions. Because some of the subdivisions were comprised of only one or two agencies, 
some statistical tests were not feasible due to the decreased degrees of freedom and 
inability to estimate Box’s M. This was mainly an issue with the data analysis related to 
the second research question. Perhaps, conducting the analysis on the agency level rather 
than the regional level would have mitigated this issue. 
External Validity 
 External validity allows researchers to apply their findings to a broader population 
through the application of descriptive and causal claims. Because the population of 
interest for this study was localized to a single geographical locale (i.e., the St. Louis, 
MO metropolitan area), the findings may be limited in their generalizability even though 
policing practices are generally similar across the country and responsive to events in 
jurisdictions that are far removed from the event. To improve generalizability, the study 
should be repeated across various geographical regions in the U.S. to improve 
understanding of the Ferguson Effect and how events hundreds or thousands of miles 
away may affect policy and practice.  
Recommendations 
 Although this study did not investigate the causes of the increased crime rates 
across the region, it shed light on how policing practices have evolved pre- and post-
Ferguson. The study results also revealed regional trends in crime and policing that may 





findings produced additional gaps in knowledge necessitating future and additional 
inquiry. 
 Because there is a discrepancy over what constitutes de-policing, additional 
measures of policing should be incorporated into future studies to determine whether de-
policing is occurring and to what extent it may be occurring. Additional covariates and 
confounding variables should also be explored to identify additional sources for increased 
crime rates and decreased levels of policing across the region. Similarly, the research 
should be replicated using the three covariates identified in RQ3 while reducing the unit 
of measurement from the regional level to the agency or precinct/district level. Moreover, 
in comparing individual departments and their associated characteristics, differences in 
policing practices across agencies within regions may provide more insight into the 
Ferguson Effect and what agencies are doing to reduce its impact on crime and policing. 
A qualitative inquiry might also yield insight into the practice of de-policing and allow 
for improved methods for measuring levels of policing. 
 Future research should also focus on how high-profile events impact policing 
through repeated instances of the Ferguson Effect. In other words, given the evidence in 
this analysis, the Ferguson Effect is ongoing in the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region but 
had the most significant effect in 2015 and 2016. Recent events in 2020 in Minneapolis, 
MN; Louisville, TN; and Atlanta, GA may have produced similar local and national 
effects that have profound implications for the future of law enforcement given the 





 Finally, additional research should further investigate and incorporate 
organizational characteristics (e.g., perceived organizational support, organization justice, 
procedural justice, job satisfaction, morale, public support) into the analysis to determine 
what and how organizational characteristics impact policing. Assessing organizational 
characteristics may also uncover proactive policing activities that deter crime and 
positively engage the public (e.g., public service events, specialized units). The research 
may also serve as a foundation for future inquiry using more geospatial specificity and 
more community, officer, and organizational characteristics to improve understanding of 
the Ferguson Effect within a community or jurisdiction. Future research may also focus 
on the role the community and media play on policing policy, strategies, and tactics to 
determine protective and risk factors that influence de-policing efforts. Moreover, 
identifying and measuring public levels of support may also prove useful in determining 
the factors that mediate crime and de-policing. 
Implications 
 This research project has several implications for positive social change. The most 
significant implication is realizing and appreciating regional and department trends in 
crime and policing to help adapt policy and policing practices. The findings of this 
research study support the premise that the Ferguson Effect is still occurring within the 
St. Louis region, though additional factors may influence violent crime and homicide 
rates and decreases in policing measures. To address the issues, agencies need to develop 





justice, as well as the formation of cooperative multi-agency task forces and the 
development of procedural justice initiatives, community-oriented policing tactics, and 
specialized teams to address crime. Law enforcement agencies should also collect data 
and conduct research regarding the effectiveness of new legislation to determine if the 
legislation is improving the quality of service or contributing to de-policing and increased 
crime rates. Policymakers and administrators should also conduct policy evaluations to 
assess if policies are effectively reducing crime and improving the quality of police 
services. 
Policymakers and administrative officials may use the research to monitor public 
perception and identify areas that may reduce officer morale. Department officials may 
also utilize the research to develop or refine policy to ensure officer safety is paramount, 
and the public is being protected from unjust police practices and unfair policies. 
Administrations should also create policies that support their officers’ actions, despite 
public scrutiny, so police officers may engage in proactive policing without fear of 
retribution from the community. However, the larger implications of the study may be 
used to inform policy and improve officer morale as the researchers determined that 
morale is closely related to self-legitimacy. Policymakers may also use the findings to 
develop training and policy focused on mitigating the effects of negative publicity. The 
research findings also have additional implications for law enforcement officials, 





relations and mutual trust. Policy should also be reformed to increase organizational 
justice to enhance officer morale and motivation, despite the negative climate.  
 While training may provide an awareness of de-policing actions (or inactions), 
addressing decreased staffing in the wake of increased calls for service might more 
effectively reduce crime and improve measures of policing (i.e., decrease or eliminate de-
policing). The improvements will stem from more officers available to respond to calls 
for service while also providing the time and opportunity to engage the public and 
perform proactive policing activities. Decreased calls for service per officer will also 
likely improve morale and job satisfaction, reduce burnout, and decrease the number of 
injuries and suicide. 
Conclusion 
 The increase in violent crime and homicide rates across the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region is alarming. While there has generally been a steady decline in total 
crime and property crime across the region since 2010, the spike in violence that has 
occurred since 2014 signifies a change. Statistics from the calendar year 2020 are even 
more dismal as the independent city of St. Louis and Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. Louis 
Counties all logged increases in total crime, violent crime, and murder, something not 
seen since 2015. The entire metropolitan region also experienced a significant increase in 
murders, recording 391 in 2020 compared to 312 in 2019. Additionally, the city of St. 
Louis was two murders away from a record set in 1970; however, given the lower 





significantly higher at 8.83 homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. The ongoing trends in 
crime across the region, as well as decreases in levels of policing, indicate that there may 
be some relationship between crime and policing, despite previous reports disputing the 
relationship (MacDonald, 2019; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017; 
Tiwari, 2016). 
 Aside from declines in measures of policing, the region has experienced 
improvements in the socioeconomic index, indicating lower levels of poverty and 
unemployment with increases educational attainment as well as racial diversification 
across the region. Even the independent city of St. Louis and North St. Louis County saw 
improvements in their socioeconomic indices over the 10-year period covered by this 
study. Percentages of non-White persons also remained stable in the city of St. Louis 
while increasing across Jefferson, St. Charles, and St. Louis Counties. Based on the 
analysis conducted for this study, race does not appear to be a factor in crime or policing; 
however, regions with higher percentages of non-Whites do experience higher crime 
levels. While there was evidence linking the socioeconomic index crime, the overall 
improvement in the socioeconomic index reveals that it is weakly associated with crime. 
This was evident when comparing crime between Jefferson County and St. Louis City 
and North St. Louis County, where the socioeconomic indexes (i.e., economic disparity) 
were the highest. 
 Additional research, then, should be conducted to identify the confounding 





rates increased significantly. Because there was a steady decline in measures of policing 
that do not correlate with increases in crime, perhaps there are other measures of policing 
that might produce better insight. This claim is further substantiated by scholars who laud 
policing should be measured by more than just traffic stops and arrest rates (MacDonald, 
2019; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019; Shjarback et al., 2017).  
Aside from the variables studied here, future research should also evaluate 
alterations and calls for service as a function of crime and policing. Moreover, identifying 
additional measures of policing will provide insight into the levels of policing occurring 
across and within the region to determine the continued presence of the Ferguson Effect. 
To further improve understanding of the consequences of the Ferguson Effect, the 
potential factors driving crime rates upward should also be identified to improve policing 
and reduce crime in the future. 
Nonetheless, given the findings from this research study, one may conclude that 
there are both annual and regional differences in crime rates and levels of policing across 
time, thereby disproving the first and second null hypotheses of no difference. Evidence 
also supports the claim that race, the socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs 
affect crime levels, though to varying levels and degrees. There is only weak evidence 
supporting the claim that race, the socioeconomic index, and the number of LEOs affect 
levels of policing across time. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no effect should be 
rejected. However, I believe it would be prudent to re-examine the data and conduct 





even though I formally rejected it as there is a great deal of evidence indicating racial 
disparity in the application of policing practice. 
  The Ferguson Effect has become central to policing since 2014, shaping the way 
law enforcement officers in both the St. Louis, MO metropolitan area and across the 
county perform proactive policing and patrol activities. The events in Ferguson in 2014 
have also led to vast reforms and policy changes that have further altered the course of 
policing as we know it today. Moreover, the recent civil unrest stemming from events in 
Minneapolis, MN; Louisville, KY; and Atlanta, GA, has also likely affected how LEOs 
perform their jobs. The phenomenon, then, may have far-reaching and continued effects 
that will influence the future of law enforcement and policing. 
 Therefore, if crime is to be reduced, it becomes necessary for policymakers, law 
enforcement administrators, and law enforcement officers to understand why violent 
crime and homicide rates are continuing to rise as well as how to improve and repair 
community relationships through proactive policing to reduce the incidence of crime. 
This study's findings shed light on alterations in crime and policing both before and after 
the events in Ferguson, indicating the events in 2014 had a significant impact on the 
region. Spikes in crime rates across the region further indicate that current legislation and 
agency policies and practices are insufficient to quell crime and may be contributing to 
increases in crime and decreases in policing. 
 Moreover, de-policing may stem more from public and media scrutiny, increased 





policy, perceived lack of organizational fairness, leading to increased cynicism, 
decreased morale, questionable self-legitimacy, and mental health issues (e.g., PTSD and 
suicide; Adams, 2019; Alpert et al., 2005; Capellan et al., 2020; Deuchar et al., 2019; 
MacDonald, 2019; Marier & Moule, 2019; Nix et al., 2019; Nix & Pickett, 2017; Nix & 
Wolfe, 2017; Oliver, 2017). While these potential causes may be the result of the events 
in Ferguson in 2014 and the current policing climate, they are beyond the scope of this 
research study and should be investigated as potential sources or confounders associated 
with de-policing and increased crimes rates. Nonetheless, policymakers and 
administrators should identify the potential sources of de-policing to address the issue 
effectively. 
 The increased number of calls for service and crime rates coupled with staffing 
shortfalls is creating a perfect storm that may be breeding higher crime rates. The St. 
Louis, MO metropolitan region and the U.S. have been experiencing similar trends in 
policing since 2014, creating a crisis that has had disastrous effects (Oliver, 2017). Aside 
from staffing shortages, area officers are also dealing with policies that limit their actions 
and a legal system that is prosecuting fewer cases, and it is not likely that these are 
regional issues.  
Policymakers and administrators need to appreciate the effects of staffing 
shortages and restrictive policies and practices on policing and patrol activities and crime. 
A compromise, then, should be reached in developing new policies that align with 





priority. Those developing new policies should focus on improving staffing and 
developing policy that reduces crime to ensure safe communities. Moreover, future 
studies and insight may also effect change beyond what was discovered by this study. 
 As a law enforcement officer and first responder in the St. Louis, MO 
metropolitan region, I have seen the Ferguson Effect evolve as well as the unintended 
consequences law enforcement officers have suffered in the wake of the events in 2014. 
Despite claims to the contrary, both the results of this study and my personal experiences 
as a law enforcement officer support the claim that the Ferguson Effect is real and is still 
affecting the St. Louis, MO metropolitan region. Perhaps, with additional inquiry, 
especially in light of the events and civil unrest in 2020, coupled with positive changes 
supporting law enforcement efforts, officers can begin engaging in more proactive 
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